So the German security strategy is out - what does it say on Germany's place in Europe, European security, and EU/Germany-China? A thread: 🇩🇪🧵 #Sicherheitsstrategie
Let's start with some counting:
- France: 5
- USA: 4
- Poland: 0
- UK: 0
- China: 6
- European Union/ EU: 74
On world order and China: not many new elements.
According to the press conference, the China strategy "will be ready when it's ready".
Potential launch date of the China strategy: 5 July.
How Germany sees itself in the world order: continuity. Deepening of EU integration is "raison d'Etat", and so is the emphasis on US-German relationship.
NATO is the cornerstone of Germany's security strategy: explicit focus on NATO planning goals and coordination with NATO partners.
First mentions of the EU in the chapter "defending peace and freedom" relates to the role of EU for civil protection, then underlines that EU needs to leverage its entire toolkit (e.g. enlargement, CSDP tools).
On European defence industry, one could paraphrase is "wherever possible, but also buy non-European when necessary". Let's see how this plays out in practice.
Article 44 TEU gives the possibility for EU member states to delegate a task of the CSDP to a European coalition of the willing. It's part of the EU's Strategic Compass (agreed upon by all EU-MS), but this is a real evolution of German security policy compared to pre-2022.
Important political sign that the EU's mutual solidarity clause is mentioned alongside NATO article 5 and article 4 of the Aachen treaty with France.
What's not included (1):
- national security council: in the press conference, Baerbock mentioned that this was an idea in the beginning of the drafting process, but that the government worked well together in their response to Ukraine.
What's not included (2):
- details on European defence cooperation: commitment to PESCO, EPF and art. 44, but no further details.
- European Skyshield Initiative: mentioned in the press conference as a good project, but not in the strategy
What's not included (3):
- details on arms exports. The government is still working on a national legislation on arms exports. Particularly challenging for the Greens to strike the balance between restrictive arms export policy and leaving legal space for support for Ukraine.
Strategy in a nutshell:
- a lot of continuity in German security policy orientation
- Germany learns strategic thinking and the language of geopolitics - that is the real innovation
- it's a big picture outline and not a step-by-step document
The process itself that Germany is drafting a strategy with so many ministries involved was a clear progress. Now it's about implementation. The hard decisions will have to be made once the special fund is used. To understand where German security is heading, look at 2024 budget.
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Scholz starts the conference and underlines that the idea to draft a strategy was already included in the coalition agreement before the Zeitenwende. Also underlines that the approach is integrated.
Scholz underlines continuity: "deep friedship with France and close partnership with US". (Comment: very important that France is mentioned in the very beginning here - good signal.)
Why I think it matters to clarify this: there are many good elements in the text. Yet, adding just another "strategic XYZ" to the list of "strategic autonomy/ sovereignty/ intimacy..." will not make things clearer.
Yes, the article mentions that one could call it "strategic humility" (does not cite Macron), but I find it misleading in the title because it just looks like Macron had come up with yet another concept - although he did not, and that was one of the strengths of this speech.
My first thoughts on the speech by EU Commission President @vonderleyen today at @epc_eu and @merics_eu: a balanced speech that did not fall into the trap of a great power competition narrative, but outlines a European way of dealing with China. Short (non-exhaustive)🧵:
No sugar-coating of the challenges for the relationship: von der Leyen clearly addressed human rights, economic coercion, Chinese retaliation measures, and Russia-China relations. Clear statement on Ukraine peace plan as well.
Focus on de-risking instead of decoupling, both diplomatically and economically. Many concrete ideas and approaches in the speech already on economic de-risking align with EU's newer approaches to trade policy (reflections on economic coercion instruments, export control).
What it means (1/2): if 287 MPs vote in favour of the motion, Macron's government has to step down.
There is no mechanism leading to the dissolution of the parliament as a confidence of the non-confidence vote. But French president can decide to do so.
What it means (2/2):
If the motion is not successful (government remains in power), the pension reform is accepted.
If the motion is successful, the process will have to start again.
What to watch in France today, or better: whom to watch during the non-confidence vote? Excellent work by @ehouardvial for @Grand_Continent (and explanation below):
The centrist group LIOT has initiated a non-confidence motion. Unlike motion presented by Rassemblement National, this one could get support from NUPES (left alliance with far-left, socialists, greens) and even Rassemblement National. If all vote in favour, 27 votes are needed...
...to obtain 287 votes, and to de facto vote out the government. These 27 votes could be obtained from members of the centre-right Républicains, who do not have agreed on a common party line yet.
This kind of tweets & discussions about France's security priorities (and support for Ukraine) are quite frequent among experts outside France - and symptom of a bigger underlying issue: a misunderstanding of France's security policy abroad, and a credibility problem. A 🧵:
France's problem is mostly a communication problem - because France actually has adapted its strategic doctrines, commitments to European defence, and military spending in light of Russia's war on Ukraine. Yet, this is not what's most visible from the outside. Some quick facts:
In late 2022, France published an updated version of its Revue stratégique ("Strategic Review"), which, in light of Russia's war on Ukraine, aims to provide "precisions on the consequences of these new threats on our action and our armed forces". otan.delegfrance.org/Revue-national…