In Germany @derspiegel, @welt, @ntvde and in Austria @derStandardat write that "the Ukrainian Offensive has failed"... ...
That is wild nonsense.
This nonsense happens, because all of them interviewed the same expert, who doesn't understand Ukraine's Offensive phases, of
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which there are at least 5, and we're barely in the middle of Phase 1 - Attrition & Interdiction.
I wouldn't have to do this thread, if i.e. @derStandardat wouldn't confuse the Ukrainian Army's Assault brigades, with the National Guard's Offensive Guard brigades, but...
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The reason people don't consider Ukraine's Phase 1 a success comes from people being used to US/NATO wars, in which Phase 1 is purely air power.
Phase 1 is meant to attrition enemy forces and interdict/disrupt their lines of communication. The West uses fighters and bombers, 3/n
and cruise missiles for that.
During the 1991 Gulf War 1,700+ coalition combat aircraft needed 37 (!) days and 100,000+ sorties to attrition the Iraqi forces enough to trigger the ground campaign. And 288 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired at Iraqi targets. 4/n
During the 2003 Invasion of Iraq coalition combat aircraft flew 41,000 sorties and fired 802 Tomahawks at Iraqi targets.
This time the coalition skipped the attrition phase and went directly to Phase 2 - Close Air Support = bombing a road to Baghdad for the 1st Marine and 5/n
3rd Infantry divisions.
Ukraine doesn't have any of this air power; and so Ukraine is forced to replace fighters and bombers with GMLRS, Excalibur, Storm Shadow and drones.
Whereas in US and NATO operations the sky is continuously swarming with fighters and bombers looking 6/n
for enemy positions and vehicles to annihilate, all Ukraine has in the air are drones, which look for russian equipment, ammo points, command centers, logistic points, etc. but the drones can't bomb these objects.
Once a drone spots a target, the drone operator has to request
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mensuration, the results of which are then transmitted to either a M142 HIMARS or M270A1 MLRS launcher, which will enter the target's coordinates into a GMLRS rocket; or transmitted to a M777, PzH 2000, M109A6 or Archer howitzer, which will enter the target's coordinates into 8/n
an Excalibur projectile; or the data is transmitted to the Ukrainian Air Force's 7th Tactical Aviation Brigade, which will enter the target's coordinates into a Storm Shadow...
Did you notice that all of these take time? Ukraine can only hit russian equipment that is static. 9/n
Unlike Western fighters, which can hit the passenger seat of a driving car, Ukraine can only hit russian vehicles and objects that are static. A massive drawback.
Even worse: a US fighter jet can fly deep into enemy territory, and hit a dozen targets 500km behind the front, 10/n
while Ukraine's range is limited to:
Excalibur range: 40 km
GMLRS range: 84 km
Storm Shadow range: 500+ km, but only in limited numbers
Ukraine is massively handicapped by the time it takes to hit a russian target and by the range of its systems. (GLSDB will improve HIMARS 11/n
range but the production line is not yet running...)
Now if you're russia, all you have to do it to park your heavy equipment outside of GMLRS range and Ukraine can't hit it.
It makes no sense to use a expensive Storm Shadow missile to hit i.e. a russian T-90M tank...
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Still Ukraine must attrition russia's heavy equipment before it can begin Phase 2 of the offensive... and the only way to do it is to bait russian forces into GMLRS and Excalibur range.
And Ukraine is doing this right now by attacking the russian lines with four of the ten 13/n
All other brigades (i.e. 35th Marine, 68th Jaeger, etc.) are merely supporting these four brigades. 14/n
A further six brigades can be deployed for this phase. Now the russians are in a dilemma: either bring their heavy equipment forward and risk losing it to GMLRS and Excalibur or leave their heavy equipment out of range and allow Ukraine an unexpected early breakthrough
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through the russians lines... well, the russians decided to bring their equipment forward and Ukraine is hitting it relentlessly.
Still it is a far, far slower process than air power... and unlike in an air campaign Ukraine is losing troops and vehicles... and this has led 16/n
to some analysts declaring the Ukrainian Offensive a "failure"... it is NOT. These "analysts" and "experts" just fail to understand the Ukrainian plan.
And they fail to understand that Ukraine gets stronger every day: Ukraine readied 35 (!) brigades for the offensive, by
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raising new units, splitting existing units, pulling units out of the front and refreshing them... and just 4 of 35 are in the fight now.
All the others are at the training grounds - training every day to improve their skills; AND incorporating the lessons learned in the 18/n
offensive so far.
And every day troops return from training in NATO countries and Sweden; and new equipment arrives - the Offensive Guard brigades started out as light infantry... and are now getting tanks from Germany and Denmark, turning them into mechanized formations. 19/n
So many troops return from training in Europe that Ukraine recently formed three new brigades; and as the russians have stopped attacks in the South and along the Donetsk front, Ukraine recently pulled two elite brigades out of the front to freshen them up for the offensive.
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How can an offensive have "failed" if more than 90% of forces are still training for the offensive?
I do not know when the next Phase of the Ukrainian Offensive will begin... but I am sure it is not tied to a date or certain geographic locations.
