In light of the ongoing discussions surrounding the counter-offensive, we need to revisit the topic of mines due to its utmost importance. As I have previously emphasized, the extensive deployment of mines by Russian forces remains a significant threat to our troops.
2/ The mine problem encountered in this counter-offensive would pose a formidable challenge even for NATO or Western militaries if given the same resources. With thousands of heavily mined square kilometers, it is a complex and protracted issue that cannot be easily resolved.
3/ Providing us with more anti-mine means would improve the situation, but it doesn't solve all the challenges. Russians use various methods to lay mines, including manual, mechanized, and remote approaches, adding complexity as different types of mines require various clearance
4/ While the possibility of bombarding the mined areas to create safe passages theoretically exists, it would necessitate an extensive quantity of ammunition and resources that Ukraine currently lacks and realistically cannot acquire to clear dozens of kilometers that way
5/ What about mine plows? While this option may appear viable, it is vulnerable to ATGM fire or loitering munitions, effectively blocking the passage and exposing personnel to potential artillery engagements as they struggle to retreat or dislodge the stuck vehicle.
6/ Does the use of mine-clearing line charges prove effective? Yes, it does. However, there are two crucial caveats to consider: a single M58 or UR-77 charge clears only a relatively small area, whereas our objective is to address areas kilometers in depth, not merely meters.
7/ In previous wars, it was easier to approach the enemy at close proximity without being easily detected. However, the element of surprise has diminished significantly due to the constant presence of drones, which easily detect any approaching mine-clearing vehicles.
8/ While the ultimate goal is to suppress the enemy before the mine-clearing vehicles arrive, it remains a difficult challenge to contend with covert and mobile ATGM teams, helicopters, and loitering munitions that cannot be easily neutralized.
9/ This necessitates an extraordinary level of coordination among anti-air defense, electronic warfare (EW) units, sappers, engineers, artillery, and reconnaissance elements on a scale not encountered by many modern armies in recent large-scale operations.
10/ The chaining effect of mines is often overlooked but significantly hampers maneuverability in battle. Even after minefields are supposedly cleared, residual mines create lingering doubts, discouraging swift movements and maneuvers by military units
11/ In conclusion, it is crucial to acknowledge the gravity of this issue and allocate the requisite resources to bolster Ukraine's anti-mine capabilities. To overcome it, we must prioritize the development of innovative solutions and foster exceptional unit cooperation.
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The Financial Times, a media outlet I respect and one of the few that consistently produces exceptional reporting on Ukraine, has released a new editorial opinion. Many, including myself, agree that changes are needed. However, I believe the timing is extremely problematic:
2/ The situation on the frontlines is currently very difficult. At the same time, Kyiv is facing external pressure from Washington, where many are echoing Kremlin-style “capitulation” narratives. In moments like these, the President must stand on solid ground.
3/ This is not about Zelensky personally - it is about the institution of the Presidency. Completely overhauling the government and appointing untested figures in the name of transparency could create a situation where we might end up with no state and government at all
Financial Times reports that, under the draft plan, Ukraine would be required to cede full control of the Donbas region and halve the size of its armed forces. The plan would also require Ukraine to give up certain types of weaponry:
2/ The plan would also require Ukraine to recognize Russian as an official state language and grant official status to the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, provisions that echo long-standing Kremlin political objectives.
3/ Officials in Kyiv briefed on the plan said it closely aligns with the Kremlin’s maximalist demands and would be a non-starter for Ukraine without significant changes, according to @ChristopherJM with @FT
A clear video showing a Kh-family cruise missile descending, releasing flares and striking a residential building in Ternopil this morning indicates the attack was deliberate, contradicting claims by Russian propaganda and bot networks that it resulted from air-defense.🧵Thread:
2/ In the first second of the video, the sound of the cruise missile is clearly audible, and flares can be seen deploying before impact. Russians started to use flares on their missiles as countermeasures against air-defence systems, including MANPADS around 2023.
3/ The missile’s silhouette, with its relatively short, swept-back wings and boat-shaped fuselage, closely matches the Kh-series of cruise missiles
In November, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported that 44 Indian nationals were serving in the Russian army. Frontelligence Insight obtained and reviewed data that shows the real number is higher. At least 146 Indian citizens have signed contracts. 🧵Thread:
2/ Thanks to data provided by @hochuzhit_com and our own investigation, we found that Russia, working through local recruiters in India, actively targeting Indian nationals and pulling them into military service despite the Indian government’s attempts to reduce such activities.
3/ We identified more than a dozen ongoing or recently concluded advertising campaigns targeting Indian citizens. In the image below, you can see examples from Facebook, YouTube, and other social-media platforms promotions. Notably, some advertisements directly mention Alabuga
A year and a half ago, in April 2024, I warned (the section is highlighted in the auto-translated text) that aid to Ukraine would continue to dwindle, and that without proper changes we would find ourselves in a poor position. What we’re seeing now was set in motion a while ago.
2/ Besides Europe, which I was mostly addressing in that post, Ukraine has also fallen short, mainly in strategic-level organization, despite several successes such as expanding and deploying unmanned forces and improving long-range strikes that have hurt the Russian economy.
3/ The winning strategy, as my team outlined after the 2023 counteroffensive, can be summed up as “stall the enemy while destroying the rear,” meaning inflict maximum socio-economic damage while preventing the enemy from making real gains and making the war plainly too costly.
Russia aim to manufacture up to 120,000 glide bombs this year, including 500 of a new, longer-range version capable of flying up to 200 km from the point of release, according to a representative of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence. 🧵Thread with data mentioned in the interview:
2/ Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence, disclosed that Russian forces are firing between 200 and 250 glide bombs every day. Last month, the daily average was about 170, according to data from the defence ministry quoted by Reuters.
3/ He added that Russia is working on modifications that would allow glide bombs to fly up to 400 km, enabling Russia to strike deep without using missiles. Skibitskyi provided estimates for Russian drone production: Russia is expected to produce around 70,000 long-range drones