“Why the events of Saturday did not weaken, but only strengthened our country.” This article in the tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda gives a good sense of the new propaganda line, as the Kremlin desperately tries to spin the Prigozhin mutiny 1/ kp.ru/daily/27520.5/…
“Russia passed another test”, it begins, excoriating “the great couch army” that hid on Saturday or praised Prigozhin, and then “began Sunday morning with belligerent statements that the authorities had done everything wrong again.” 2/
But who was the real hero? Not #Lukashenko, though “let’s not argue, he played a big role” but really just as a mouthpiece for "a man who, in a difficult situation, did not lose his composure, acting, as always, as efficiently and rationally as possible.” Of course: Putin 3/
No talk, of course, of his likely evacuation from Moscow region, nor his personal refusal to talk to Prigozhin, necessitating Luka's involvement 4/ spectator.co.uk/article/did-pu…
After all, he could easily have wiped out Wagner, and almost any other “militant general” would have, but “Thank God they are not this place. And thank God that Putin is there.” 5/
Why? Interestingly, here the cloying hagiography skirts a real truth when it continues “If you haven't noticed so far, Vladimir Vladimirovich really doesn't like the toughest decisions, and even more so, to bring things to the point of bloodshed.” 6/
(Admittedly, I’d suggest that last would be news to the people of Ukraine, Chechnya, Georgia, Syria…)
But it is true that Putin tends to dither when faced with tough choices, even that is not what the starstruck writer is saying 7/
Instead, “both with political opponents and arrogant oligarchs, he prefers to try to solve matters peacefully… only when all the methods have been exhausted, Putin makes a tough decision, but... after that... this decision... cannot be changed by any persuasion.” 8/
Thus, we are told that he had struggled for ages to try and get the Ukrainians to see sense “insofar as he did not want blood and really considered them (I don’t if he now still does) a fraternal Russian people.” But when he had to decide otherwise, well, that’s it 9/
As regards Wagner, he wanted to avoid bloodshed, but would have given the order “had they crossed the ‘red line’ and began to pose a real threat to the country” even though they lacked “the necessary support for either among the people or the authorities” to trigger civil war 10/
But as is, it all worked out, “and so, it is clearly not worth lamenting and complaining: everything was done according to the optimal scenario.” [ie, nothing to see here, move on] 11/
Russia is not weakened. Oh no. Quite the opposite: this “only strengthened it, showing that it can cope with any crises, both external and internal. Within less than a day… Russia has passed another test, and Putin, another crash test.” 12/
“There are two more things to remember. Putin never chooses outwardly spectacular solutions, but always effective ones... After yesterday, the confidence that our country has exactly the kind of leader it needs has only grown stronger... We move on. To spite our enemies.” 13/
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The New York Times, which often feels like the US intel community's PR agency, is reporting that the IC suspects Gen Surovikin knew in advance about #Prigozhin's mutiny. Maybe so, but were I a cynic I'd wonder if this was an info op because... 1/
...Surovikin quickly issued a public appeal to Wagner mercs to stand down, making a clear statement that - contrary to previous suspicions he was close to Prigozhin - he was loyal to the Kremlin. This might have helped cleanse his record and... 2/
...make him eligible to be re-appointed overall commander in Ukraine or even made Chief of the General Staff after Gerasimov (he had been the front-runner). This would, let's be honest, not have been good for Ukraine:... 3/
All still pretty unclear as to Prigozhin's rebellion, but am struck by the uncompromising language in Putin's emergency address in which he denounces this as treason and a betrayal of the Fatherland 1/ kremlin.ru/events/preside…
If Prigozhin thought there was a deal to be struck, this implies not. But I suspect VVP has (belatedly) come down hard because he must realise just how far his own legitimacy and credibility is on the line. 2/
Putin created Prigozhin, as a useful and biddable instrument (never one of his friends), and Putin allowed the Prigozhin/Shoigu rivalry to continue way past the point at which is was becoming dangerous and dysfunctional. 3/
@Stanovaya@CarnegieRussia While I wholly accept Putin does have a grandiose sense of his historic mission, my point of divergence with you was the notion that from this came a strategy, and that he was in no way fearful about the situation 1/
@Stanovaya@CarnegieRussia First of all, I don't see Putin as a real strategist, but rather an improviser with a very loose sense of his goals; this is something that has marked his whole presidency. 2/
@Stanovaya@CarnegieRussia I also find it hard to believe that he is not at all afraid by the situation (especially having had not one but two authoritarian regimes collapse around him). However cocooned by yes-men, he must have some idea of how dire the situation and the long-term damage to Russia 3/
.@Stanovaya is always well worth reading but I'm not convinced we're just talking about a 'messiah complex' + a genuine belief on his part that everything will work out. If anything, the opposite: he's least able to make decisions when they're hard 1/ carnegieendowment.org/politika/89826
Micromanaging the war and aspects of reconstruction are distractions from the intractable big issues (like drawing up a detailed revision plan rather than actually revising!), a comfort. When faced with big, hard decisions (eg, end Kyiv offensive, leave Kherson) he dithers 2/
So he tends to make hard decisions too late and too badly - delaying mobilisation until after the campaign season and when so many trainers and so much kit had been lost was a case in point. His apparent desire to hold off any more mobilisations until after Sept elex another 3/
A vicious but fair assessment of Gerasimov from @WarintheFuture - if anything, I'd add another failure, a moral as much as professional one. A short thread 1/
The role of the CoGS is not just to be the foreman of the military imposing the leadership's orders but also the shop steward, arguing the military's case and fighting its corner. This Gerasimov failed to do, and it's hard to get any sense he even tried 2/
Obviously in particular this means before the war: Russian doctrine, its approach to preparing for war and, I understand, even warnings from the GRU all seem to have been ignored. Gerasimov ought to have been the one man to stand up for all this 3/ inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2022/03/23/how…
Hah, when I recorded this, I said that I thought Prigozhin would be walking back his threat to pull Wagner out of Bakhmut, before his deadline. I just hadn't appreciate just how quickly he would! A couple of thoughts 1/ bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur…
Realistically, Prigozhin couldn't. Apart from the practical point that Wagner depends on the MOD for strategic mobility, short of just walking west, I don't think it would have been politically survivable for a man so wholly dependent on the Kremlin - and with so many enemies 2/
It would have been considered treachery, and we know what Putin thinks about traitors. Prigozhin's whole business empire - and possibly life and freedom were at stake. 3/