As our troops advance towards the primary line of defense south of Staromlynivka, whether they proceed directly or choose to breach the line elsewhere, I'd like to share some information about the defenses and other hidden challenges of the current situation.
🧵Thread:
2/ While obstacles can be effectively bypassed using mine-clearing vehicles, bulldozers, mine plows, and other engineering equipment, it becomes challenging to do so with the presence of drones that provide real-time corrections to artillery fire and alert ATGM/helicopter teams.
3/ In anticipation of the AFU potentially capturing settlements on the flank, the enemy has deployed additional defensive systems, including anti-tank ditches, mines, and infamous dragon's teeth. These measures are implemented to hinder flanking maneuvers by the AFU.
4/ While trenches and obstacles play role, the key consideration lies in the enemy's available manpower and resources deployed in the area. Observers often overlook details such as the vulnerability of the area of responsibility between two units or unit's combat readiness
5/ It may seem counter-intuitive, but we are unlikely to witness adequately equipped or manned vehicle revetments and trenches here. Despite the russians following textbook requirements for defenses, in practical terms, I have not observed orthodox troop deployment
6/ Instead of deploying conventional linear defenses as outlined in textbooks, the enemy opts for smaller units such as squads positioned in tree lines, buildings, or other locations that provide concealment from satellites and drones, while also offering basic protection.
7/ An often overlooked aspect of the offensive is the success ratio of Ukrainian ranged targeting of russian troops, command centers, and logistics. This factor plays a key role in determining the outcome of the offensive, even though it may not be immediately observable
8/ Independent observers can't track progress solely by looking at maps. As a result, a "breakthrough" or its absence can seem random. Operational success isn't just capturing positions, but also maintaining momentum and advancing after breaching enemy defenses.
9/ It's essential to recognize that if Ukraine successfully breaches enemy defenses and gains momentum in its advance, it will be a remarkable achievement in modern military history. This feat would entail overcoming a major military power, even in the absence of air superiority
10/ Despite internal conflicts and limitations in strategic assault capabilities, the Russian army remains a formidable adversary. To ensure victory in any upcoming battle next year, preparations need to start tomorrow, if not today
11/ @RALee85 and @KofmanMichael in their article for FP, emphasize the need for the West to focus on a long-term strategy rather than solely on counter-offensive: “history shows that wars are difficult to end and often go on well beyond the decisive phases of fighting"
12/ Considering recent news of russia bypassing sanctions and successfully restoring its pre-war import levels of microchips and electronics, I think that we cannot build a strategy that relies on a black-swan event that would abruptly defeat Russia and bring an end to the war.
13/ To prevent prolonged war, Ukraine must address negative Soviet legacy issues. Simultaneously, the West should bolster military aid and production. Western equipment has been proven to save lives of our soldiers, a major element for achieving victory.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation
With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
Thread 🧵:
2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”