First, the attack was attributed to Ukraine from the start. The first couple of days it was chalked up to heavy artillery, supported by the claim that Ukraine regularly shelled the dam. Reports also suggested that US-supplied HIMARS were used to shell the dam.
2/14
By June 8, Russian TV stopped mentioning artillery and HIMARS and instead referred to the dam as being blown up or destroyed by Ukrainian forces/fighters/nationalists/radicals (used interchangeably). There was no acknowledgement of changing explanations for what happened.
3/14
Characterizing the attack as a terrorist act was important (as with Belgorod) for distinguishing the SMO from a war. But on Day 2, Russia's UN ambassador Nebenzya made the problematic claim that it amounted to a war crime. That's admitting that Russia's at war. Whoops.
4/14
For a while after, it was called a "terrorist act, like a war crime," until Putin chucked the playbook out the window and declared it to be an "act of barbarism." Mentions of the dam attack as a terrorist act plummeted afterwards.
5/14
Atypical for Russian TV, Day 1 framing focused on the enemy's logic! The attack was portrayed as part of Ukraine's c/offensive and a sign of its failure. It also claimed Ukraine planned for months with prior shelling and overloading the reservoir to weaken the structure.
6/14
The claim that Ukraine planned this for months was supported by a cherry-picked quote from a Washington Post article from last December and water levels in the reservoir. This is...remarkably fast research for an event that happened earlier the same day.
7/14
Day 1 also saw a smattering of claims about consequences: it was emphasized that the dam was not destroyed; evacuations weren't needed, then they were; the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and Crimea's water supply were not threatened; and acknowledgement of ecological disaster.
8/14
Again similar to Belgorod: acknowledging that a thing happened, but also downplaying the impact for Russians. On Day 1, the message that everything is under control was dominant, with frequent use of statements by the Mayor of Novaya Kakhovka.
9/14
By Day 2, Shoigu framed the dam attack in relation to Ukraine's counter-offensive, alleging that Ukraine sought to maximize civilian losses for Russia to compensate for its battlefield losses.
So it was planned well in advance, but also a panic move. Got it.
10/14
Also deserving mention: Tucker Carlson presented a gift to Russian propaganda. State TV used his claims as a springboard for decrying Western disinformation, linking the dam attack to Nord Stream and Crimean Bridge bombings, and arguing the West bears responsibility.
11/14
When compared to coverage of Belgorod, the implications are that Russia treats Kherson and other occupied regions as not fully Russian, given that a limited cross-border attack appeared far more sensitive than an unprecedented ecocide.
12/14
The willingness to undersell the scale of destruction perhaps tells us that Russia's commitment to maintaining occupation regimes in Ukraine is not particularly strong, nor does it think the Russian public cares nearly as much about Kherson as about, say, Crimea.
13/14
In sum, Russian TV was better prepared for the attack on the Kakhovka Dam than it was for Belgorod. There wasn't much narrative drift. Aside from Nebenzya's slip of the tongue, it was well a coordinated campaign.
In other words, all the makings of an inside job.
14/14
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The attack on Belgorod and Shebekino was an interesting moment for Russian propaganda as the media grappled with how to report an attack on Russian soil by Russian forces collaborating with the enemy in a war that can't be called a war on TV. How did it manage it? 1/9
The first and most obvious thing is that Russian TV didn't ignore it. Mentions of Belgorod skyrocketed last week, and most of the mentions concerned fighting in/around Shebekino. But predictably, what happened vs what was reported are different stories. 2/9
Belgorod/Shebekino provides insight into Russia's domestic war reporting:
First, attribution to Ukrainian forces/nationalists/terrorists/regime (used interchangeably). This is in line with our previous observation that mentions of enemies dominate Russia's war narratives. 3/9
Approaching the first anniversary of Russia's invasion, it's a good time to take stock of the war narratives in circulation on Russian TV.
But first, back by popular demand, the spaghetti chart: 1/8
To make things a little less chaotic, we re-calculate mentions on TV relative to mentions of the weather. This provides an intuitive measure of a topic's salience: if something is mentioned more often than the weather, it's more likely to be noticed (and vice versa). 2/8
Over the last year, we see a steady decline in the salience of war narratives on Russian TV.
Topics that remained consistent staples of coverage throughout the year: the US, Ukrainian nationalists, and DNR/LNR. 3/8
Was the Russian public primed for war by television?
Everyone accepts that TV is a cornerstone of the Kremlin's power, but usually in the sense that it tells Russians what to think about Putin and the war.
But what if it uses TV to shape *how* people think about war?
1/16
There is an indirect media effect known as priming, and it refers to the ways that ideas broadcast in the media are made more accessible. When people think about other things, they over-sample the things that were primed because they are already "there."
2/16
For ex., Gary Shteyngart locked himself in a hotel room and watched Russian TV for a week. He wanted to see if it would change the way he thought & felt about Putin, Crimea, Russia. It was a stunt, but it was a theory about indirect media effects.
3/16 nytimes.com/2015/02/22/mag…
There are distinct phases, marked by different combinations of narrative elements (enemies, plots, justifications).
Notable in the last few weeks: rising mentions of US & NATO, while sanctions and nationalists are dropping. 1/5
Here we can see more clearly that only the US, NATO, nationalists, and sanctions are mentioned more often than the weather, meaning Russians are more likely to notice in daily life.
Liberation used to be a prominent justification for war, but it recently faded from view. 2/5
One recycled narrative to watch concerns Russia's allegations that Ukraine will use "dirty bombs." This narrative was briefly in circulation during the war's first couple of weeks then disappeared.
That is, until now:
Oct 17-23: 11 mentions
Oct 24-26: 102 mentions
3/5
The RuMOR project tracks Russia's war narratives in Russian domestic broadcast and online media. War narratives tell us a lot about the ways the war impacts Russian domestic politics and society, especially as they change over time along with Russian advances and losses. 1/4
The project uses broadcast transcripts from the Integrum Profi service (integrum.ru). Topics are measured by the number of mentions on a weekly basis. To estimate their salience in everyday life, they are additionally measured relative to mentions of the weather. 2/4
In addition to the rise & fall of Russia's war narratives, the project will make an occasional deep dive into important themes like sanctions or liberation to qualitatively examine how they are presented for Russian audiences. 3/4