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Jun 28, 2023 11 tweets 3 min read Read on X
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In light of the ongoing discussions surrounding the counter-offensive, we need to revisit the topic of mines due to its utmost importance. As I have previously emphasized, the extensive deployment of mines by Russian forces remains a significant threat to our troops.
2/ The mine problem encountered in this counter-offensive would pose a formidable challenge even for NATO or Western militaries if given the same resources. With thousands of heavily mined square kilometers, it is a complex and protracted issue that cannot be easily resolved.
3/ Providing us with more anti-mine means would improve the situation, but it doesn't solve all the challenges. Russians use various methods to lay mines, including manual, mechanized, and remote approaches, adding complexity as different types of mines require various clearance
4/ While the possibility of bombarding the mined areas to create safe passages theoretically exists, it would necessitate an extensive quantity of ammunition and resources that Ukraine currently lacks and realistically cannot acquire to clear dozens of kilometers that way
5/ What about mine plows? While this option may appear viable, it is vulnerable to ATGM fire or loitering munitions, effectively blocking the passage and exposing personnel to potential artillery engagements as they struggle to retreat or dislodge the stuck vehicle.
6/ Does the use of mine-clearing line charges prove effective? Yes, it does. However, there are two crucial caveats to consider: a single M58 or UR-77 charge clears only a relatively small area, whereas our objective is to address areas kilometers in depth, not merely meters.
7/ In previous wars, it was easier to approach the enemy at close proximity without being easily detected. However, the element of surprise has diminished significantly due to the constant presence of drones, which easily detect any approaching mine-clearing vehicles.
8/ While the ultimate goal is to suppress the enemy before the mine-clearing vehicles arrive, it remains a difficult challenge to contend with covert and mobile ATGM teams, helicopters, and loitering munitions that cannot be easily neutralized.
9/ This necessitates an extraordinary level of coordination among anti-air defense, electronic warfare (EW) units, sappers, engineers, artillery, and reconnaissance elements on a scale not encountered by many modern armies in recent large-scale operations.
10/ The chaining effect of mines is often overlooked but significantly hampers maneuverability in battle. Even after minefields are supposedly cleared, residual mines create lingering doubts, discouraging swift movements and maneuvers by military units
11/ In conclusion, it is crucial to acknowledge the gravity of this issue and allocate the requisite resources to bolster Ukraine's anti-mine capabilities. To overcome it, we must prioritize the development of innovative solutions and foster exceptional unit cooperation.

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Sep 17
The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has published new details about the Russian “Geran-3” UAV. The “U” series model is equipped with a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine, allowing it to reach speeds of 300–370 km/h and an estimated operational range of up to 1,000 km. Image
2/ The “Geran-3” reaches its maximum speed of up to 370 km/h mainly in areas covered by Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare systems, in zones where interceptor UAVs are deployed, and during the terminal phase of flight as it descends toward its target. Image
3/ Electronic units are largely the same as in the gasoline-powered versions of the “Geran-2” UAV of the “Ы” series. It includes, in particular, the standard SADRA inertial navigation system, an air data computer (ADC), a power distribution unit (PDU), and other components Image
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Sep 16
The dynamics of the battlefield have shifted even further in 2025. With manpower shortages and infiltration tactics, the frontline in some areas has become far less defined and certain. That’s one of the reasons I haven’t posted any tactical updates for a while:
2/ It has reached the point where even soldiers on both sides are uncertain about the frontline - at least beyond their own unit’s tactical area. As a result, sources once considered reliable for mappers are no longer as dependable.
3/ The fog of war is nothing new, of course, but in recent years people grew accustomed to accurate maps to the point of taking them for granted. Unfortunately, even I’ve noticed that many OSINT maps have become markedly less accurate lately.
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Sep 12
Up to two-thirds (66%) of respondents in Russia believe it is time to move toward peace negotiations, a record high for this indicator. Only 27% say military action should continue, the lowest level. The figures come from the Levada Center, known for its methodological rigor: Image
2/ Fifty-eight percent of respondents say the war has affected them or their families. Among those “strongly” affected, common issues include the death of relatives or friends, family members participating in combat, injuries/disability, emotional distress, and economic hardship
3/ Higher support for negotiations among: women; young people under 24; rural residents; those who believe national affairs are going poorly; people who disapprove of Putin; those who rely on YouTube or non-state sources for information.
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Sep 11
Two days after being conscripted into Russia's army, Maxim Suvorov signed a contract. Less than a month later, he fell on the battlefield - one of many casualties of Russia’s new practice of filling contract ranks with conscripts. A detailed case showcasing recruitment problems: Image
2/ Frontelligence Insight has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to meet recruitment targets with monetary bonuses, pushing the military to seek alternatives, including pressuring conscripts to sign contracts. The recent death of a conscript allowed us to trace his story
3/ Our investigation begins with an obituary posted on a local Russian social media group dedicated to fallen soldiers in various conflicts. According to the post, Maxim was conscripted on June 25 and signed a contract on June 27. To verify this, we sought additional evidence Image
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Sep 9
Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more: Image
Image
2/ According to a report by VIGI­­NUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU) Image
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern:
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Sep 9
A recurring question is whether Russia categorizes AWOL cases as a way to conceal combat deaths in its official reports. The short answer is no. The longer answer is more complicated, and requires looking at how AWOL is treated within the Russian military system. 🧵Short thread: Image
2/ Most AWOL cases can escalate into actual criminal proceedings if all other measures to bring soldiers back fail. High rates of desertion or absence trigger investigations on record - problems that weigh more heavily on commanders and unit statistics than combat losses do
3/ Casualties themselves are rarely the main concern, provided objectives set by higher command are met. By contrast, desertion is seen as evidence of weak leadership and poor control over subordinates. KIA and MIA are regarded as an acceptable cost of war; AWOL is not.
Read 7 tweets

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