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I assume the next Phase will be triggered when Ukraine is confident it has destroyed a certain % of the remaining russian howitzers, rocket launchers, electronic warfare systems, air defense systems; and degraded russian logististics by striking russian supply lines, and 22/n
destroyed most of the russian ammo dumps and command posts... you know, the exact same parameters that triggered the ground campaign of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Ukraine's Offensive has barely begun. And due to the lack of air power Phase 1 will take far longer than 23/n
people are used to... but journalists need to come up every day with a fresh new drama.
But the real story here is how many more forces Ukraine is readying, how many more forces Ukraine and NATO are training, and how much more equipment the West needs to donate for these
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new units.
In Phase 3 Ukrainian forces will slice through russian lines and liberate Mariupol; will cross the Dnipro and liberate Northern Crimea; and will destroy russia's army in the South.
Ukraine's victory is inevitable. We just need a bit of patience.
25/end
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Gripen fans continue to spam my mention with claims how fantastic Sweden's Bas 90 and Gripen combination is... and that it would work for Canada's North too...
Ok, let's quickly compare Canada's three northern territories (Yukon, Northwest, Nunavut) and Sweden... ... 1/6
Land area:
🇸🇪 450,295 km2 (173,860 sq mi)
🇨🇦 terr.: 3,593,589 km2 (173,860 sq mi)
The land area of just the three territories (without Canada's 10 provinces) is already 8 times bigger than all of Sweden...
(In total Canada's land area is 9,984,670 km2
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(3,855,100 sq mi) or 22 times Sweden).
Population:
🇸🇪 10.61 million
🇨🇦 terr.: 0.13 million
Sweden's population is 81.6 times bigger than that of the three territories... and if you look at population density:
🇸🇪 23,6/km2
🇨🇦 terr.: 0,013/km2
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Saab loooves to tout the claim that the Gripen can "operate from dispersed air bases".
They do that, because they know no one of you knows what it means. And every time I see someone regurgite "dispersed air bases" (or "road runways" or "short runways") I know I am dealing
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with someone, who knows absolutely nothing about the topic.
So allow me to take you on a deep dive into what "operating from dispersed air bases" actually means.
Let's start with Såtenäs Air Base in Southern Sweden - the most important Swedish air base. 2/n
When the Viggen entered service, Såtenäs received it first.
When the Gripen entered service, Såtenäs received it first.
When the Gripen E entered service, Såtenäs received it first.
In the 1950s Sweden developed the Bas 60 system, which would have dispersed the Swedish 3/n
The 11th Airborne Division is the least likely to be used to invade #Greenland.
The division's deputy commander is Canadian. He is responsible for Operations. The 11th would have to arrest part of their own officers, before being able to plan a Greenland invasion.
Also
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there are just 8 C-17 Globemaster aircraft at Elmendorf Air Force Base. The USAF would need to fly a dozen more up to Alaska, which of course Canada would notice. Then to reach Greenland the C-17 would have to cross Canada's North, which NORAD's Canadian officers would report
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to the Canadian and Danish governments.
It is much more likely the US will inform allies that a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg will fly to the Middle East, which means the air route will take them right over Greenland. And at Fort Bragg you also have the
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This is a typical clown tweet by someone, who knows nothing about WWII.
3 years before D-Day, the Soviets & nazis were in a love-feast, while the US had not entered the war; & when it did it had to cross an ocean full of nazi submarines to stage troops & materiel for D-Day.
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And unlike the warmongering Soviets, which in June 1941 fielded 304 divisions, the US Army fielded just 37 divisions when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor (+ two Marine Corps divisions).
Before any D-Day the US Army had to start forming new divisions (38 in 1942 and 17 in 1943) &
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then ship those divisions across the Atlantic, which was teeming with German subs, while the Soviets just used trains to bring troops and materiel to the front (& if the Soviet had had to ship troops across an ocean, they would have just accepted that a third of their troops
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The @RoyalAirForce - once the strongest air force in Western Europe... but now...
7 Eurofighter Typhoon squadrons are expected to fulfill the tasks, for which 35 years ago the RAF fielded 40 squadrons (31 active & 4 reserve + 5 shadow squadrons, which would have been formed
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from the personnel & fighters of the RAF's operational conversion units).
At the end of the Cold War these 40 squadrons were assigned to 4 commands, each with a specific mission & enough aircraft to fulfill their mission.
No. 1 Group was tasked with striking Soviet forces
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in Northern Germany, including with WE.177 tactical nukes.
The Group fielded 8 active, 4 reserve and 2 shadow squadrons, which flew Tornado GR1, Jaguar GR1A, and Harrier GR5 fighters (the reserve squadrons flew Hawk T1A). The group also included the RAF's 3 aerial
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Since there are still people claiming the Gripen is the "ideal fighter for Canada"... here are the refueling stops the Gripen C/D needed to get from Ronneby in Sweden to Eielson Air Base in Alaska.
So of course this is an "ideal fighter" for Canada... as it will have to stop 1/5
at every Canadian airfield to refuel...
For the curious ones:
On 13 July 2006 five Gripen C and two Gripen D left
their base in Ronneby Sweden. They refueled at RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland, then flew to NAS Keflavik in Iceland, where they refueled and stayed overnight.
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On 14 July the Gripens flew to Sondre Stromfjord in Greenland for another refueling, then proceeded to RCAF Iqualuit in Canada for refueling and the night.
On 15 July the Gripens flew to Churchill, refuelled and then flew to RCAF Cold Lake, where they spent 16 July to rest.
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