Sam Greene Profile picture
Jun 24 8 tweets 2 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
My main thought, as Prigozhin sends his men back to base, is that this isn’t over yet.

I’m not suggesting that Prigozhin will try again. But my strong sense is that Putin’s challenges are only beginning.

/1
From the first hours, Prigozhin’s uprising made Putin look weak, unable to control his own hinterland and the forces fighting his war. As Wagner troops got closer to Moscow, that only deepened.

/2
To regain his mojo, Putin needed more than a speech: he needed to dispatch Prigozhin quickly and decisively. He did not do that.

The fact that this was moderated by Lukashenka strikes me as embarrassing in the extreme. Putin needs someone else to solve his problems?

/3
By turning around “to avoid bloodshed”, Prigozhin somehow managed to make himself look like the cooler head — and, in fact, the only decisive person on the stage, given Putin’s conspicuous absence.

/4
The question is, what does Putin do next? Unless Prigozhin is arrested and tried, what people will remember is that he could have stormed the capital but thought better of it; the futility of the whole thing will likely be forgotten.

But if he is arrested, he’ll be a martyr.

/5
Assuming Putin somehow manages to square that circle, this whole episode may have punctured the air of inevitability that has kept him aloft for the past 23 years. Elites will wonder whether he can hold things together, and they may look more urgently for an alternative.

/6
This will also be the conversation topic around tens of millions of kitchen tables, and people will debate whether Putin was right or wrong. Previously unimaginable things, like a change of leadership, may become more plausible.

/7
Indeed, it’s hard to see how anyone wakes up in Moscow tomorrow and pretends that this didn’t just happen. Something will have to give.

/TO BE CONTINUED

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More from @samagreene

Jun 24
Ok. Time for a bit of political analysis.

What happens if Prigozhin’s adventure ends up bringing down Putin? Without trying to predict the future, it is possible to map out some plausible scenarios.

(A 🧵, duh)

/1
From a political analysis point of view, who is in power is less important than how he (or she) gets into power, and the incentives that accrue once power has been obtained. Thus, the first question is the manner in which Putin leaves office — chaotically, or smoothly.

/2
If Putin leaves office smoothly — ie, through a negotiated process, in which he cedes power without a fight — the key implication is that whoever takes power will retain the full apparatus of control that Putin currently enjoys.

/3
Read 20 tweets
Jun 23
I will admit that I don’t know what Prigozhin is playing at. Honestly. And I won’t guess.

None of the available explanations stand up to the evidence.

(A quick 🧵)

/1
I’ll start with the most absurd: the idea that Prigozhin is attacking Putin. That story got slightly less absurd with today’s video, which seemingly protects Putin but undermines so much of what Putin has said that it still feels like an attack.

It’s still absurd, though.

/2
Prigozhin completely and utterly depends on Putin. Nothing of what he does is possible without Putin’s protection, and there is no evidence that he has become so indispensable to the war that he’s invulnerable.

/3
Read 10 tweets
Jun 7
As Russia's propagandist-in-chief Margarita Simonyan broaches the idea of ending the war, ostensibly because Ukraine is getting too strong to counter without an attack on the West itself, it's worth taking a moment to reflect on how Russian propaganda works.

(A 🧵)

/1
First, the facts of the matter: Simonyan said on TV that Ukraine now has the capability to strike deep inside Russia, and that will grow with F16s, and the only way to reduce that threat is to hit the Western infrastructure that supplies Ukraine.

meduza.io/feature/2023/0…

/2
A Russian attack on the West, Simonyan continued, would provoke a Western attack on Russia, which would have catastrophic consequences. As a result, she suggested (more or less), Russia should accept a stalemate.

/3
Read 20 tweets
May 3
A few thoughts on the "drone attack" on the Kremlin.

TL;DR: Leaving aside all the things we cannot know, we should expect Moscow to milk this for all it's worth -- but that's probably not much.

(A quick and probably ill-advised 🧵)

/1
Thought 1⃣: I don't care who launched these drones, where they came from, and whether they were capable of killing Putin. I don't care because I cannot know, and as an analyst I don't want to waste my time worrying about things that are not subject to empirical investigation.

/2
Thought 2⃣: What I do care about is what happens next, and that includes how this plays domestically in Russia, and whether it induces significant new escalation from the Russian side. That said, I'm not here to predict the future.

/3
Read 14 tweets
Apr 16
Russia's decision to turn the screws on military mobilization -- and to make fleeing much more difficult -- appears to be provoking anger at the elite, whose kids bask on tropical beaches, and at the military, for being so hungry for troops.

(A quick Sunday 🧵)

/1
For fuller analysis, see yesterday's TL;DRussia (and subscribe for free, in case this website turns into a pumpkin).

tldrussia.substack.com/p/tldrussia-we…

/2
Whether that anger yields a boost for anti-war sentiment depends on what the Kremlin does next. If this is a marginal tightening of the screws, the Kremlin may skate through, as it did last autumn.

/3
Read 15 tweets
Apr 10
Since my Twitter feed is still maddeningly redolent of pundits angry with Macron, I'm afraid I can't help myself: Macron wasn't wrong.

More specifically, he's probably not wrong on China (though he may not be right, either). And he's certainly not wrong on Europe.

/1
First things first: Don't read the headlines or the Tweets. Go back and read Macron's actual interview (in French, if you can, or with Google Translate): lesechos.fr/monde/enjeux-i…

/2
First of all, how many world leaders have ever used the phrase "in the Gramscian sense"? But I digress.

If you read the actual interview, what you find is something quite different from the "Macron sold out the West" hyperbole that has dominated the public response.

/3
Read 19 tweets

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