1. 'Failure to prepare adequately for a range of pandemic threats'
'One consequence of the predominant focus on an influenza-style pandemic was that the UK's response to Covid-19 failed to properly consider the potential for aerosol transmission of the virus'
'Shockingly, this is the case even now. The current
IPC guidance continues to put staff & patients at risk
by erroneously stating that fluid-resistant surgical
masks are adequate protection for healthcare workers
carrying out routine care for Covid positive patients...
...rather than specifying respirators such as filtering
facepiece respirators, often referred to as FFP2 & FFP3 masks, which are recommended by international
guidance & by the BMA...'
'The limitations of surgical masks were well known
prior to the pandemic, highlighted, for example, in
a research report by the Health and Safety Executive in
2008'
JVT, Horby, Whitty, Vallance, Powis, Harries, Curran: they all knew
& they all just washed their hands of us
Countless doctors are concerned about the failure to provide adequate protection: GP in NI complained that there was:
"... no attempt by the health & social care board to follow the science on airborne transmission & the need for staff to have FFP3 masks & HEPA air filters."
Govs could & should have been better prepared for the foreseeable risks to Drs & HCWs
This would have reduced the serious harm that affected so many of the BMA's members & the wider healthcare workforce, many of whom are today still suffering with LC acquired in their workplace
2. 'failures to implement the recommendations from pandemic planning exercises
Insufficient consideration of wider pandemic threats
Inadequate learning
Failure to act on PPE lessons learned
🚨This @TheBMA evidence is stunning, because it's the truth - THANK YOU
'The fact that in Mar 2020 @NHSEngland assured the Health & Social Care Committee that there was sufficient supply of PPE nationally, despite stocks containing less than two weeks' worth of most equipment, suggests serious failures of planning & preparation'
'Frontline staff often had to go without PPE, buy their own, use home-made, donated or expired items, & re-use single use items. Staff also had to use items that were out of date, with multiple expiry stickers visibly layered on top of each other'
Continues...
'Many felt pressured to work without adequate protection, with consequences for their mental & physical health'
'In a BMA survey as part of its Covid-19 review, 81% of respondents reported not feeling fully protected during the first wave of the pandemic, & feeling worried or being fearful to speak out about the lack of PPE'
Afraid, & afraid to speak up: sound familiar @helenh49?
Cont'd:
'That was more commonly reported by doctors from an ethnic minority background and those with a disability or long-term health condition.'
Cont'd:
Commenting on the wholly inadequate supply of PPE, a GP in Northern Ireland said:
"We were sent six pairs of gloves and six aprons in an envelope approximately three weeks after the start of lockdown."
'These failures of planning and preparation also led to PPE being procured from organisations with no experience of manufacturing PPE, resulting in PPE being produced and delivered that was unsuitable for use at huge public expense.'
'Little consideration was given within pandemic planning policies & strategies to detect & contain the spread of the disease, but rather the emphasis was on how to respond in a situation where there was already significant mortality & morbidity'
=>Fatal bias from UK 'scientists'
'The failure to adequately prepare for the testing capacity that was needed left healthcare workers and their patients at increased risk of exposure to Covid-19, particularly at the beginning of the pandemic'
As one junior doctor in England told the BMA:
...cont'd...
'"There was a delay in allowing testing of all patients with possible Covid symptoms. I was seeing patients in A&E and being told I could not test them because they had not travelled to relevant countries...
...When testing was later allowed some of these patients, unsurprisingly, ended up testing positive. I saw these patients with no PPE due to hospital rules around when PPE was allowed to be worn."'
=> 'Rules' based on toxic culture, bad science & PPE availability
3. 'Public health system was not in a position to scale up its activity to respond to the pandemic due to a decade or more of reduced funding, resource cuts & reorganisations that caused fragmentation in the system.'
4. 'The fourth & final key area to highlight is that the UK entered the pandemic with poor population health, widening health inequalities, & health services that had been consistently underfunded & understaffed'
The NHS was NOT 'well prepared' at all, Mr Hancock
'These failures to ensure a resilient, well-resourced health & care system were brutally exposed by the pandemic, & the systems are now in an even worse state, with more people waiting for care than ever...
