This RUSI report, looking at preliminary lessons from Feb-July last year, is one I come back to again and again. Its core message is one I hear again and again. "There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth."
https://t.co/Y3uK3ibMDbstatic.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
.@nicolange_'s paper for @GLOBSEC, published in February, is another outstanding survey of what Ukraine has been doing right. He emphasises areas in which NATO countries would find it hard to emulate Ukrainian practices for various reasons.
https://t.co/8DQuBYFNe9globsec.org/sites/default/…
Sweden's @FOIresearch team (including @MansRAD, @niklas_granholm) have produced very good output on Russia-Ukraine, including a study last summer () and more recently a forward-looking anthology (https://t.co/3sGivzdPKM).foi.se/rapportsammanf… foi.se/en/foi/reports…
.@HoansSolo, among other good writing, has reflected on the ways in which Ukraine might offer false or misleading lessons for a war over Taiwan. He disagrees with one of the points I emphasise in the special report—that defence is likely to dominate. https://t.co/genq3KWlZ1foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/02/les…
Ben Barry for @IISS_org looks at some of the lessons for land war. He points to the basics: "The war reminds us that the prime requirement for armed forces is competence."
https://t.co/BjVi9Yq7WAiiss.org/globalassets/m…
Israeli analysis has been good at putting the war into perspective, particularly in picking out the ways it echoes typical land wars of the past:
Here's one piece by Eado Hecht:
And another below by @Eyal_Berelovich https://t.co/bDHp5iKEyq https://t.co/WrRsNHbZhobesacenter.org/the-russo-ukra… idf.il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D…
Estonia's defence ministry has been a consistently pragmatic voice on the war, warning of Russian military strength even when others have played it down. Some of their assessments seem a bit pessimistic to me, but always worth reading: https://t.co/IahY1cfLbbkaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/…
.@peterwsinger looks at the technologies in use in Ukraine. "So too in Ukraine, we have seen similar examples of new technology in use—not drastically shaping the fighting, but providing signs of what’s to come." newamerica.org/international-…
We've also spoken to officials on what lessons they are drawing:
- @PedderSophie & I interviewed France's top general:
- @BWallaceMP on how defence review will reflect lessons: https://t.co/hfnmQeZgso
- JIC chair on intel lessons: https://t.co/zrSy9dSPc6 https://t.co/1Ix88EzdZAeconomist.com/europe/2023/06… economist.com/britain/2023/0… economist.com/britain/2023/0…
.@defpriorities has a good symposium from Feb on lessons, many from experts of a more realist bent. @AngelaStent: "The most important lesson U.S. strategists and policymakers should take away from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that deterrence failed." defensepriorities.org/symposium/less…
On resilience, society and total defence: Hannah Shelest on Ukraine's "third way", between the "whole-of-society" approach (Sweden, Finland, etc) and the big-power highly centralised approach (US, Russia, China). "Europeans should learn from this." https://t.co/Xqiyypu4suecfr.eu/publication/de…
Finally, though I will have a proper sources & acknowledgments section up shortly, I want to thank the many people who anonymously shared their insights with me for this special report—in particular the Ukrainian experts & officials generous with their time & wisdom in Kyiv.
I'll add some as they occur to me. @AmosFox6 in RUSI Journal: "today’s technological investments accelerate the death of manoeuvre while increasing the possibility of replicating [WW1] battlefields [eg] Somme, Ypres & Verdun—static, defensive, destructive" https://t.co/i58yqldWp4tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
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1/ The UK Parliament's intelligence & security committee (ISC) has published its first full annual report in two years, covering the administration and finance of the UK intelligence community. A few highlights below. isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/upl…
2/ As in previous reports, the committee notes that more & more departments are doing security & intel work compared to the past, and that the ISC doesn't have sight of these. "The impact of these matters has become more serious since then," it says. isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/upl…
3/ ISC: "China’s state intelligence apparatus – almost certainly the largest in the world – targets the UK and its interests prolifically and aggressively, presenting a challenge for our Agencies to cover" isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/upl…
1/ The first of two speeches by UK military / intelligence leaders today. The later one by Rich Knighton, the new chief of defence staff. This one by Blaise Metreweli, the chief of MI6. "We are now operating in a space between peace and war." gov.uk/government/spe…
2/ Metreweli says speech is not a "global threat tour". Says China "a central part of the global transformation taking place this century" and "essential that we, as MI6, continue to inform the govt's understanding of China’s rise and the implications for UK national security."
3/ Metreweli says "Russia is testing us in the grey zone with tactics that are just below the threshold of war" and includes "Drones buzzing airports and bases." About as close to an official attribution as you're going to get. gov.uk/government/spe…
Trump's national security strategy is out and some of the Europe sections are shocking. "...the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed
gives cause for great optimism." whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
Trump national security strategy: Make Europe White Again.
"Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades ...certain NATO members will become majority non-European"
"the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure"
As far as I can see, this nat sec strategy is far harsher on Europe than on Russia. There is no mention of a threat from Russia or of deterrence, only that "re-establishing strategic stability" is a priority. Europe is cast as a major threat to freedom.
The proposal is nothing short of a very bad joke. I mean, read this:
"$100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine;
-- The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture."
The fact that this absurd and unworkable clause is in there is itself a suggestion that the proposal is the basis for further negotiation and not a "take it or leave it"
"military assessments seen by the FT show that Yantar was one of several Russian naval vessels that congregated in UK waters for 13 months of sustained surveillance around nodes of critical infrastructure starting in the autumn of 2023." ft.com/content/0b3510…
"adversaries could interfere with the timing signals in underwater communication cables by altering the frequency of pulses passing through them — causing severe disruption in time-sensitive industries such as high-frequency trading." ft.com/content/0b3510…
AIS/radar analysis "suggests that this vessel [Yantar] was stationary for several hours in a small stretch of sea containing three major cables — the CeltixConnect-2, Geo-Eirgrid and Rockabill—all of which are data connections linking Ireland with the UK." ft.com/content/0b3510…
Some defence stories in this week’s @TheEconomist. First, we looked at Ukraine’s new cruise missile. ‘Production…at least partially carried out abroad, but “over 90%”, the company says, of final assembly is in secret sites dispersed throughout Ukraine’ economist.com/europe/2025/08…
We reported on the Wagner group’s meltdown in Mali. “Murdering ordinary Malians, it turns out, is a bad way to win over ordinary Malians. Informants have dried up.” economist.com/middle-east-an…
We examined the US naval buildup in the Caribbean & whether it’s really for counter-narcotic purposes. ‘This “looks just right to scare the daylights out of Maduro’s supporters”, says Evan Ellis of the US Army War College.’ economist.com/the-americas/2…