Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Jul 6, 2023 25 tweets 5 min read Read on X
Lots of recent discussion about the ‘slow’ Ukrainian offensives. What is actually occurring now is a steady, deliberate taking down of the Russian 'operational system'. This takes time. 1/25 🧵
2/ What is this operational system? To understand what it is, and how Ukraine is ‘taking down’ the Russian operational system, two foundational concepts are important to understand: the operational art; and, systems destruction warfare.
3/ In war, we talk about strategy (the link of purpose with high level resource allocation & action) & tactics (involving attacks & conduct of specific combat ops). Because of the complexity of modern war, strategy and tactics are linked through what we call Operational Art.
4/ Operational Art is the planning, orchestration, sustainment and adaptation of tactical actions over long period of time and, often, across a large geographic area as well. It ensures military forces are in a good position for tactical activity that achieves strategic outcomes.
5/ One element of the operational art that is debated is whether there is an operational ‘level’ of war. Critics argue that the operational level undermines strategy & relegates tactics to a less important aspect of war. Perhpas, but most nations recognise this level in doctrine.
6/ Systems Destruction Warfare. A RAND report notes that: “thinking about systems pervades virtually every aspect of the PLA’s approach to training, organizing, and equipping for warfare… the system-of-systems construct is the mode of modern fighting for the PLA."
7/ PLA theorists view modern war as a confrontation between opposing systems in a multidomain battlespace. As such, the Chinese seek to build their own systems to attack enemy systems. An important component of this is degrading and destroying the enemy ‘operational system’.
8/ An operational system is the components of a military force – above units and brigades – that binds a force together, allows for concurrent and sequential tactical activities, and underpin its ability to conduct operational level maneuver that achieve strategic objectives.
9/ For the Russians in #Ukraine, there are 6 key elements of their operational system: the command system, the firepower-strike system, the information system, the reconnaissance-intelligence system, the support system (logistics etc); and, the learning and adaptation system.
10/ In essence, this is the brain and nervous system of the Russian forces in Ukraine. This operational system will have been a first-order target when planning and executing military campaigns.
11/ The reason for this is that if the Ukrainians can attack the Russian brain (such as it is) and nervous system, the limbs are unable to be coordinated, and can be isolated and destroyed.
12/ Therefore, when the Ukrainians have asked for modern fighters, long range strike (and probably classified cyber and IW capabilities as well), they have been requesting the capabilities to attack, degrade and destroy the Russian operational system.
13/ All six elements of the Russian operational system have been attacked in the lead up to the Ukrainian offensive beginning in June, and they continue to be attacked. The cumulative effect of Ukrainian attacks on the Russian system will be aggregated & measured regularly.
14/ There will be a time when Ukraine assesses the Russian operational system has been sufficiently degraded, its ability to support tactical forces damaged & the ability to move reserves has been limited. This decision point will inform when large-scale ground combat begins.
15/ Unfortunately, in the west, the only model we have for taking down an enemy operational system is the US in the 1991 Gulf War. A 42-day campaign using thousands of aircraft was needed. We then have to look back further into history to see a campaign of this complexity.
16/ So, in short, there is no modern comparator for what Ukraine is trying to do. It lacks control of the air, and western nations have failed to provide the kinds of modern fighters, or the quantity of long range attack systems (eg. ATACMS), needed.
17/ Therefore, Ukraine has had to think & plan creatively for a different way to take down the Russian operational system. This has involved HUMINT in rear areas, use of civil and military intelligence collection, and selective tactical actions to prompt Russian responses.
18/ Russian responses aren't just tactical. Ukraine will be hoping to also see how Russian operational level C2 makes decisions & how its communication networks work. They will also want to find key reserve units, assess triggers for their deployment, and how long it takes.
19/ Other objectives of this current phase of degrading the Russian system including finding & destroying logistics / engineers (who lay minefields) as well as fire support units. Given the size of the Russian force in Ukraine, this is a considerable undertaking & takes time.
20/ While this is occurring, information & lessons are being fed back into the Ukrainian system to improve targeting and their knowledge of the Russian operational system. And, it provides time for Ukrainian units to be raised, trained and rehearsed for their roles in later ops.
21/ That time will come. But before then, #Ukraine will do everything it can to make these ground combat operations as uneven as possible in their favour. That means they must steadily, methodically take down the Russian operational system over the coming weeks.
22/ One final element of this approach is important. In holding back most of their tactical forces, the Ukrainians have a lot of flexibility about where they eventually make their main effort in subsequent phases.
23/ This Russian system, perhaps the most complex multi-domain system ever constructed, includes EW, air defence, long range fires, multiple protected N2 nodes, etc. No country on earth, besides the US, could attack and degrade such a system. Except #Ukraine.
24/ When they do, the Ukrainians will have disconnected tactical units from achieving Russia’s strategic objectives in Ukraine. They will have given their soldiers the best chance of breaking through the Russia defensive lines & unhinging their operational scheme of defence. End
25/ For those who are interested, I will be publishing a longer piece at my substack that explores this topic. . Thank you to the following whose images were used in this thread: @Militarylandnet @combined2forcesmickryan.substack.com

