In light of the ongoing discussions surrounding the counter-offensive, we need to revisit the topic of mines due to its utmost importance. As I have previously emphasized, the extensive deployment of mines by Russian forces remains a significant threat to our troops.
2/ The mine problem encountered in this counter-offensive would pose a formidable challenge even for NATO or Western militaries if given the same resources. With thousands of heavily mined square kilometers, it is a complex and protracted issue that cannot be easily resolved.
3/ Providing us with more anti-mine means would improve the situation, but it doesn't solve all the challenges. Russians use various methods to lay mines, including manual, mechanized, and remote approaches, adding complexity as different types of mines require various clearance
4/ While the possibility of bombarding the mined areas to create safe passages theoretically exists, it would necessitate an extensive quantity of ammunition and resources that Ukraine currently lacks and realistically cannot acquire to clear dozens of kilometers that way
5/ What about mine plows? While this option may appear viable, it is vulnerable to ATGM fire or loitering munitions, effectively blocking the passage and exposing personnel to potential artillery engagements as they struggle to retreat or dislodge the stuck vehicle.
6/ Does the use of mine-clearing line charges prove effective? Yes, it does. However, there are two crucial caveats to consider: a single M58 or UR-77 charge clears only a relatively small area, whereas our objective is to address areas kilometers in depth, not merely meters.
7/ In previous wars, it was easier to approach the enemy at close proximity without being easily detected. However, the element of surprise has diminished significantly due to the constant presence of drones, which easily detect any approaching mine-clearing vehicles.
8/ While the ultimate goal is to suppress the enemy before the mine-clearing vehicles arrive, it remains a difficult challenge to contend with covert and mobile ATGM teams, helicopters, and loitering munitions that cannot be easily neutralized.
9/ This necessitates an extraordinary level of coordination among anti-air defense, electronic warfare (EW) units, sappers, engineers, artillery, and reconnaissance elements on a scale not encountered by many modern armies in recent large-scale operations.
10/ The chaining effect of mines is often overlooked but significantly hampers maneuverability in battle. Even after minefields are supposedly cleared, residual mines create lingering doubts, discouraging swift movements and maneuvers by military units
11/ In conclusion, it is crucial to acknowledge the gravity of this issue and allocate the requisite resources to bolster Ukraine's anti-mine capabilities. To overcome it, we must prioritize the development of innovative solutions and foster exceptional unit cooperation.
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Over the past few months, Russians have focused on disrupting Ukrainian logistics, using a mix of drones, including fiber-optic. Once EW is neutralized or forced to withdraw by fiber-optic drones, it clears the way for drones like the Molniya, which can fly over 20 km. Thread:
2/ Cutting off supply lines has made vehicle transport nearly impossible. In some cases, individual soldiers must walk more than 10 km at night to deliver basic supplies: an unsustainable way for supporting any sizable unit, or even rotating troops.
3/ Despite growing logistical problems, Ukrainian command has made bad choices to launch Russian-modelled assaults. The attempt to capture positions while already struggling to hold current ones, with fewer troops and less equipment, lead to predictably poor outcome
Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread:
2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault
3/ In February 2024, Polyus Scientific Research Institute, part of Shvabe Holding, was tasked with advancing laser technologies to counter UAVs. This includes developing materials like active elements under a program focused on high-power lasers, running through 2033.
How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
🧵Thread:
2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?