OK, the Sheldon Report is fatally flawed for one simple point (actually, it is flawed from numerous points, some deliberately put in place by the @DefenceHQ): the analysis of "what went wrong" only starts in detail in 2017. The problem with this? The key problems started...
Prior to the contract being awarded. An example required? Notes from 2010 say that a briefing General stating that Pizarro 2 was in service, low risk etc. So what? Well, it had actually been cancelled in Spain about a year earlier as a response to the global financial crisis...
So, the decision to opt for that base platform was utterly flawed from the off, before the @BritishArmy piled idiocy upon idiocy.
And there are at least half a dozen defence journos who will attest to the first stories about "things going wrong with Ajax" started c.2015-16...
...the mice are scurrying in all directions about the state of the RN escort fleet. I've now had half doz sources - all in the same capability area - coming up with the same thing in the aftermath of the de factor retirement of HMS Westminster. She's not the last to see this.
Now, this could all be circular talk - it happens. But triangulating sources is suggestive that there is a kernel of summat going on here. The "name in the frame" is HMS Lancaster, the forward deployed Type 23.
Late Friday/this Monday have been v interesting as regards the quiet, background briefs that have been going the rounds about the Defence Command White Paper, especially what will happen to the Army.
Top Line: the White Paper will say previous version was absolutely fine...
...all assumptions deductions totally right, Ukraine has changed nothing, because 2021 version had foreseen it!
However, Army White Paper Top Line: the briefings say a cut to 60,000.
Yes, the "line to take" is 60,000 - the previous total talked up was 72,000...
@benmoores2@BritishArmy@DefenceHQ@DefenceU
Now, Ukraine will be thankful for pretty much anything that they get. But recent statements suggest that they want 2-300 MBTs, 600+ MICVs, 00s of arty. So, let's be honest, what is the use of "up to 10 CR2"?
It's not even a squadron in NATO parlance - it's not a coherent unit, it's just a handful of tanks. Now, it might be that 10 is all that can be brought up, which the UK can then give to Ukraine without denuding the Army of armour...
A thread about an intriguing story that came via Reuters on 3 January about leadership of the NATO Very high-readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The core (original) story? Germany, the current VJTF leader, was being asked to extend this role into 2024... reuters.com/world/europe/g…
So what? Well, in theory, the UK takes over the role as of 1 January 2024. Berlin being asked to extend by 3-4mths, minimum, suggests that the British Army is finding itself in a position where, for whatever reasons, it cannot generate a formed Bgde HQ...
Overall, a very interesting listen, with some very good points made, especially such things as the fact that the UK is a maritime, not a continental power, and that the Army should not, and never has aimed to be the largest.
But there are a few things I'd like to pick up on...
"£30bn cut from the Army since 2015": REALLY? CGS needs to show workings on this... Does this include, say, the fact that there are fewer troops, so the pay bill has fallen? As will be seen later, if there is a claim of £30bn cut from kit, this is not supportable...
OK, off the back of 2-days of work on anti-ship missiles, I have a question to which I look to naval-minded Twitteratti...
In land ops, you have the concept of K-kills and M (mobility) kills, possibly interchangeable with suppression.
Depending on the circumstances, either can be entirely acceptable - K-kill might be seen as the acme, but just depends.
When it comes to Anti-ship operations, is there the same concept? OK, you might want to see the enemy ship just blow up, but might an M-kill be "good enough"?
By M-kill, I mean a hit(s) that doesn't blow a ship up, doesn't immobilise it so it just floats, helplessly, but causes it to stop fighting actively, as damage control takes precedence, or that it has to depart the scene of action to deal with its damage.