In light of the ongoing discussions surrounding the counter-offensive, we need to revisit the topic of mines due to its utmost importance. As I have previously emphasized, the extensive deployment of mines by Russian forces remains a significant threat to our troops.
2/ The mine problem encountered in this counter-offensive would pose a formidable challenge even for NATO or Western militaries if given the same resources. With thousands of heavily mined square kilometers, it is a complex and protracted issue that cannot be easily resolved.
3/ Providing us with more anti-mine means would improve the situation, but it doesn't solve all the challenges. Russians use various methods to lay mines, including manual, mechanized, and remote approaches, adding complexity as different types of mines require various clearance
4/ While the possibility of bombarding the mined areas to create safe passages theoretically exists, it would necessitate an extensive quantity of ammunition and resources that Ukraine currently lacks and realistically cannot acquire to clear dozens of kilometers that way
5/ What about mine plows? While this option may appear viable, it is vulnerable to ATGM fire or loitering munitions, effectively blocking the passage and exposing personnel to potential artillery engagements as they struggle to retreat or dislodge the stuck vehicle.
6/ Does the use of mine-clearing line charges prove effective? Yes, it does. However, there are two crucial caveats to consider: a single M58 or UR-77 charge clears only a relatively small area, whereas our objective is to address areas kilometers in depth, not merely meters.
7/ In previous wars, it was easier to approach the enemy at close proximity without being easily detected. However, the element of surprise has diminished significantly due to the constant presence of drones, which easily detect any approaching mine-clearing vehicles.
8/ While the ultimate goal is to suppress the enemy before the mine-clearing vehicles arrive, it remains a difficult challenge to contend with covert and mobile ATGM teams, helicopters, and loitering munitions that cannot be easily neutralized.
9/ This necessitates an extraordinary level of coordination among anti-air defense, electronic warfare (EW) units, sappers, engineers, artillery, and reconnaissance elements on a scale not encountered by many modern armies in recent large-scale operations.
10/ The chaining effect of mines is often overlooked but significantly hampers maneuverability in battle. Even after minefields are supposedly cleared, residual mines create lingering doubts, discouraging swift movements and maneuvers by military units
11/ In conclusion, it is crucial to acknowledge the gravity of this issue and allocate the requisite resources to bolster Ukraine's anti-mine capabilities. To overcome it, we must prioritize the development of innovative solutions and foster exceptional unit cooperation.
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1/ There are certain aspects regarding OSINT map projects that need discussion. I want to emphasize that my intention is not to criticize, as I recognize and respect the public service you provide for free.
2/ Frequently, brigades are pinned on a map based on video, photo or press release. However, there is an issue where russian brigades are often not comprised of their organic units. It is not uncommon to see battalions from the same brigade positioned hundreds of kilometers apart
3/ Moreover, many brigades consist of a mixture of units. For instance, a VDV regiment might be reinforced by a motor-rifle battalion from another brigade, a tank company from a separate tank regiment, and a Storm-Z company from yet another brigade.
1/ I would like to address instances where some of the world's largest media outlets, such as the @WSJ and @Reuters , have either plagiarized my materials or used them without providing proper credit.
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2/ The first instance involves Reuters, which utilized information from one of my threads without making significant changes. I could easily recognize my own writing, as I had used general terms like "Camouflaged area" due to uncertainties in translation.
3/ Regarding the @WSJ , in their recent video on Wagner, a portion of their content bears striking resemblance to a video that I had before the WSJ published their investigation. I will share a segment of the video WSJ, alongside my original video, letting the public to judge:
Given the persistent efforts of individuals like David Sacks to pursue a "peaceful resolution" on russia’s terms, it becomes crucial to review some pillars of Russian military strategy, thoroughly analyzed and documented by Michael Kofman in 2021.
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2/ To gain a comprehensive understanding of the fallacy and manipulation within David Sacks' narrative, it is crucial to examine his words in the context of the ongoing Russian invasion and their military strategy, objectives and core principles.
3/ In his work, @KofmanMichael assesses russian military strategy, including core theoretical pillars like operational concepts and strategic operations. Non-military means, including warfare in the informational space, are essential components of the russian military strategy.
Wagner PMC is actively expanding its operations in the Central African Republic (CAR) and neighboring countries, beyond the scope of gold and diamond extraction. This is supported by my satellite imagery analysis and information from @alleyesonwagner project:
2/ In this thread, our attention will be directed towards a wood processing facility near Boda that not only industrializes the deforestation and ecosystem degradation in the area to extract rare timber but also facilitates Wagner's expansion into neighboring countries.
3/ In January 2021, control over Boda, situated west of Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic (CAR), was secured by both the CAR army and Wagner forces. Visual evidence in the form of obtained photos clearly depicts the presence of Wagner forces within the city.
Mines pose a significant challenge for our army during the counter-offensive. As I've highlighted months ago, the difficulty lies in effectively tackling this issue while dealing with the constant threat of fire from enemy aircraft, AT weaponry, and artillery.
2/ Based on my knowledge about the current situation, russian forces continue mining vast expanses, spanning dozens and hundreds of square kilometers. Even the deployment of Mine Clearing Line Charges (MICLIC) does not provide a foolproof solution, given the scale of the problem.
3/ Russian forces persistently employ both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines to fortify the area. Additionally, it appears that they are utilizing a significant number of remote-mining machinery, such as the Zemledeliye system.
As our troops advance towards the primary line of defense south of Staromlynivka, whether they proceed directly or choose to breach the line elsewhere, I'd like to share some information about the defenses and other hidden challenges of the current situation.
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2/ While obstacles can be effectively bypassed using mine-clearing vehicles, bulldozers, mine plows, and other engineering equipment, it becomes challenging to do so with the presence of drones that provide real-time corrections to artillery fire and alert ATGM/helicopter teams.
3/ In anticipation of the AFU potentially capturing settlements on the flank, the enemy has deployed additional defensive systems, including anti-tank ditches, mines, and infamous dragon's teeth. These measures are implemented to hinder flanking maneuvers by the AFU.