This RUSI report, looking at preliminary lessons from Feb-July last year, is one I come back to again and again. Its core message is one I hear again and again. "There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth."
https://t.co/Y3uK3ibMDbstatic.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
.@nicolange_'s paper for @GLOBSEC, published in February, is another outstanding survey of what Ukraine has been doing right. He emphasises areas in which NATO countries would find it hard to emulate Ukrainian practices for various reasons.
https://t.co/8DQuBYFNe9globsec.org/sites/default/…
Sweden's @FOIresearch team (including @MansRAD, @niklas_granholm) have produced very good output on Russia-Ukraine, including a study last summer () and more recently a forward-looking anthology (https://t.co/3sGivzdPKM).foi.se/rapportsammanf… foi.se/en/foi/reports…
.@HoansSolo, among other good writing, has reflected on the ways in which Ukraine might offer false or misleading lessons for a war over Taiwan. He disagrees with one of the points I emphasise in the special report—that defence is likely to dominate. https://t.co/genq3KWlZ1foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/02/les…
Ben Barry for @IISS_org looks at some of the lessons for land war. He points to the basics: "The war reminds us that the prime requirement for armed forces is competence."
https://t.co/BjVi9Yq7WAiiss.org/globalassets/m…
Israeli analysis has been good at putting the war into perspective, particularly in picking out the ways it echoes typical land wars of the past:
Here's one piece by Eado Hecht:
And another below by @Eyal_Berelovich https://t.co/bDHp5iKEyq https://t.co/WrRsNHbZhobesacenter.org/the-russo-ukra… idf.il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D…
Estonia's defence ministry has been a consistently pragmatic voice on the war, warning of Russian military strength even when others have played it down. Some of their assessments seem a bit pessimistic to me, but always worth reading: https://t.co/IahY1cfLbbkaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/…
.@peterwsinger looks at the technologies in use in Ukraine. "So too in Ukraine, we have seen similar examples of new technology in use—not drastically shaping the fighting, but providing signs of what’s to come." newamerica.org/international-…
We've also spoken to officials on what lessons they are drawing:
- @PedderSophie & I interviewed France's top general:
- @BWallaceMP on how defence review will reflect lessons: https://t.co/hfnmQeZgso
- JIC chair on intel lessons: https://t.co/zrSy9dSPc6 https://t.co/1Ix88EzdZAeconomist.com/europe/2023/06… economist.com/britain/2023/0… economist.com/britain/2023/0…
.@defpriorities has a good symposium from Feb on lessons, many from experts of a more realist bent. @AngelaStent: "The most important lesson U.S. strategists and policymakers should take away from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that deterrence failed." defensepriorities.org/symposium/less…
On resilience, society and total defence: Hannah Shelest on Ukraine's "third way", between the "whole-of-society" approach (Sweden, Finland, etc) and the big-power highly centralised approach (US, Russia, China). "Europeans should learn from this." https://t.co/Xqiyypu4suecfr.eu/publication/de…
Finally, though I will have a proper sources & acknowledgments section up shortly, I want to thank the many people who anonymously shared their insights with me for this special report—in particular the Ukrainian experts & officials generous with their time & wisdom in Kyiv.
I'll add some as they occur to me. @AmosFox6 in RUSI Journal: "today’s technological investments accelerate the death of manoeuvre while increasing the possibility of replicating [WW1] battlefields [eg] Somme, Ypres & Verdun—static, defensive, destructive" https://t.co/i58yqldWp4tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
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Good account of a KGB "dangle" to the CIA in the cold war. "GTPROLOGUE exemplifies CIA’s troubled experience with hostile double agents during the 1980s, when a few select services—particularly the Soviets, East Germans & Cubans—badly burned the agency." cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"The ‘85–86 losses [due to Ames], as they became colloquially known within CIA, also signaled the need for a major KGB undertaking to deceive CIA as to the real reason for these losses. A multichannel KGB disinformation campaign, which operated from at least 1986, was launched" cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"Within the KGB, the Soviet preoccupation with secrecy fostered an institutional bias against release of the sort of valid feed typically required to establish the credibility of a deception channel." cia.gov/resources/csi/…
Important. "The US military strikes on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities last weekend did not destroy the core components of the country’s nuclear program and likely only set it back by months, according to an early US [DIA] intelligence assessment" edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
Wow. 'Two of the people familiar w/ the assessment said Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium was not destroyed. One of the people said the centrifuges are largely “intact.” “...the (DIA) assessment is that the US set them back maybe a few months, tops”...' edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
And a caveat. "It is still early for the US to have a comprehensive picture of the impact of the strikes, and none of the sources described how the DIA assessment compares to the view of other agencies in the intelligence community." edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
Pentagon briefing: “I know that battle damage is of great interest. Final battle damage will take some time, but initial battle damage assessments indicate that all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction.”
Pentagon briefing: “In total, US forces employed approximately 75 precision guided weapons during this operation. This included, as the President stated last night, 14 30,000 pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance penetrators, marking the first ever operational use of this weapon.”
Pentagon briefing: “our initial assessment… is that all of our precision munitions struck where we wanted them to strike and had the desired effect, which means especially in Fordo, which was the primary target here, we believe we achieved destruction of capabilities there”
1. Useful details here. “While some American officials find the Israeli estimate credible, others emphasized that the U.S. intelligence assessment remained unchanged” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
2. “American spy agencies believe that it could take several months, and up to a year, for Iran to make a weapon.” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
3. “new [White House] assessments echoed material provided by Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, which believes that Iran can achieve a nuclear weapon in 15 days.”
But: “None of the new assessments on the timeline to get a bomb are based on newly collected intelligence”
1. British Army CGS speaking at RUSI Land Warfare Conference: Today "nearly 100%" of army lethality comes from highly sophisticated crewed platforms. 100% of equip budget on sustaining that or buying next. But says army would los/e w these: "on the wrong side of the cost curve"
2. CGS says army will always need these sophisticated platforms at heart of land power. Aways need boots on ground &won't put them on ground without proper protected vehicles. But need to "layer around them a series of attritable platforms" to sense more & launch more munitions.
3. CGS argues that for price of two attack helicopters the army could instead “layer” disposable “mule drones” and “one way effectors” (attack drones) to go from 16 kills at 16km standoff to 200+ kills at 50+km standoff. That gets to 2x-3x “lethality” he argues.
'To reach even [Natanz] all the weapons available to the Israeli Air Force, and all except the 30,000 lbs GBU-57/B and the 5,000 lbs GBU 72/B available to the United States, would likely require several impacts into the same crater to ‘burrow’ down...' rusi.org/explore-our-re…
"For the FFEP [Fordow] and new facility at Natanz at an estimated 80-100 meters, possibly with layers of reinforced concrete, even the GBU-57/B [carried by B2/B21] would likely require multiple impacts at the same aiming point to have a good chance of penetrating the facility."
"Strikes with lesser penetrating weapons could still collapse entry and exit tunnels...However, unless a longer-term campaign were mounted with regular follow-up strikes, efforts to dig down...to re-establish access and supplies would likely begin almost immediately."