...a staggering 7.4 million patients in England alone, unsafe bed occupancy levels, acute staffing shortages, neglected infrastructure, & deteriorating equipment'
'This, in the BMA's view, is the elephant in the room when considering issues of planning, preparation & resilience, & unless it is acknowledged and addressed, the same mistakes are destined to be repeated'
Prof Jimmy Whitworth & Dr Charlotte Hammer [p36] make an 'interesting' (i.e., exposing their bias &/or COI) statement concerning future recommendations covid19.public-inquiry.uk/wp-content/upl…
/1
'Engagement...with academic research groups is needed so that key unanswered Qs arising during the early stages of an epidemic can be rapidly addressed. An example from the COVID-19 epidemic would have been to determine the role of airborne and droplet spread of infection'
/2
This, as we know, is a 'controversy' manufactured by WHO et al
van Doremalen (you know, whose research group's experimental aerosol viability work affirmed the airborne nature of MERS in 2013) proved beyond doubt that SARS2 was airborne in their 17 Mar 2020 @NEJM paper
/3
The fact that key opinion leaders at WHO, CDC etc energetically devoted themselves to advertising a never proven & obviously flawed hypothesis of predominant large droplet & fomite transmission, yet as early as Apr 2020 my then 9yo kids knew SARS2 was airborne, is mind boggling
The fact that many scientists far greater than me have, since Apr 2020, energetically devoted themselves - free of charge - to trying to counter this false narrative AND YET WERE PERSISTENTLY IGNORED &/OR SHOUTED DOWN, is mind boggling
Aerosol transmission - fine droplets of liquid containing virus are breathed out, form an aerosol & are carried through the air. You may become infected if you breathe these in'
/1
Anyone interested in accountability for countless harms following still ongoing anti-reality IPC measures?
This June 2020 document has a nice authorship evidence trail of who in 🇬🇧 leadership could & should have done better at communicating the risks of airborne SARS2
/2
From an expert on wordplay, Tom Jefferson, this is good
Use of the word ‘exactly’ allows the suggestion that our knowledge of respiratory viral biology is so lacking in detail that we can’t define & deliver transmission preventative measures
No cardiac electrophysiologist knows *exactly* why any individual patient gets AF (a rhythm disturbance typically causing lifestyle limiting symptoms & conferring a >> risk of stroke - risk varies)
Therefore, I should get another job, where there are no such unknowns
But if I do take the bold step to recommend & perform AF ablation (a fabulous Rx when it works, which is most of the time, but never subject to placebo-controlled RCT), I don’t know *exactly* what each radiofrequency energy delivery is doing…
In the face of negligent leadership leading to hundreds of preventable deaths EVERY WEEK, I would like to share a story of how, against the odds, a dedicated team of NHS professionals once tried to save a single life 🧵
It was ~15y ago & I was a registrar on call for cardiology
A consultant at a neighbouring hospital called me to explain that he had a lady whose heart was being compressed by a blood clot in the pericardial space (the sac around the heart)
Her BP was very low, & dropping
He said he couldn’t drain the clot & had put her in an ambulance for emergency transfer, with an anaesthetist: he thought she needed urgent surgery
(When the heart is compressed like this it doesn’t properly fill with blood; it’s incompatible with life)
🚨Two new FOIA rejections: public interest disclosure
@beisgovuk 'Working safely during COVID19' guidance
10 Jul 2020
Increased risk of AEROSOL TRANSMISSION likely from 'people needing to unduly raise their voices to each other'
Q: Source data please?
A: 'No'
@beisgovuk 'Working safely during COVID19' guidance
22 Jun 2021
'Section 6.1 PPE
COVID-19 is a different type of risk to the risks you normally face in a workplace. You do not need to manage this risk by using PPE.’
Is the juxtaposition of these requests (#31966 & 31967) - one seeking data underlying @beisgovuk affirmation of aerosol transmission risk & the other requesting the data which 12 months later effectively (& erroneously) refuted this workplace risk - the reason for rejection?