Final official results of 🇵🇱 elections:

PiS (right): 35.4%
KO (Center): 30.7%
Third Way (centre): 14.4%
Left: 8.6%
Confederation (extreme right): 7.2%

Turnout: 74.4%

A great victory for liberal democracy and for European integration.

A few takeaways🧵/1 —The three main opposition parties (KO, Third Way, Left) are the election victors. Combined they will have 248 seats, and they have committed to staying in coalition. They should form the next government. PiS is the first party but does not have the numbers to form a government/2

Theresa May is often seen as a "reasonable" and "selfless" PM who tried to make the best of a bad situation. This🧵, reacting to her preposterous attempt to disown her signature policy (hostile environment), has some useful reminders. There are others: /1👇

https://twitter.com/TanjaBueltmann/status/1697329053944934675

Threatening to rip up the Human Rights Act /2
theguardian.com/politics/2017/…

Farage complained of an attack on his freedoms after his bank accounts were shut down. This @thetimes article connects this decision to the (unproven) claim that Farage received more than 500K from Russia Today, the 🇷🇺 channel. If true, this would fit a pattern. Short 🧵 /1 Russia has supported the Eurosceptic radical right in several European countries. Connections have of course been secret, but have been documented, among others, in Austria.../2
politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/sourc…

Farage complained of an attack to his freedoms after his bank accounts were shut down. @thetimes reports that the reason was that Farage received more than 500K from Russia. This fits a pattern. Short 🧵/1 Russia has supported the Eurosceptic radical right in several European countries. Connections have of course been secret, but have been documented in Austria.../2
doew.at/neues/studie-z…

Death of Silvio #Berlusconi: expected after the recent hospitalization. Discussions on his role in Italian politics and his legacy will be polarized as those on his politics. But his departure opens up a phase of uncertainty in the 🇮🇹 party system. A🧵/1 Berlusconi was no longer the leader of the center-right, and his party, Forza Italia, has not been the hegemonic force right-of-center in the 🇮🇹 political spectrum for several years now. Still, FI's MPs (44 Chamber, 18 Senate) are decisive for the survival of Meloni's govt./2

A new poll in 🇮🇹 (@Corriere) confirms the trends seen in the elections and since then: in the right-wing coalition, Meloni's FdI continues to grow, Lega goes down; among the oppositions, the Democratic Party continues to slide and the 5-Star Mov. surpasses it.
A short 🧵/1 Meloni continues to cannibalize her allies, Lega in particular. Meloni's party FdI surpasses 30% (31.4% -- it got 26% of the vote last September) and Salvini's Lega continues to slide down (7.3%; -1.5% vis-a-vis the already disappointing electoral result). /2

First exit polls on 🇮🇹 elections:
% votes, +/-2%

RIGHT:
FdI (Meloni): 25% (largest party)
Lega (Salvini): 11.5%
FI (Berlusconi): 7%

LEFT:
PD: 20%
SI/Greens: 3.5%
+Eur: 2.5%

5MS: 15.5%

Azione/Italia Viva (centrists): 7% As expected, FdI top party, and bad results for PD, Lega and FI. 5SM unexpectedly much higher than expected: 15.5%.

Even though the victory of the Meloni-Salvini-Berlusconi coalition in 🇮🇹 elections is highly likely, today's vote will have consequences on both the stability of the right and the future configuration of the left. A🧵/1 On the right, future stability will depend on how large the result of Meloni's FdI will be vis-a-vis Lega and FI, which are both in crisis..
FdI has grown largely to their detriment, in particular Salvini’s Lega. While Meloni grew from 5% to 25% Salvini fell from 34% to 13% /2

No. The rhetoric of the 🇮🇹 center-right, likely winner of the next elections, is in fact aligned with that of other Eurosceptic parties. No nationalist right wing party today advocates exiting the EU/Euro, while still wanting to undermine the EU. 🧵1/12
politico.eu/article/italia… It has become clear to all right-wing eurosceptic parties that advocating exit is a losing strategy (see Marine Le Pen in 2017)—too expensive especially for countries with a high GDP/debt ratio like Italy or France. 2/12

The 🇮🇹 center-right coalition elections has just published its “coalition program”. This includes introducing “presidentialism”What is the reform likely to entail exactly?

