This RUSI report, looking at preliminary lessons from Feb-July last year, is one I come back to again and again. Its core message is one I hear again and again. "There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth."
https://t.co/Y3uK3ibMDbstatic.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
.@nicolange_'s paper for @GLOBSEC, published in February, is another outstanding survey of what Ukraine has been doing right. He emphasises areas in which NATO countries would find it hard to emulate Ukrainian practices for various reasons.
https://t.co/8DQuBYFNe9globsec.org/sites/default/…
Sweden's @FOIresearch team (including @MansRAD, @niklas_granholm) have produced very good output on Russia-Ukraine, including a study last summer () and more recently a forward-looking anthology (https://t.co/3sGivzdPKM).foi.se/rapportsammanf… foi.se/en/foi/reports…
.@HoansSolo, among other good writing, has reflected on the ways in which Ukraine might offer false or misleading lessons for a war over Taiwan. He disagrees with one of the points I emphasise in the special report—that defence is likely to dominate. https://t.co/genq3KWlZ1foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/02/les…
Ben Barry for @IISS_org looks at some of the lessons for land war. He points to the basics: "The war reminds us that the prime requirement for armed forces is competence."
https://t.co/BjVi9Yq7WAiiss.org/globalassets/m…
Israeli analysis has been good at putting the war into perspective, particularly in picking out the ways it echoes typical land wars of the past:
Here's one piece by Eado Hecht:
And another below by @Eyal_Berelovich https://t.co/bDHp5iKEyq https://t.co/WrRsNHbZhobesacenter.org/the-russo-ukra… idf.il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D…
Estonia's defence ministry has been a consistently pragmatic voice on the war, warning of Russian military strength even when others have played it down. Some of their assessments seem a bit pessimistic to me, but always worth reading: https://t.co/IahY1cfLbbkaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/…
.@peterwsinger looks at the technologies in use in Ukraine. "So too in Ukraine, we have seen similar examples of new technology in use—not drastically shaping the fighting, but providing signs of what’s to come." newamerica.org/international-…
We've also spoken to officials on what lessons they are drawing:
- @PedderSophie & I interviewed France's top general:
- @BWallaceMP on how defence review will reflect lessons: https://t.co/hfnmQeZgso
- JIC chair on intel lessons: https://t.co/zrSy9dSPc6 https://t.co/1Ix88EzdZAeconomist.com/europe/2023/06… economist.com/britain/2023/0… economist.com/britain/2023/0…
.@defpriorities has a good symposium from Feb on lessons, many from experts of a more realist bent. @AngelaStent: "The most important lesson U.S. strategists and policymakers should take away from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that deterrence failed." defensepriorities.org/symposium/less…
On resilience, society and total defence: Hannah Shelest on Ukraine's "third way", between the "whole-of-society" approach (Sweden, Finland, etc) and the big-power highly centralised approach (US, Russia, China). "Europeans should learn from this." https://t.co/Xqiyypu4suecfr.eu/publication/de…
Finally, though I will have a proper sources & acknowledgments section up shortly, I want to thank the many people who anonymously shared their insights with me for this special report—in particular the Ukrainian experts & officials generous with their time & wisdom in Kyiv.
I'll add some as they occur to me. @AmosFox6 in RUSI Journal: "today’s technological investments accelerate the death of manoeuvre while increasing the possibility of replicating [WW1] battlefields [eg] Somme, Ypres & Verdun—static, defensive, destructive" https://t.co/i58yqldWp4tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
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An interesting essay on how US intelligence agencies judged Soviet intentions and capabilities & how that changed over time. "...probably incorrectly believing there was also a Soviet proclivity to prepare to launch a war if conditions seemed propitious" cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"...considerable [Soviet] exaggerations of Western bellicosity and capabilities, including planning for initiation of war. Soviet intel estimates, like those of the United States and NATO, were always predicated on initiation of war by the other side" cia.gov/resources/csi/…
'It is clear in retrospect that what had been needed in 1976 was not a hard-line Team B, but a more imaginative and far-seeing "Team C."' cia.gov/resources/csi/…
I've been reviewing many of the past year's US & European military & intelligence assessments of how long it would take Russia to rebuild its military capability and the timeline on which any threat to NATO could unfold. A brief thread below which summarises these assessments.
Norway intel service: "At the earliest, Moscow may be able to fully realise these plans [for military expansion e.g. Karelia] five to ten years after the war in Ukraine is over." In some areas Russia has "next to no reserves" for the next two years. etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/…
Denmark intel: "no threat" now & "some years" for new units to be ready, but Ru more willing to use force "if it believes...NATO...is unable to maintain its military superiority, does not respond to Ru mil activities or no longer presents a united front." fe-ddis.dk/globalassets/f…
I wrote a piece on China’s evolution into a bigger, more sophisticated and more threatening cyber power over the past decade, and particularly in the last few years. I also look at the pivotal role played by China’s private sector ecosystem in that shift. economist.com/china/2025/03/…
A few sources. Ciaran Martin’s very good survey from a few days ago gazumped mine. rusi.org/explore-our-re…
Absolutely incredible. The Trump admin accidentally adds the editor of the Atlantic to a Signal group. Then Pete Hegseth sends him details of the US strikes on Yemen hours ahead of time incl. "precise information about weapons packages, targets & timing" theatlantic.com/politics/archi…
Walz: "it will have to be the United States that reopens these shipping lanes [Red Sea]. Per the president’s request we are working with DOD and State to determine how to compile the cost associated and levy them on the Europeans" theatlantic.com/politics/archi…
Stephen Miller: "...if Europe doesn’t remunerate [for Houthi strikes], then what? If the US successfully restores freedom of navigation at great cost there needs to be some further economic gain extracted in return" theatlantic.com/politics/archi…
Witkoff on UK troop proposals. “it’s a combination of a posture and a pose and…simplistic. I think there’s this … sort of notion of we’ve all got to be like Winston Churchill, the Russians are gonna march across Europe. I think that’s preposterous” singjupost.com/transcript-of-…
Witkoff transcript is just eye popping: “Why would they want to absorb Ukraine? For what purpose, exactly? They don’t need to absorb Ukraine. That would be like occupying Gaza…They want stability there… But the Russians also have what they want” singjupost.com/transcript-of-…
Witkoff on US-Russia cooperation: “Share sea lanes, maybe send LNG gas into Europe together, maybe collaborate on AI together. If we can get past technology migration. Who doesn’t want to see a world like that?” singjupost.com/transcript-of-…
America’s main negotiator with Russia appears to be completely captured by Russian propaganda. Witkoff: “there have been referendums where the overwhelming majority of the people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule.” pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/…
The Russians must be dumbstruck they their opponents have managed to find perhaps the most gullible man on the planet. Putin “told me a story, Tucker, about how when the president was shot, he went to his local church and met with his priest and prayed.” pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/…
‘"I don’t regard Putin as a bad guy. That is a complicated situation, that war, and all the ingredients that led up to it," Witkoff noted.’ pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/…