Mark Galeotti Profile picture
Jul 1 12 tweets 3 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
There’s been some wild speculation that #Russia’s other mercenary forces could be the source of the “next mutiny” that misses the mark as to how they are unlike #Wagner. A quick explanatory thread 1/
Russia has PMCs and also mercenary forces: the former are generally reputable international businesses involved in mine-clearing, maritime security, training, VIP protection – not front-line fighting 2/
Then there are the real mercs. The larger ones that remain like Patriot, Shchit, Redut, are essentially offshoots of the MOD. 3/
meduza.io/en/feature/201…
Just as much domestic private security in Russia is in the hands of FGUP Okhrana, the National Guard’s corporate arm, so too these are not really independent. They are active in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, etc, but MOD calls the shots 4/
muse.jhu.edu/article/780975
Then there is a new wave of merc units being backed by corporate giants like Gazprom (Potok, Plamya, Fakel) and Roscosmos (Uran). They bankroll them and then hire them out to the MOD but – so far at least – these are not real merc companies 5/
buzzsprout.com/1026985/episod…
We don’t see them anywhere but Ukraine. They are really just ways for the state to force corporations to pay to raise more troops, and they seem to have recruited in the 100s not 1000s. Operational control is again in the MOD’s hands. 6/
Besides, state corporations have a stake in the status quo that a relatively loose cannon like Priogozhin, for all that Concord depends on Kremlin contract, lacked. While Prigozhin challenged the chain of command in Ukraine, they don’t 7/
inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2022/11/16/fy2…
There are some more ideological groups such as the ENOT Corps, which was Prigozhin-linked, but infused much more with ultra-nationalist ideology (like Wagner’s Rusich ‘Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group’) 8/
One could see these acting with more agency, but they are small and, I think, carefully watched for that very reason. 9/
Finally, there are what one could call territorial mercs, such as Convoy, established by Crimean head Sergei Aksenov, and, of course, Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechens. They have a powerful potential or actual local role, to be sure, but limited power projection potential 10/
The Kadyrovtsy are more serious and more numerous and can be troublesome, but their territorial base is Chechnya and, frankly, I think everyone would unite against them if they tried anything independently outside the N Caucasus 11/
So while Putin still appears willing to countenance mercs after the mutiny (really, he ought to read more Machiavelli), these are rather different forces in terms of scale, subordination and role. I see no equivalents of Wagner on the horizon. 12/end

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More from @MarkGaleotti

Jun 29
“Why the events of Saturday did not weaken, but only strengthened our country.” This article in the tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda gives a good sense of the new propaganda line, as the Kremlin desperately tries to spin the Prigozhin mutiny 1/
kp.ru/daily/27520.5/…
“Russia passed another test”, it begins, excoriating “the great couch army” that hid on Saturday or praised Prigozhin, and then “began Sunday morning with belligerent statements that the authorities had done everything wrong again.” 2/
But who was the real hero? Not #Lukashenko, though “let’s not argue, he played a big role” but really just as a mouthpiece for "a man who, in a difficult situation, did not lose his composure, acting, as always, as efficiently and rationally as possible.” Of course: Putin 3/
Read 13 tweets
Jun 28
The New York Times, which often feels like the US intel community's PR agency, is reporting that the IC suspects Gen Surovikin knew in advance about #Prigozhin's mutiny. Maybe so, but were I a cynic I'd wonder if this was an info op because... 1/
...Surovikin quickly issued a public appeal to Wagner mercs to stand down, making a clear statement that - contrary to previous suspicions he was close to Prigozhin - he was loyal to the Kremlin. This might have helped cleanse his record and... 2/
...make him eligible to be re-appointed overall commander in Ukraine or even made Chief of the General Staff after Gerasimov (he had been the front-runner). This would, let's be honest, not have been good for Ukraine:... 3/
Read 5 tweets
Jun 24
All still pretty unclear as to Prigozhin's rebellion, but am struck by the uncompromising language in Putin's emergency address in which he denounces this as treason and a betrayal of the Fatherland 1/
kremlin.ru/events/preside…
If Prigozhin thought there was a deal to be struck, this implies not. But I suspect VVP has (belatedly) come down hard because he must realise just how far his own legitimacy and credibility is on the line. 2/
Putin created Prigozhin, as a useful and biddable instrument (never one of his friends), and Putin allowed the Prigozhin/Shoigu rivalry to continue way past the point at which is was becoming dangerous and dysfunctional. 3/
Read 4 tweets
May 28
@Stanovaya @CarnegieRussia While I wholly accept Putin does have a grandiose sense of his historic mission, my point of divergence with you was the notion that from this came a strategy, and that he was in no way fearful about the situation 1/
@Stanovaya @CarnegieRussia First of all, I don't see Putin as a real strategist, but rather an improviser with a very loose sense of his goals; this is something that has marked his whole presidency. 2/
@Stanovaya @CarnegieRussia I also find it hard to believe that he is not at all afraid by the situation (especially having had not one but two authoritarian regimes collapse around him). However cocooned by yes-men, he must have some idea of how dire the situation and the long-term damage to Russia 3/
Read 6 tweets
May 27
.@Stanovaya is always well worth reading but I'm not convinced we're just talking about a 'messiah complex' + a genuine belief on his part that everything will work out. If anything, the opposite: he's least able to make decisions when they're hard 1/
carnegieendowment.org/politika/89826 Image
Micromanaging the war and aspects of reconstruction are distractions from the intractable big issues (like drawing up a detailed revision plan rather than actually revising!), a comfort. When faced with big, hard decisions (eg, end Kyiv offensive, leave Kherson) he dithers 2/
So he tends to make hard decisions too late and too badly - delaying mobilisation until after the campaign season and when so many trainers and so much kit had been lost was a case in point. His apparent desire to hold off any more mobilisations until after Sept elex another 3/
Read 6 tweets
May 10
A vicious but fair assessment of Gerasimov from @WarintheFuture - if anything, I'd add another failure, a moral as much as professional one. A short thread 1/
The role of the CoGS is not just to be the foreman of the military imposing the leadership's orders but also the shop steward, arguing the military's case and fighting its corner. This Gerasimov failed to do, and it's hard to get any sense he even tried 2/
Obviously in particular this means before the war: Russian doctrine, its approach to preparing for war and, I understand, even warnings from the GRU all seem to have been ignored. Gerasimov ought to have been the one man to stand up for all this 3/
inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2022/03/23/how…
Read 7 tweets

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