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Great new @HamdiAMalik piece here in @WashInstitute #MilitiaSpotlight on 3 new facade brands being readied for use by militias in Iraq. What does this herald? A real escalation of security threat or fake resistance & whitewashing of other militia leaders? washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
None of the three new facades - Kataib al-Sabereen, Kataib Karbala and Kataib Saifollah - has yet claimed an attack, nor do they have any obvious specialization (such as a geographic focus or method of attack, such as anti-air operations) washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
All three new facades critique Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's failure to secure a timeline for U.S. military withdrawal. The main Coordination Framework groups - Badr, AAH, KH - have refrained from bashing the US presence, even on Quds Day. What gives? washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
The answer is probably what @HamdiAMalik describes as a purported division of labor: the Coordination Framework appears to stick to politics, while Akram Kaabi appears to lead the "resistance". Both the CF leaders & Sudani have a strong interest in distancing from violent acts.
I've also noted the task-segmentation of militia leaders since Soleimani/Muhandis were blown into little pieces in Jan 2020. If Abu Fadak took the PMF role and Kaabi took the resistance, I'd now add Qais Khazali as taking Muhandis' political role.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
So, are these new facades - and an enigmatic fourth that Ashab al-Kahf is teasing - represent a real physical security threat inside Iraq. AK is promising a lot: how soon before this constant crying wolf is exposed? Or is the threat being polished to increase its trade-in value?
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