As our troops advance towards the primary line of defense south of Staromlynivka, whether they proceed directly or choose to breach the line elsewhere, I'd like to share some information about the defenses and other hidden challenges of the current situation.
🧵Thread:
2/ While obstacles can be effectively bypassed using mine-clearing vehicles, bulldozers, mine plows, and other engineering equipment, it becomes challenging to do so with the presence of drones that provide real-time corrections to artillery fire and alert ATGM/helicopter teams.
3/ In anticipation of the AFU potentially capturing settlements on the flank, the enemy has deployed additional defensive systems, including anti-tank ditches, mines, and infamous dragon's teeth. These measures are implemented to hinder flanking maneuvers by the AFU.
4/ While trenches and obstacles play role, the key consideration lies in the enemy's available manpower and resources deployed in the area. Observers often overlook details such as the vulnerability of the area of responsibility between two units or unit's combat readiness
5/ It may seem counter-intuitive, but we are unlikely to witness adequately equipped or manned vehicle revetments and trenches here. Despite the russians following textbook requirements for defenses, in practical terms, I have not observed orthodox troop deployment
6/ Instead of deploying conventional linear defenses as outlined in textbooks, the enemy opts for smaller units such as squads positioned in tree lines, buildings, or other locations that provide concealment from satellites and drones, while also offering basic protection.
7/ An often overlooked aspect of the offensive is the success ratio of Ukrainian ranged targeting of russian troops, command centers, and logistics. This factor plays a key role in determining the outcome of the offensive, even though it may not be immediately observable
8/ Independent observers can't track progress solely by looking at maps. As a result, a "breakthrough" or its absence can seem random. Operational success isn't just capturing positions, but also maintaining momentum and advancing after breaching enemy defenses.
9/ It's essential to recognize that if Ukraine successfully breaches enemy defenses and gains momentum in its advance, it will be a remarkable achievement in modern military history. This feat would entail overcoming a major military power, even in the absence of air superiority
10/ Despite internal conflicts and limitations in strategic assault capabilities, the Russian army remains a formidable adversary. To ensure victory in any upcoming battle next year, preparations need to start tomorrow, if not today
11/ @RALee85 and @KofmanMichael in their article for FP, emphasize the need for the West to focus on a long-term strategy rather than solely on counter-offensive: “history shows that wars are difficult to end and often go on well beyond the decisive phases of fighting"
12/ Considering recent news of russia bypassing sanctions and successfully restoring its pre-war import levels of microchips and electronics, I think that we cannot build a strategy that relies on a black-swan event that would abruptly defeat Russia and bring an end to the war.
13/ To prevent prolonged war, Ukraine must address negative Soviet legacy issues. Simultaneously, the West should bolster military aid and production. Western equipment has been proven to save lives of our soldiers, a major element for achieving victory.
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Russia aim to manufacture up to 120,000 glide bombs this year, including 500 of a new, longer-range version capable of flying up to 200 km from the point of release, according to a representative of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence. 🧵Thread with data mentioned in the interview:
2/ Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence, disclosed that Russian forces are firing between 200 and 250 glide bombs every day. Last month, the daily average was about 170, according to data from the defence ministry quoted by Reuters.
3/ He added that Russia is working on modifications that would allow glide bombs to fly up to 400 km, enabling Russia to strike deep without using missiles. Skibitskyi provided estimates for Russian drone production: Russia is expected to produce around 70,000 long-range drones
У США спалахнув гучний скандал після того, як Конгресовий комітет опублікував переписку Джеффрі Епштейна, відомого організатора зустрічей із неповнолітніми та впливовими людьми. Серед тих, хто згадується у листах - Дональд Трамп. Крім того, у документах не обійшлось без росіян:
2/ Зокрема, у листі Джеффрі Епштейна до Торб’єрна Ягланда від 24.06.2018 р. він зазначав: «Чуркін був чудовим. Після наших розмов він зрозумів Трампа. Це не складно - йому потрібно лише побачити щось, щоб зрозуміти, усе дуже просто». (Чуркін на той час був постпердом РФ при ООН)
3/ Його наступна відповідь звучала так: "Я думаю, ви могли б запропонувати Путіну, щоб Лавров поспілкувався зі мною і отримав необхідне розуміння. Віталій Чуркін раніше це робив, але він помер. ? !"
На той час, Торб'єрн був Генеральним секретарем Ради Європи
A few broad observations on the course of war, based on observations, discussions with officers, soldiers, and analysts, data, and other relevant sources. I will begin with a high-level sociopolitical overview before gradually moving toward operational-tactical level. 🧵Thread:
2/ Overall, the situation for Ukraine has not improved since last year. Ukraine has markedly increased its long-range strike capabilities, which have very tangible effects across Russian society. However, the battlefield initiative remains with Russia, much as it did most of 2024
3/ A plausible Ukrainian "victory" approach can be summarized as: disrupt logistics, degrade the Russian economy, and avoid catastrophic operational collapses. Russia’s apparent approach is simpler: keep pressing until Ukraine exhausts its will or physical capacity to resist.
According to Russian milblogger Fighterbomber, who has a wide network within the Russian Air Force, an Il-76 was shot down in Sudan on November 4 by the Rapid Support Forces. According to him, the aircraft had been purchased in Kyrgyzstan a month and a half ago for $12 million
2/ A video showing a burning object falling from the sky, likely the claimed Il-76, has also been recorded and published
3/ While I do not have solid sources in Sudan, one of my contacts located there has confirmed that reports about a downed Il-76 have been circulating within the RSF since yesterday. Government forces are actively using the Air Force to supply besieged cities
Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding for another year, would have required diverting significant resources from other sectors of the front, a tradeoff that would result in disastrous situation elsewhere.
North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread:
2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.
3/ In the summer of 2024, Russia confirmed plans to build a road bridge over the Tumen River, with construction led by Russia’s TunnelYuzhStroy. The project is budgeted at ~9 billion rubles (~$110M), spanning 4.7 km in total, with the bridge itself about 1 km long