As our troops advance towards the primary line of defense south of Staromlynivka, whether they proceed directly or choose to breach the line elsewhere, I'd like to share some information about the defenses and other hidden challenges of the current situation.
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2/ While obstacles can be effectively bypassed using mine-clearing vehicles, bulldozers, mine plows, and other engineering equipment, it becomes challenging to do so with the presence of drones that provide real-time corrections to artillery fire and alert ATGM/helicopter teams.
3/ In anticipation of the AFU potentially capturing settlements on the flank, the enemy has deployed additional defensive systems, including anti-tank ditches, mines, and infamous dragon's teeth. These measures are implemented to hinder flanking maneuvers by the AFU.
4/ While trenches and obstacles play role, the key consideration lies in the enemy's available manpower and resources deployed in the area. Observers often overlook details such as the vulnerability of the area of responsibility between two units or unit's combat readiness
5/ It may seem counter-intuitive, but we are unlikely to witness adequately equipped or manned vehicle revetments and trenches here. Despite the russians following textbook requirements for defenses, in practical terms, I have not observed orthodox troop deployment
6/ Instead of deploying conventional linear defenses as outlined in textbooks, the enemy opts for smaller units such as squads positioned in tree lines, buildings, or other locations that provide concealment from satellites and drones, while also offering basic protection.
7/ An often overlooked aspect of the offensive is the success ratio of Ukrainian ranged targeting of russian troops, command centers, and logistics. This factor plays a key role in determining the outcome of the offensive, even though it may not be immediately observable
8/ Independent observers can't track progress solely by looking at maps. As a result, a "breakthrough" or its absence can seem random. Operational success isn't just capturing positions, but also maintaining momentum and advancing after breaching enemy defenses.
9/ It's essential to recognize that if Ukraine successfully breaches enemy defenses and gains momentum in its advance, it will be a remarkable achievement in modern military history. This feat would entail overcoming a major military power, even in the absence of air superiority
10/ Despite internal conflicts and limitations in strategic assault capabilities, the Russian army remains a formidable adversary. To ensure victory in any upcoming battle next year, preparations need to start tomorrow, if not today
11/ @RALee85 and @KofmanMichael in their article for FP, emphasize the need for the West to focus on a long-term strategy rather than solely on counter-offensive: “history shows that wars are difficult to end and often go on well beyond the decisive phases of fighting"
12/ Considering recent news of russia bypassing sanctions and successfully restoring its pre-war import levels of microchips and electronics, I think that we cannot build a strategy that relies on a black-swan event that would abruptly defeat Russia and bring an end to the war.
13/ To prevent prolonged war, Ukraine must address negative Soviet legacy issues. Simultaneously, the West should bolster military aid and production. Western equipment has been proven to save lives of our soldiers, a major element for achieving victory.
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1/ Why is Ukraine losing ground? There are many explanations, ranging from a lack of aid to a lack of political will to win. The reality, however, is far more complex. This thread offers a brief excerpt from my recent analysis, with the full link provided at the end.
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2/ Many struggles that the Ukrainian military faces stem from before 2022 and have scaled significantly by 2025. A mobilized force, where teachers, farmers, and IT workers replaced the professional core, turned what began as 'growing pains' into systemic flaws
3/ A damning report on Ukraine’s 155th Anne of Kyiv Brigade grotesquely exposed systematic issues. Despite training in France and sufficient funding and equipment, the unit faced high AWOL rates and fragmentation across frontline units. The issues that lead to it are systematic
When Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, a critical geopolitical question emerged: can Russia maintain its foothold in the MENA region, and if so, how? What does this mean for Ukraine? Below are the key points from the latest Frontelligence Insight report:
2/ Maxar satellite images, dated December 17, show an unusual buildup of vehicles at the Tartus Naval Base. Video from site show that most of these vehicles are logistical, with only a few appearing to be combat vehicles. We identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 containers
3/ It is assessed that the vehicles are likely being prepared for evacuation from the Tartus by naval vessels. Indications suggest that two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Ursa Major, could be involved in the operation. It could take over a week for them to reach the port
The Pokrovsk direction, once known as the Avdiivka direction, remains one of the most active and difficult areas. After failing to seize the town directly, as in Novohrodivka, Russian forces pushed towards south of the town, creating an increasingly dangerous situation.🧵Thread
2/ The fall of Selydove has allowed Russian forces to advance south of Pokrovsk, opening a path to Shevchenko, a key settlement before the town itself. With this vital position now almost lost, Russian forces can now expand to the south of Pokrovsk.
3/ A particularly bad development reported to our team is the growing Russian effort to target supply routes leading to Pokrovsk with FPV drones. Ground reports to our team confirm that russians have successfully deployed FPV drones with fiber-optic cables along the E-50 highway
Famous YouTuber @johnnywharris, with 6 million followers, released a video titled "Why People Blame America for the War in Ukraine." He presented his argument in it, essentially blaming the West for causing Russia's imperialistic rise. I find it necessary to respond🧵:
2/ In essence, Johnny claims that after the USSR collapse, Russia was excluded from Western society and draws parallels to the treatment of Weimar Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, suggesting that an unjust settlement fueled militarization in both cases
3/ So, what's wrong with that vision? First, shortly after the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia engaged in conflicts and created pro-Russian pseudo-states, a scenario it later replicated in Ukraine in 2014. Specific examples include Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1992–1993.
With Russia's budget deficit at 3.3 trillion rubles, 21% key interest rate and 2-3 million job vacancies, Russia has to choose between hyperinflation or an economic freeze, says Vladimir Milov, former Deputy Minister of Energy in an interview with Frontelligence Insight
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2/ Vladimir Milov (@v_milov), an economist and longtime ally of Alexei Navalny, explains that Russian markets are gloomy ahead of the Central Bank’s board meeting on Dec 20. The Bank is expected to raise interest rates once again, from the current 21%, possibly to 23% or even 25%
3/ For Central Bank to continue interest rate hikes means to kill the real sector of the economy, where most companies simply don't have sufficient profitability to borrow at current interest rates (Central Bank's 21% rate translates into 25-30% commercial loan rates)
Overnight, Ukraine carried out a series of missile strikes on Khalino Airbase in Kursk Oblast, reportedly using ATACMS missiles. Here’s what we can anticipate based on previous data gathered by Frontelligence Insight:
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2/ In recent months, the airfield had been spotted to home SU-25 close air support jets, helicopters, and UAVs.
3/ For some time, the airfield hasn’t been heavily utilized by Russia in the same way as other air bases. Instead, it has primarily hosted helicopters and Su-25 for close-air support, rather than for KAB deployments like those conducted from bases in Voronezh or Lipetsk.