TLDR: too extensive presidential powers and a too weak PM may lead to crisis in some circumstances.

A🧵/1 With a couple of exceptions, the CRX’s “A government for Italy” is a list of generalities too vague to be politically meaningful. We’ll have to wait until the component parties present their own programs. One such exception may be presidentialism, given CRX earlier proposals. /2

The alliances for the 🇮🇹 elections of Sep 25 are now shaping up, with Calenda’s Azione and Renzi’s Italia Viva joining forces. Last polls give them at 6%.
Except some small fringe parties, such as Italexit (right) and Unions popolare (left) there will be four main actors. 🧵/1 The center-right, formed by Meloni’s FdI, Salvini’s Lega, Berlusconi’s FI, and a common list of small centrist parties, called “Noi Moderati”. Last polls give the center-right at 48%. /2

An Ist. Cattaneo study on 🇮🇹 elections shows that the center-right might get 61% of seats in the Chamber and 64% in the Senate. Still early days, but this is close to the supermajority sufficient to change the constitution (2/3 in both Chambers). A 🧵/1
cattaneo.org/wp-content/upl… The Italian electoral system is mixed, with 1/3 of the seats elected in single-member districts by plurality voting, and the remaining 2/3 elected in multi-member districts (of various sizes, but overall rather small), with a 3% national threshold (10% for coalitions) /2

At 9 days from the 1st round, the situation in the French Presidential elections is becoming clearer, with Macron and Le Pen most likely to get to the 2nd round.

TLDR: ...but we're NOT back to September's easy prediction of Macron's victory over the "unelectable" Le Pen.🧵/1 Macron leads the pack as he has always done; Le Pen is now over 20%, and Mélenchon polls at a somewhat distant third place. /2

The invasion of Ukraine has not just had the effect to further EU integration.
Yesterday the 🇪🇺 Commission has disbursed the first tranche of the recovery fund to 🇭🇺 and 🇵🇱, despite their challenge to the EU legal system. A short 🧵/1
ec.europa.eu/info/news/comm… The role that 🇵🇱 has played in the war in accepting refugees and being at the frontier with fightings has made the EC shelve its controversy with 🇵🇱 and 🇭🇺. However, their challenge to the #RuleofLaw remains an existential one for the 🇪🇺 itself./2
ft.com/content/8620df…

Signs of democratic backsliding and executive overreach in the UK multiply. /1🧵 After planning to introduce "mechanisms" through which the executive can neutralize court rulings –for the UK Supreme Court /2
gov.uk/government/spe…

The Johnson Govt never meant to respect the NI Protocol, so this is the logical outcome. In the meantime the EU has made important concessions. 🧵/1
UK seeks new legal advice to back possible change to N Ireland protocol ft.com/content/3f6c3f… The UKGovt's goal seems to be that of keeping an open battlefront with the EU for as long as possible, waiting for the international situation to evolve in its favor or against the EU. /2

Like after Brexit in 2016, the battle over the EU's future will be fought in France. /1🧵 Macron won in 2017, after M Le Pen had enthusiastically welcomed Brexit. Today, the extreme right does not advocate "Frexit" or exiting from the Euro, because these are unpopular choices even for its own electorate /2

Again, unsurprising. The UKGovt does not want an agreement, but wants to disrupt the EU for as long as possible. /1🧵

https://twitter.com/SamCoatesSky/status/1453772535238217735

If the UKG triggers art. 16, the EU would only have left the "nuclear" option of suspending the whole TCA. /2

The perspective of "hollowing out" from within, ie seriously undermining the integrity of the legal order supporting the single market, is the biggest threat faced by the EU at the moment. /1🧵 It is at the heart of the position taken by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, and it would be the effect (and is probably one of the purposes) of the attack to the jurisdiction of the ECJ in Northern Ireland by the UKGovt. /2

So, the elimination of the ECJ jurisdiction on how EU rules are interpreted in NI is a “red line” now for UKGovt. Obviously, they are reneging on the solution that they themselves proposed only a few months ago.🧵 /1
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northe… The EU is extremely unlikely to accept this because a different body would likely provide a different interpretation of EU law than the ECJ, thus creating legal uncertainty in the single market. Preventing such uncertainty is exactly what the ECJ is there for. /2