As our troops advance towards the primary line of defense south of Staromlynivka, whether they proceed directly or choose to breach the line elsewhere, I'd like to share some information about the defenses and other hidden challenges of the current situation.
🧵Thread:
2/ While obstacles can be effectively bypassed using mine-clearing vehicles, bulldozers, mine plows, and other engineering equipment, it becomes challenging to do so with the presence of drones that provide real-time corrections to artillery fire and alert ATGM/helicopter teams.
3/ In anticipation of the AFU potentially capturing settlements on the flank, the enemy has deployed additional defensive systems, including anti-tank ditches, mines, and infamous dragon's teeth. These measures are implemented to hinder flanking maneuvers by the AFU.
4/ While trenches and obstacles play role, the key consideration lies in the enemy's available manpower and resources deployed in the area. Observers often overlook details such as the vulnerability of the area of responsibility between two units or unit's combat readiness
5/ It may seem counter-intuitive, but we are unlikely to witness adequately equipped or manned vehicle revetments and trenches here. Despite the russians following textbook requirements for defenses, in practical terms, I have not observed orthodox troop deployment
6/ Instead of deploying conventional linear defenses as outlined in textbooks, the enemy opts for smaller units such as squads positioned in tree lines, buildings, or other locations that provide concealment from satellites and drones, while also offering basic protection.
7/ An often overlooked aspect of the offensive is the success ratio of Ukrainian ranged targeting of russian troops, command centers, and logistics. This factor plays a key role in determining the outcome of the offensive, even though it may not be immediately observable
8/ Independent observers can't track progress solely by looking at maps. As a result, a "breakthrough" or its absence can seem random. Operational success isn't just capturing positions, but also maintaining momentum and advancing after breaching enemy defenses.
9/ It's essential to recognize that if Ukraine successfully breaches enemy defenses and gains momentum in its advance, it will be a remarkable achievement in modern military history. This feat would entail overcoming a major military power, even in the absence of air superiority
10/ Despite internal conflicts and limitations in strategic assault capabilities, the Russian army remains a formidable adversary. To ensure victory in any upcoming battle next year, preparations need to start tomorrow, if not today
11/ @RALee85 and @KofmanMichael in their article for FP, emphasize the need for the West to focus on a long-term strategy rather than solely on counter-offensive: “history shows that wars are difficult to end and often go on well beyond the decisive phases of fighting"
12/ Considering recent news of russia bypassing sanctions and successfully restoring its pre-war import levels of microchips and electronics, I think that we cannot build a strategy that relies on a black-swan event that would abruptly defeat Russia and bring an end to the war.
13/ To prevent prolonged war, Ukraine must address negative Soviet legacy issues. Simultaneously, the West should bolster military aid and production. Western equipment has been proven to save lives of our soldiers, a major element for achieving victory.
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SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread:
2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework
Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”
The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.
🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.