As our troops advance towards the primary line of defense south of Staromlynivka, whether they proceed directly or choose to breach the line elsewhere, I'd like to share some information about the defenses and other hidden challenges of the current situation.
🧵Thread:
2/ While obstacles can be effectively bypassed using mine-clearing vehicles, bulldozers, mine plows, and other engineering equipment, it becomes challenging to do so with the presence of drones that provide real-time corrections to artillery fire and alert ATGM/helicopter teams.
3/ In anticipation of the AFU potentially capturing settlements on the flank, the enemy has deployed additional defensive systems, including anti-tank ditches, mines, and infamous dragon's teeth. These measures are implemented to hinder flanking maneuvers by the AFU.
4/ While trenches and obstacles play role, the key consideration lies in the enemy's available manpower and resources deployed in the area. Observers often overlook details such as the vulnerability of the area of responsibility between two units or unit's combat readiness
5/ It may seem counter-intuitive, but we are unlikely to witness adequately equipped or manned vehicle revetments and trenches here. Despite the russians following textbook requirements for defenses, in practical terms, I have not observed orthodox troop deployment
6/ Instead of deploying conventional linear defenses as outlined in textbooks, the enemy opts for smaller units such as squads positioned in tree lines, buildings, or other locations that provide concealment from satellites and drones, while also offering basic protection.
7/ An often overlooked aspect of the offensive is the success ratio of Ukrainian ranged targeting of russian troops, command centers, and logistics. This factor plays a key role in determining the outcome of the offensive, even though it may not be immediately observable
8/ Independent observers can't track progress solely by looking at maps. As a result, a "breakthrough" or its absence can seem random. Operational success isn't just capturing positions, but also maintaining momentum and advancing after breaching enemy defenses.
9/ It's essential to recognize that if Ukraine successfully breaches enemy defenses and gains momentum in its advance, it will be a remarkable achievement in modern military history. This feat would entail overcoming a major military power, even in the absence of air superiority
10/ Despite internal conflicts and limitations in strategic assault capabilities, the Russian army remains a formidable adversary. To ensure victory in any upcoming battle next year, preparations need to start tomorrow, if not today
11/ @RALee85 and @KofmanMichael in their article for FP, emphasize the need for the West to focus on a long-term strategy rather than solely on counter-offensive: “history shows that wars are difficult to end and often go on well beyond the decisive phases of fighting"
12/ Considering recent news of russia bypassing sanctions and successfully restoring its pre-war import levels of microchips and electronics, I think that we cannot build a strategy that relies on a black-swan event that would abruptly defeat Russia and bring an end to the war.
13/ To prevent prolonged war, Ukraine must address negative Soviet legacy issues. Simultaneously, the West should bolster military aid and production. Western equipment has been proven to save lives of our soldiers, a major element for achieving victory.
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So far, Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated strategic goals in this war:
Demilitarization – failed.
Regime change in Kyiv – failed.
Full control over Donbas – failed.
Preventing NATO enlargement – failed.
🧵Short thread:
2/ Demilitarization of Ukraine. The Ukrainian military is now larger, better armed, and far more experienced than before the war. It is more technologically advanced and capable than ever before.
3/ Russia failed to remove Zelenskyy or his government. Kyiv remains fully under Ukrainian control. The chances of a pro-Russian party winning the next election are slim to none
1/ As I noted from the outset, based on the limited information then available, there was no “operational breakthrough”. The penetration was tactical, involving roughly a battalion-sized force. Still, it is too soon for celebration
2/ Initially, the situation was especially risky, as Russian units managed to break east of Dobropillia. I would not describe this as a DRG (sabotage group) operation or a simple raid, since neither term accurately reflects the size of the force or its mission in the context
3/ It is positive that Ukrainian forces contained the threat and prevented it from developing into an operational breakthrough. However, the scale of reinforcements required was significant. According to Deep State, the following units were involved in the reinforcement effort:
Missing Targeting Pods, Inflated Bills: An Exclusive Investigation into the Su-57 Procurement Problems by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵Thread:
1/ Newly obtained classified documents, show that Russia purchased its 5-generation Su-57 fighters for more than 3 billion rubles each;
2/ Data provided by Analytical Company "Dallas" (@dallasparkua) shows that in 2021 & 2022, Su-57 fighter jets were delivered without targeting pods, leaving them short of their advertised capabilities. At the time, the cost of a single Su-57 was roughly $42.1 million in USD terms
3/ The documents show that in 2021, a year before the war, the Russian Defense Ministry formally accepted Su-57 aircraft without the 101KS-N, an electro-optical targeting subsystem. This was allowed under Additional Agreement No. 8.
Debates over losses are always heated, but hard data cuts through the noise. Frontelligence Insight analyzed Russian documents released by the I Want to Live project, giving insight on soldiers of the 8th Army who went missing in action. 🧵Thread:
2/ From January 2024 to June 2025, 6,921 soldiers and officers of the 8th Army were reported missing in action. Part of the Southern Military District, the 8th Army has primarily operated in Donetsk Oblast, with elements recently deployed at Pokrovsk to reinforce the 58th Army.
3/ Looking at the timeline, losses in 2025 have significantly peaked compared with 2024. The number of monthly MIA cases more than doubled and remained consistent throughout 2025, reflecting the period of active offensive operations, particularly in Donetsk.
Commented to the FT on pressure to cede territories:
“The constitution limits his power: he has no legal right to alter Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Even more constraining is pressure from society and, crucially, the military, which opposes giving up unoccupied territory"
“President Zelenskyy is caught between a rock and a hard place,” the article concludes with my comment.
Given the opportunity, I also want to add that if peace is to be negotiated, we cannot start with non-starter demands, which our President won't be able to accept
Diplomacy is the art of compromise and seeking constructive solutions. Ukraine has been constructive, avoiding maximalist demands, but if Moscow imposes such demands, the Trump administration should recognize that Ukraine is not the party which obstructs his vision and peace
Russians plan to produce 79,000 Shahed-type drones in 2025, including 40,000 Geran-2; 5,700 Garpiya-1; and ~ 34,000 “Gerbera” and other decoys, according to Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Chief of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine. More key data in the thread🧵:
2/ Around 11,000 North Koreans remain in the Kursk region and, more broadly, across the European part of Russia. They are stationed at the training grounds where four brigades were initially formed. An additional 1,200 North Koreans are expected to arrive in the Kursk region.
3/ Russia and North Korea have reached a preliminary agreement to deploy 6,000 personnel for demining, engineering, infrastructure projects, and medical services, with 1,200 forming the first batch.