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More from @WarintheFuture

Nov 18
I recently returned from another research visit to #Ukraine, my second for 2025. I have written a new white paper, published by the @CSIS, which explores 7 strategic insights based on knowledge gained on my recent visit & other research. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦 Image
2/ The white paper covers a range of subjects related to how #Ukraine and #Russia are fighting this war. The seven insights not only illuminate the state of the war, and the degree of learning and #adaptation occurring, they provide lessons that western military institutions must analyse and heed.
3/ The seven subjects covered are:

1. Drone saturation and Russian drone innovation.
2. The new tactical battle triangle.
3. The ongoing and accelerating adaptation battle.
4. Long-range strike operations.
5. Ground-based air defence.
6. Russia's tactical and strategic advantages.
7. War strategy and trajectory.

I highlight just a couple of these below.
Read 7 tweets
Nov 14
Yesterday, my report on the new global adaptation war was published by the @scsp_ai . The report proposes that the learning and adaptation ecosystem spawned by the war in #Ukraine has now metastasised into an international learning and #adaptation competition. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦 Image
2/ As the report describes, in the past three years, Ukraine and Russia have learned and adapted. Both sides have also learned to learn better and to absorb lessons into their military and industrial systems with increasing speed. But the sharing of lessons by both nations has seen the Ukraine Adaptation Battle transform into a global Adaptation War.
3/ A new adversary learning and adaptation bloc has emerged. While not a formal alliance, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have developed a mesh of different agreements and strategic partnerships that have allowed these authoritarian regimes to construct a connected knowledge market on 21st century strategic competition and conflict.
Read 10 tweets
Nov 8
I have just published my weekly update on modern war and strategic competition. This week: the Battle of Pokrovsk, Russian casualties, deep-strike campaigns, China's 3rd aircraft carrier commissions, as well as my recommended war and national security reads. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 Image
2/ In #Ukraine, the Battle of #Pokrovsk continues. While an audacious air assault was conducted this week, it is hard to see that it will arrest the overall Russian momentum in enveloping the city. Both Ukraine & Russia are continuing their deep strike operations in the lead up to winter, although Ukraine's strikes are yet to change Putin's strategic calculus about the war.
3/ In the #Pacific, Chinese aggression around #Taiwan continued, albeit at a lower tempo than previous months. The Chinese also commissioned their third aircraft carrier during the week. Taiwan announced several initiatives related to the operation of unmanned systems.
Read 5 tweets
Nov 8
Recently, I returned from my second 2025 visit to Ukraine. It was, as always, both enlightening & inspiring to spend time with Ukrainian military personnel who are innovating & fighting to keep Ukraine free. I published several articles while in #Ukraine, linked below. In this long-ish thread, I cover drone operations. 1/20 🧵🇺🇦Image
2/ During my visit, I published a series of articles. These were at my Substack, Futura Doctrina, and can be read here: mickryan.substack.com/p/ukraine-disp…

I also published a couple of pieces for the Lowy Interpreter, which can be read at this link: lowyinstitute.org/the-interprete… Image
3/ In this thread, as noted above, I will cover my observations and assessments about the operation of autonomous systems in #Ukraine.
Read 20 tweets
Oct 13
Russia has employed missiles similar to Tomahawks since Day 1 of the full-scale invasion. This is NOT escalation. It is just leveling the playing field for a three-year-long Ukrainian long-range strike campaign that has now achieved critical mass and momentum. How have they done this? 1/16 🧵 🇺🇦
msn.com/en-us/news/wor…Image
2/ Back in 2022, when Ukraine received HIMARS, it changed the game. Ukraine could now hit Russia at depth. But it was clear even back then that Ukraine had bigger plans for making Russia hurt through even deeper strikes.
mickryan.substack.com/p/striking-fur…Image
3/ By the 2nd half of 2023, Ukraine’s strategic aspirations for deep strike against Russia were clear. As I wrote back then, “throughout the war the Ukrainian Armed Forces have undertaken a range of adaptations to their force posture, structure and processes to enhance their operational effectiveness.  Their development of more complex, long-range strike capabilities stands out.”Image
Read 16 tweets
Oct 8
The last few years have seen many examples of wartime adaptation. This has occurred in #Ukraine as well as the Middle East. We have also seen nations in Europe, North America and Asia seek to learn and conduct peacetime adaptation. But there is a 3rd form of #adaptation that is crucial. 1/4 🧵Image
2/ This 3rd form of adaptation is that which occurs in the short period between peace and war: Peace to War Adaptation. It is important to understand this form of adaptation because it is the crucial process of learning and change that connects peacetime and wartime adaptation.
3/ The effectiveness or otherwise of Peace to War Adaptation can also influence the trajectory of a war. It is important to ensure governments, industry, the military and society are all prepared for such a rapid cognitive shift.
Read 4 tweets

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