Although it appears quiet in Russia today, things are not back to 'normal.' The coming days or weeks will tell more. Until then, its wise to consider that “nothing is true and everything is possible” – even the things we see. A few reflections for today:
48 hours in, Shoigu & Gerasimov are publicly radio silent, even to Russian milbloggers. Unusual, given the threat against them specifically. Are they secure in their jobs? all that matters is what Putin decides for them. /2
They could emerge anytime (once the danger has passed). I think Gerasimov's position is weaker than Shoigu's. Regardless of when they emerge and how, their silence will be remembered and they could look even weaker. /3
Alekseev and Surovikin were the public faces of the appeal to Prigozhin. Their videos looked coerced. While Alekseev emerged the next day, their ultimate status remains unclear. /4
Hard to say what will happen to other senior officers . Milbloggers reporting that the chain of command continued out of Rostov for Ukraine. /5
No signs of major disruptions/desertions/mutinies in Ukraine so far. Soldiers in Ukraine with cell phones and coverage could follow along. Watching for future ripples /6
The Kremlin should be worried that Wagner columns were waved through – on the ground at least- by multiple authorities and openly received by the people in Rostov. That's passive popular support though, and we never saw what would happen if there was armed confrontation. /6
Watching the public reaction to Wagner's presence, and the heckling of the police that followed (in Rostov), I think there is something that bubbled up that's worth following. Not antiwar per se; but it did seem like an expression against the authorities. /7
I don’t take Peskov’s statement of the “negotiated terms” for Prigozhin at face value. Anything is possible. Armed insurrection is not a "water under the bridge" situation. Not how the authorities were acting, anyway. There isn't much clarity yet. /8
In days/weeks ahead, worth paying attention to public clarifications of the National Guard, intel, military command chains. Arrests are also in realm of possibility, or, some people could simply not be seen again. I don't think this is over. Much has changed. /x
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A thread about the Russian military and what to watch for in the days ahead. Developments are highly contingent, but there are a few big movements to look out for. /1
1: For Prigozhin’s insurrection against Shoigu/Gerasimov to succeed or expand, it will require support from elements of the Russian security services, National Guard, police, and military. These are individuals’ decisions and therefore difficult to predict. /2
2: Proof of military command and control: Prigozhin has threatened Shoigu and Gerasimov personally. To show that they are still in place and commanding the military/war, they will provide a visual. If one does not emerge in the next few days that’s telling that all is not ok./3
Observations on the counteroffensive this week. As anticipated, when the UAF close on Russian trenches, they clear them. UAF are making deep cuts on logistics in the south. Strong dissonance (again) between hard realities on the battlefield and what’s happening in Moscow. /1
UAF strikes on the Chonhar bridge could add nearly a hundred kilometers to Russian GLOCs in occupied Kherson. This is on top of the recent attacks on other logistics and C2 locations, but /2
I write often on Russian military personnel problems because I think it's a central issue. I will be the first to tell you that their military morale is poor in Ukraine. I still would not recommend any plan that rests on 'bad Russian morale will trigger a collapse in the front'/1
I hope that’s not a critical assumption at play. I don’t think it is, but, I’ve seen a few statements from some quarters that give me pause, like this one below. /2 meduza.io/en/news/2023/0…
In my view the Russian troops that are the most exhausted and maltreated are the ones in Luhansk and Donetsk, who fought a failed offensive since January, were subordinated (legally) to Luhansk/Donetsk proxies, or allegedly to mercenary groups, according to some families. /3
🧵re: Nova Khakovka dam, I'm looking at the status of Russian forces on the east bank for clues.On imagery some Russian defensive positions are now flooded.Many were built months ago in positions above the flood plain (for now)-an appropriate tactical choice h/t @defmon@bradyafr
There are some reports from Russian social media of losses, others say its calm. The most diagnostic clue for me about whether Russia had knowledge or responsibility for this event would be evidence that Russian forces downriver were moved out of position beforehand. /2
If no change to patterns, followed by chaos, it *could* suggest this was a surprise to them. I've written about the Russian command withholding info and treating their own with callousness in service to unworkable objectives, but flooding occupied positions with no warning? IDK.
The Russian military's problems go beyond casualties and equipment losses. It faces two looming crises in retention and veteran PTSD and other disorders, when its soldiers are allowed to leave Ukraine. I explore this topic in my piece for @TheEconomist, linked in tweet below. /1
In my newest piece for @TheEconomist I explore the Russian military’s looming twin crises of retention and veteran mental health problems. 2/ economist.com/by-invitation/…
Russia’s wartime personnel policies mask the war’s impact on retention. Since September, *all* Russian forces (except PMCs, perhaps Rosgvardia) in Ukraine are serving in a compulsory status once mobilization began, according to decree. /3
Last night, Russian forces continued their attacks on Kyiv and tried to overwhelm its air defenses. This time using 18 missiles launched from different directions, speeds, and profiles, with coordinated arrival times. UAF says all were intercepted 1/ bbc.com/news/world-eur…
UAF claims 6 Kinzhal, 9 Kalibr, and 3 SS-26 or S400s and drones were launched and intercepted. Russia is trying to find a complex targeting solution to saturate these SAMs , so far they haven’t yet. They continue to launch, evaluate, and try something different. 2/
Their missiles have not performed well against these systems so far, yet they keep launching at Kyiv, wearing down their stockpiles in the process. This was a complex attempt and in the process, they wear down Ukraine’s interceptors too. 3/