So the German security strategy is out - what does it say on Germany's place in Europe, European security, and EU/Germany-China? A thread: 🇩🇪🧵 #Sicherheitsstrategie
Let's start with some counting:
- France: 5
- USA: 4
- Poland: 0
- UK: 0
- China: 6
- European Union/ EU: 74
On world order and China: not many new elements.
According to the press conference, the China strategy "will be ready when it's ready".
Potential launch date of the China strategy: 5 July.
How Germany sees itself in the world order: continuity. Deepening of EU integration is "raison d'Etat", and so is the emphasis on US-German relationship.
NATO is the cornerstone of Germany's security strategy: explicit focus on NATO planning goals and coordination with NATO partners.
First mentions of the EU in the chapter "defending peace and freedom" relates to the role of EU for civil protection, then underlines that EU needs to leverage its entire toolkit (e.g. enlargement, CSDP tools).
On European defence industry, one could paraphrase is "wherever possible, but also buy non-European when necessary". Let's see how this plays out in practice.
Article 44 TEU gives the possibility for EU member states to delegate a task of the CSDP to a European coalition of the willing. It's part of the EU's Strategic Compass (agreed upon by all EU-MS), but this is a real evolution of German security policy compared to pre-2022.
Important political sign that the EU's mutual solidarity clause is mentioned alongside NATO article 5 and article 4 of the Aachen treaty with France.
What's not included (1):
- national security council: in the press conference, Baerbock mentioned that this was an idea in the beginning of the drafting process, but that the government worked well together in their response to Ukraine.
What's not included (2):
- details on European defence cooperation: commitment to PESCO, EPF and art. 44, but no further details.
- European Skyshield Initiative: mentioned in the press conference as a good project, but not in the strategy
What's not included (3):
- details on arms exports. The government is still working on a national legislation on arms exports. Particularly challenging for the Greens to strike the balance between restrictive arms export policy and leaving legal space for support for Ukraine.
Strategy in a nutshell:
- a lot of continuity in German security policy orientation
- Germany learns strategic thinking and the language of geopolitics - that is the real innovation
- it's a big picture outline and not a step-by-step document
The process itself that Germany is drafting a strategy with so many ministries involved was a clear progress. Now it's about implementation. The hard decisions will have to be made once the special fund is used. To understand where German security is heading, look at 2024 budget.
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First round of French legislative elections takes place on 30 June.
What do the parties actually say on security and defence, Ukraine, and in general foreign policy? Now that they all have published their programmes, here's a short overview (Ensemble, RN, Front Populaire): 🧵🇫🇷
In general, security and defence are clearly not the central topics of this electoral campaign. Instead, parties focus on questions related to social security, work, salaries, cost of living, and immigration. The exact ideas on Europe were laid out in the EU election programmes.
Programme by Ensemble (Macron's Renaissance party and allies) on defence (1/2):
- commitment to stay in NATO and maintain nuclear deterrence (that's explicit because it is not the case for other parties); explicitly underlines that this is a "guarantee of our nation"
Didn't follow everything that happened? No worries, this thread has all the important (and maybe a few not so important) information for you. 🇫🇷
This is (of course) not about baguette, but France's legislative elections. 🔽
Context reminder: after a disastrous result at the EU elections, French President Macron called for snap legislative elections, which will be help on 30 June and 7 July.
These elections do *not* include the president, who is directly elected in presidential elections.
If you need a punchline for the day, "a reshuffling right and far-right" would probably fit.
Les Républicains (formally centre-right party, w/ members w/ far-right sympathies) and Reconquête (far-right even more far-right than Rassemblement National) had internal battles today.
Background: I see a lot of speculations here about a Le Pen presidency after the parliamentary elections.
This is not how the French constitution works: the president is elected directly by the citizens, not by parliament - and can stay in office w/o parliament majority.
In the past, French presidents have governed without parliamentary majority - this is called “cohabitation” in French. In this case, the President appoints a prime minister from the leading party in parliament.
Analysis of the context/ world order: Europe risks decline because of structural factors (e.g. demography, economy...); international order is challenged.
Consequence: need for a "relatively simple diplomacy: defend our interests".
Macron recalls principles of French foreign policy: "path of independence", i.e. France has allies and partners, but willingness to speak to all. Calls for a diplomacy of trust, "d'équilibres au pluriel" (equilibriums, in plural), and recalls that this does not mean equidistance.
Scholz starts the conference and underlines that the idea to draft a strategy was already included in the coalition agreement before the Zeitenwende. Also underlines that the approach is integrated.
Scholz underlines continuity: "deep friedship with France and close partnership with US". (Comment: very important that France is mentioned in the very beginning here - good signal.)
Why I think it matters to clarify this: there are many good elements in the text. Yet, adding just another "strategic XYZ" to the list of "strategic autonomy/ sovereignty/ intimacy..." will not make things clearer.
Yes, the article mentions that one could call it "strategic humility" (does not cite Macron), but I find it misleading in the title because it just looks like Macron had come up with yet another concept - although he did not, and that was one of the strengths of this speech.