Thread by @GresselGustav

1/ Some thoughts on the munity turned attempted Putsch yesterday. A lot on it is still in the dark. But a few observations.
A 🪡

2/ First, to pull this, there must have been considerable collaboration from the side of the Russian armed forces. Rostov and Voronezh are not de-militarised spaces. Quite the contrary.
Rostov hosts the SMD command and units of the 8th CAA, Voronezh the 20th CAA.

3/ From FSP border guards that let Wagner in to various units along the way that led Wagner pass with impunity, not to mention stockpiling army equipment like Pantsir SAM to T90M MBT.
Wagner made a stunning dash towards Moscow, the only real resistance came from the VKS.

4/ Here are some speculations in the Ukrainian press on how deep the conspiracy was:
Will they be purged now? How would prigs affect the conduct of the war? Especially if the rather abled commanders had sympathies for Prigozhin.news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/russia/ope…

5/ Prigozhin was popular amongst lower rank soldiers: from contractors to roughly captains. A lot of the things he criticised were genuinely true (corruption, bad leadership, lousy logistics, unnecessary casualties, and finally the war-rationale built on lies and nonsense).

6/ He also was the only senior figure (disputable of course) that regularly visited soldiers, was close to the front, visited graves and wounded. It may sound crazy for the mafia-monster he is, but he was a father-figure to soldiers that Putin certainly wasn’t.

7/ Putin in turn is so concerned about another Zhukov emerging from the war, that he does not allow regular generals to fill that role and pull the show Prigozhin did.

8/ He either demotes generals or sticks with the incompetent ones (Gerasimov) because they will not fill that void. And while we still don’t know if Shoigu and Gerasimov will be replaced, will Putin find one who is a) loyal, b) competent and c) not a threat?

9/ Next topic: this was a munity turned putsch, and that probably was why it failed. Prigozhin’s initial interest may have been to confront the senior military leadership to keep his PMC alive and in his ow hands.

10/ But on Friday Putin decided against him, and from then on, exchanging the defence minister against the will of the president meant to challenge the president for power.

11/ The military side of this seems to have been prepared rather well. Not so the political side. Prigozhin received no support from the political-financial elites to speak off. Did he try to assemble a shadow government? Maybe, maybe not.

12/ If Utkin would have reached Moscow and took the Kremlin, what then? What next? With whom?
Somehow, activating military forces without thinking through the political rational seems to be a trend in Russia.

13/ The big but: there is a ton of dissent in Russia with Putin and the conduct of his war. That could be exploited. It would need someone who not only has the military tools and charisma to challenge Putin, but also the financial stamina and political network to make it happen.

14/ Unfortunately, for the time being, I don’t see any one out there.
Turning to our own 🇷🇺 strategy: we cannot expect that someone else will solve our problems or they disappear by themselves.

15/ A lot of takes on “this will be the end of Putin” and “this is the end of the war” are – sorry – wishful thinking. Putin is not invincible, but to push him into the corner, we need a serious, long-term military, financial and political effort to support Ukraine.

16/ On this, the West is still too slow, too undecided, too hesitant, and too much preoccupied with its own domestic politics.