Mines pose a significant challenge for our army during the counter-offensive. As I've highlighted months ago, the difficulty lies in effectively tackling this issue while dealing with the constant threat of fire from enemy aircraft, AT weaponry, and artillery.
2/ Based on my knowledge about the current situation, russian forces continue mining vast expanses, spanning dozens and hundreds of square kilometers. Even the deployment of Mine Clearing Line Charges (MICLIC) does not provide a foolproof solution, given the scale of the problem.
3/ Russian forces persistently employ both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines to fortify the area. Additionally, it appears that they are utilizing a significant number of remote-mining machinery, such as the Zemledeliye system.
4/ In the specific case, provided to me from the field, the identified mine was likely deployed via remote mining, possibly utilizing the BM-27 Uragan launcher. The Uragan launcher, equipped with 16 rockets containing 9 mines each, enables the simultaneous deployment of 144 mines
5/ The civilian population is endangered by this situation. Numerous reports have emerged about incidents of both domestic animals and people falling victim to mines. Similar incidents occurred before; however, the scale of the current mining is far larger.
6/ The limited supply of engineering equipment, SHORAD, and long-range artillery poses a challenge in breaking through the rigid minefield. While it remains possible to breach the defense line, achieving this objective will demand significant time and resources.
7/ Modern Western armies haven't faced similar challenges with extensive minefields recently. This is primarily due to their aerial supremacy, which enables the elimination or neutralization of threats long before mine-clearing equipment is deployed in the operational area.
8/
The core emphasis of the Russian military doctrine and strategic thinking on defense and active defense measures was designed to resist more technologically advanced enemy than russia itself
9/
In summary, the task of breaching defenses and minefields, particularly in the presence of hostile artillery and air support, is a high-risk task that needs significant time and effort. Let us not forget the formidable challenge that our officers and soldiers are confronting.
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There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation
With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
Thread 🧵:
2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”