Thread by @TrentTelenko

This thread is going to expand on a point from a June 19, 2023 thread that has bugged the heck out of me for a while.

"Dude, where is the Russian Army barbed wire?"

A Barbed Wire & more🧵

1/

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1670971895594856449

The systematic lack of barbed wire in satellite evaluations of Russian trench fortifications is really darned noticeable when you go back to reference materials on WW1 and WW2 trench systems.

2/

https://twitter.com/emilkastehelmi/status/1671399475028414465

The lack of Russian barbed wire in overhead imagery of their trench systems/field fortifications, when you hit the photographic interpretation reference materials, positively glows.

3/

This figure of a fully developed WW2 field fortification is from FM 30-236 Tactical Interpretation of Air Photos.

Both barbed wire and two man fighting & crew served weapon positions ahead of the fighting trench are signatures of WW2 field fortifications.

4/

Those fighting positions are consistent with 1943/Kursk era field fortification clipped from Osprey's "Soviet Field Fortifications 1941-1945."

The whole point of what FM 30-236 calls "Bracelet & Bangles" fighting positions ahead of the trench line was to get enfilading
5/

...machine gun fire on troops stacked up at barbed wire obstacles in the same way anti-tank fire does for anti-tank trenches or dragon's teeth.

And what mine fields do for both vehicles & infantry.

6/

And the lack of camouflage for Russian trench work to prevent field glasses or overhead photos for reconnaissance planes in WW2 or, far more importantly now, drones, is another "The WW2 Soviet Army no longer lives in today's Russian Army" moment.

7/

This series of figures from FM 30-236 shows how a series of hasty foxhole positions evolved into a proper fortified zone over time.

We have seen nothing like this by the Russians in Ukraine.

Ukraine, OTOH, made a propaganda video showing they do this the WW2 Red Army way.
8/

These overhead photographs from "World War Two Photo Intelligence" and FM 30-236 respectively show German and British fortified zones using barbed wire.

Barbed wire supporting field fortifications is highly visible in poor WW2 camera's aerial photos, if you look for it.

9/

This is another WW2 overhead photo sample of the missing barbed wire operational pattern from FM 30-236 that the Twitter OSINT crowd & Western Intelligence have consistently missed.

10/

Nothing like that WW2 Soviet Army at Kursk integrated barbed wire, Anti-tank trench and mine obstacle field fortification Osprey drew has appeared in Ukraine.

There appear to be a couple of things going on that explain its lack in satellite imagery of Ukraine.

11/

A lot of Russian field fortifications seem to be contractor built, (Crimea photos🔽) which explains the lack of wire, overhead cover & the inability to place it's dragon teeth into a WW2 style concrete matrix that makes them actually functional for use
12/
https://t.co/eRiXM8gH4M

https://twitter.com/ZalogaSteven/status/1636786330662502401

And it isn't a matter of Russia lacking barbed wire in front line trenches.

This video shows undeployed barbed wire in the bottom of Russian trenches at the 46 and 56 second mark.

13/
https://t.co/xTIwEYfD3y

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1674169260501786625

RuAF has given their troops barbed wire, but the local leadership, know how, and basic kit to install it tactically is lacking.

This is another symptom of a Russian "Lanchester square collapse" in progress.

The utter lack Russian instructor cadre to make
14/

...trained junior officers or even provide 90 days of basic training for mobiks before combat is the heart of what Lanchester square collapse is.

We are seeing symptoms of that with the unused barbed wire in that Russian trench and

15/

...to the lack of satellite photos of barbed wire or two man defensive fighting positions ahead of the trenches are dead giveaways.

So is this 62 year old Mobik who was mobilized 2 weeks ago. He was not trained to install barbed wire.

He was as
16/
https://t.co/bgiwaia6UNreddit.com/r/UkraineWarVi…

...close to an innocent lamb as any Russian soldier in Ukraine can be.

Two weeks from the streets of Russia to capture in Ukraine isn't enough time to be trained to properly operate a rifle or dig a proper latrine.

There was no time to learn Installing barbed wire.

17/

The Soviet Army doesn't live in Russia anymore.

The Soviets kept back a lot of cadets in 1941-1942 that showed up as officers in 1943. When that Kurask level of integrated barbed wire, dragon's teeth, anti-tank ditch obstacle field fortification trench system appeared.

18/

Case in point was Dmitry Loza, who crewed Sherman tanks for the Soviets to Vienna and Manchuria.

He was drafted in 1940 and graduated from the Saratov Tank School in 1942.

From 1 June 1943 on, he fought on the Western Front as commander of the 2nd
19/

https://t.co/gYGrALby3Wen.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Lo…

...Tank Company of the 1st Tank Battalion of the 233rd Tank Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Corps.

Putin's Russia has consistently done a Potemkin village 180 degree replacement for Soviet practices.

See this of Russian eating instructor seed corn🔽

20/ https://t.co/ds9G1zLxn7t.me/informnapalm/1…

The deputy commander of the 610 Center for combat use and retraining of flight personnel was in the AN-22M intelligence plane Wagner shot down.

NB see also Soviet air defence and air strike doctrine that were all thrown out the window in 1992 and evidently not replaced.

21/

So this is a pervasive problem for RuAF - every useful bit of doctrinal knowledge they inherited was thrown away & replaced with nothing useful.

Conversely the AFU has cherry picked the useful bits of Soviet doctrine, improved it, and melded it with useful bits of

22/

...Western doctrine.

The Ukrainian article "WHEN THE GODS OF ARTILLERY MAKE A POINT" is a chronicle of the use of the SS-21 SCARAB TBM and BM-30 SMERCH MLRS in Donbass against the Russian invasion


23/petrimazepa.com/goddot.html

...force up to the Debaltsevo salient, often used as a substitute for air power, for time critical targets, or targets that were too well defended for air attack, or too deep for 152mm or 203mm arty.

Language is jargon and colloquial, and did not agree with Google Translate

24/

...much.

The usual regime described was the use of SOF scouts who would geolocate targets deep behind enemy lines, and call in a TBM or MLRS strike, then BDA the effects. Often used to interdict convoys, using initial shots against lead and trail vehicles to immobilise...

25/

...the convoy for subsequent shots.

The essay includes discussion of multiple strikes against the Russian fire base on the Southern flank of Mt Saur-Mogila that militia troops at the time described as thermobaric damage effects, with all of the artillery and mortar pieces...
26/

...twisted out of shape, and the whole area blackened and scorched, and all of the Russian troops incinerated.

This was a Russian Reconnaissance Fire Complex executed by AFU with Western satellite telephones.

27/
community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/f…

The Ukrainian ability to use HIMARS/GMLRS so well was not due to any Western training.

GMLRS simply stood in doctrinally for the Luchs Adler/Vilhka-M GMLRS Ukraine could not afford to build in in large enough numbers before the war

This is why we saw the disproportionate
28/

...impact of HIMARS/GMLRS in the summer of 2022.

We have a lot of experts pontificating over "Soviet doctrine failing," while it is not actually being used by anyone but Ukraine.

29/

The lack of Soviet Army era barbed wire, troop training, air defense & strike doctrine is typical Putinist Russia.

Where everything is a Potemkin Village for propaganda show.

And far too may have bought into it for too long.

30/30 End

@threadreaderapp unroll please.