Mines pose a significant challenge for our army during the counter-offensive. As I've highlighted months ago, the difficulty lies in effectively tackling this issue while dealing with the constant threat of fire from enemy aircraft, AT weaponry, and artillery.
2/ Based on my knowledge about the current situation, russian forces continue mining vast expanses, spanning dozens and hundreds of square kilometers. Even the deployment of Mine Clearing Line Charges (MICLIC) does not provide a foolproof solution, given the scale of the problem.
3/ Russian forces persistently employ both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines to fortify the area. Additionally, it appears that they are utilizing a significant number of remote-mining machinery, such as the Zemledeliye system.
4/ In the specific case, provided to me from the field, the identified mine was likely deployed via remote mining, possibly utilizing the BM-27 Uragan launcher. The Uragan launcher, equipped with 16 rockets containing 9 mines each, enables the simultaneous deployment of 144 mines
5/ The civilian population is endangered by this situation. Numerous reports have emerged about incidents of both domestic animals and people falling victim to mines. Similar incidents occurred before; however, the scale of the current mining is far larger.
6/ The limited supply of engineering equipment, SHORAD, and long-range artillery poses a challenge in breaking through the rigid minefield. While it remains possible to breach the defense line, achieving this objective will demand significant time and resources.
7/ Modern Western armies haven't faced similar challenges with extensive minefields recently. This is primarily due to their aerial supremacy, which enables the elimination or neutralization of threats long before mine-clearing equipment is deployed in the operational area.
8/
The core emphasis of the Russian military doctrine and strategic thinking on defense and active defense measures was designed to resist more technologically advanced enemy than russia itself
9/
In summary, the task of breaching defenses and minefields, particularly in the presence of hostile artillery and air support, is a high-risk task that needs significant time and effort. Let us not forget the formidable challenge that our officers and soldiers are confronting.
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According to the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, in early 2025, the Russian occupation authorities intensified forced passportization in the temporarily occupied territories.
Starting September, those refusing Russian passports will be treated as illegal immigrants:
2/ The occupied territories are seeing a surge in paramilitary programs across schools and colleges. Educational institutions are forming Yunarmiya units, cadet classes, and “military-patriotic clubs” that focus on military drills, airgun shooting, grenade throwing, survival etc
3/ According to the same report by the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, from January to June 2025, occupation authorities took at least 2,300 Ukrainian children from occupied territories to various regions of the Russian Federation.
With increasing frequency, I hear directly from soldiers, sergeants, and officers on the ground: despite proclamations from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, little has changed for them in the ground, compared with 2024. 🧵Thread:
2/ In the coming days, I intend to elaborate further. But I can already point to systemic resistance, where a clique of generals and colonels pushes back against reforms that could dilute their entrenched power - power rooted in seniority earned during the 1990s and 2000s.
3/ The organization of fortifications, defense, as well as operational command and coordination, remains weak. Efforts to build a capable corps of noncommissioned officers, critical to any modern military, have yet to materialize.
From the Barents Sea to China’s southern coast, Russia’s tanker fleet has been quietly tracked by Ukrainians. Thanks to an investigation by the analytical group Dallas Park, we now know more. With their permission, I analyzed the report and put together a thread of key takeaways:
2/ Built in 2011 and flagged in the Marshall Islands as SUEZ VASILIS, the oil tanker was reflagged to Liberia in 2021 and renamed NAUTILUS I. In November 2022, after Russia’s invasion, it changed owners, managers, flag, and name again, becoming SABLE under the Panama
3/ In November 2023, Mikhail Gushchin became the ship’s master, according to a signed contract in Primorsk, Russia. At the time, the vessel was managed by Prominent Shipmanagement Limited.
Kirill Dmitriev, who was involved in earlier talks with Witkoff, is now trying to salvage the situation. Russia always intended to escalate the war while publicly presenting pressure on Ukraine as a path to peace and de-escalation. It worked - until it didn’t. You had six months
2/ What has Russia done in the six months since it “agreed” to negotiate? It announced an offensive in Sumy (so far unsuccessful), allegedly threatened to seize multiple oblasts within 60 days (also not going well), ramped up Shahed drone strikes and presented ultimatums
3/ It’s been clear since day one of the so-called negotiations that Russia’s only goal was to persuade the current US administration to halt support for Ukraine in exchange for a facade of goodwill diplomacy aimed at a truce -- one it never intended to follow through on.
One and a half months after the successful Operation Spiderweb, which targeted and destroyed Russian strategic bombers, our latest satellite imagery shows bomber wreckage still at several airfields, with the largest concentration at Belaya. A thread with updates on airbases:
2/ Additional analysis of bases such as Olenya and Engels-2, where Russian strategic bombers are deployed, shows no visible effort to reinforce the airfields. Olenya appears more cleared from debris than Belaya Airbase, but bomber wreckage remains visible on the apron.
3/ At Khalino Airbase, previously targeted by Ukrainian forces, Russian troops appear to have completed or nearly completed around 10 reinforced shelters with soil cover, 12 concrete shelters without it, and 8 hangar-style structures positioned on the aprons.