Lots of recent discussion about the ‘slow’ Ukrainian offensives. What is actually occurring now is a steady, deliberate taking down of the Russian 'operational system'. This takes time. 1/25 🧵
2/ What is this operational system? To understand what it is, and how Ukraine is ‘taking down’ the Russian operational system, two foundational concepts are important to understand: the operational art; and, systems destruction warfare.
3/ In war, we talk about strategy (the link of purpose with high level resource allocation & action) & tactics (involving attacks & conduct of specific combat ops). Because of the complexity of modern war, strategy and tactics are linked through what we call Operational Art.
4/ Operational Art is the planning, orchestration, sustainment and adaptation of tactical actions over long period of time and, often, across a large geographic area as well. It ensures military forces are in a good position for tactical activity that achieves strategic outcomes.
5/ One element of the operational art that is debated is whether there is an operational ‘level’ of war. Critics argue that the operational level undermines strategy & relegates tactics to a less important aspect of war. Perhpas, but most nations recognise this level in doctrine.
6/ Systems Destruction Warfare. A RAND report notes that: “thinking about systems pervades virtually every aspect of the PLA’s approach to training, organizing, and equipping for warfare… the system-of-systems construct is the mode of modern fighting for the PLA."
7/ PLA theorists view modern war as a confrontation between opposing systems in a multidomain battlespace. As such, the Chinese seek to build their own systems to attack enemy systems. An important component of this is degrading and destroying the enemy ‘operational system’.
8/ An operational system is the components of a military force – above units and brigades – that binds a force together, allows for concurrent and sequential tactical activities, and underpin its ability to conduct operational level maneuver that achieve strategic objectives.
9/ For the Russians in #Ukraine, there are 6 key elements of their operational system: the command system, the firepower-strike system, the information system, the reconnaissance-intelligence system, the support system (logistics etc); and, the learning and adaptation system.
10/ In essence, this is the brain and nervous system of the Russian forces in Ukraine. This operational system will have been a first-order target when planning and executing military campaigns.
11/ The reason for this is that if the Ukrainians can attack the Russian brain (such as it is) and nervous system, the limbs are unable to be coordinated, and can be isolated and destroyed.
12/ Therefore, when the Ukrainians have asked for modern fighters, long range strike (and probably classified cyber and IW capabilities as well), they have been requesting the capabilities to attack, degrade and destroy the Russian operational system.
13/ All six elements of the Russian operational system have been attacked in the lead up to the Ukrainian offensive beginning in June, and they continue to be attacked. The cumulative effect of Ukrainian attacks on the Russian system will be aggregated & measured regularly.
14/ There will be a time when Ukraine assesses the Russian operational system has been sufficiently degraded, its ability to support tactical forces damaged & the ability to move reserves has been limited. This decision point will inform when large-scale ground combat begins.
15/ Unfortunately, in the west, the only model we have for taking down an enemy operational system is the US in the 1991 Gulf War. A 42-day campaign using thousands of aircraft was needed. We then have to look back further into history to see a campaign of this complexity.
16/ So, in short, there is no modern comparator for what Ukraine is trying to do. It lacks control of the air, and western nations have failed to provide the kinds of modern fighters, or the quantity of long range attack systems (eg. ATACMS), needed.
17/ Therefore, Ukraine has had to think & plan creatively for a different way to take down the Russian operational system. This has involved HUMINT in rear areas, use of civil and military intelligence collection, and selective tactical actions to prompt Russian responses.
18/ Russian responses aren't just tactical. Ukraine will be hoping to also see how Russian operational level C2 makes decisions & how its communication networks work. They will also want to find key reserve units, assess triggers for their deployment, and how long it takes.
19/ Other objectives of this current phase of degrading the Russian system including finding & destroying logistics / engineers (who lay minefields) as well as fire support units. Given the size of the Russian force in Ukraine, this is a considerable undertaking & takes time.
20/ While this is occurring, information & lessons are being fed back into the Ukrainian system to improve targeting and their knowledge of the Russian operational system. And, it provides time for Ukrainian units to be raised, trained and rehearsed for their roles in later ops.
21/ That time will come. But before then, #Ukraine will do everything it can to make these ground combat operations as uneven as possible in their favour. That means they must steadily, methodically take down the Russian operational system over the coming weeks.
22/ One final element of this approach is important. In holding back most of their tactical forces, the Ukrainians have a lot of flexibility about where they eventually make their main effort in subsequent phases.
23/ This Russian system, perhaps the most complex multi-domain system ever constructed, includes EW, air defence, long range fires, multiple protected N2 nodes, etc. No country on earth, besides the US, could attack and degrade such a system. Except #Ukraine.
24/ When they do, the Ukrainians will have disconnected tactical units from achieving Russia’s strategic objectives in Ukraine. They will have given their soldiers the best chance of breaking through the Russia defensive lines & unhinging their operational scheme of defence. End
25/ For those who are interested, I will be publishing a longer piece at my substack that explores this topic. . Thank you to the following whose images were used in this thread: @Militarylandnet @combined2forcesmickryan.substack.com
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“The advantages of threatening an American ground intervention are real. The advantages of actually committing boots on the ground are also real but more limited. The disadvantages could be numerous.” My weekly update on Iran, Ukraine and the Pacific. 1/6 🧵
2/ Ukraine has achieved something significant in the south. Ukrainian attacks there have disrupted Russian offensive planning, consumed Russian reserve forces, and demonstrated that Ukrainian combined arms operations can impose genuine operational costs. But there is also a trade-off in these southern operations. Gains in the south have come at some cost to northern Donetsk, and Russian forces retain the initiative on what is Russia’s main effort on the ground: the envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt and the remainder of Donetsk.
3/ In Iran, the oldest lesson in strategy keeps surfacing: military success in the air and at sea does not automatically translate into political outcomes on the ground. Iran has not been beaten. The question being probably being considered in the Pentagon, Congress and the White House is whether ground forces would ensure that the military campaign achieves a decisive political outcome - or whether it would lead to a larger and more difficult American military commitment to the Middle East with uncertain results.
The latest update on drone and missile attacks on the UAE has just been released. With this as context, I thought I would share some initial insights arising from this Iranian retaliatory campaign and the overall war against #Iran. 1/9 🧵
2/ First, the battlespace is not transparent. It is highly visible but high visibility is not the same as high wisdom about what is seen. And we must not fall into the trap of assuming that we actually are seeing everything we need to see rather than what the enemy wants us to see. Finally, no tech can see into the hearts and minds of soldiers and combat leaders, especially when they are functioning under conditions of existential threat.
3/ Second, Understanding the enemy, and how resilient it is, matters. The Iranians have been preparing for this fight for decades, will have many caches of weapons and have strategised how this might play out. And assuming that a few bombs from the sky topple a regime (especially when it has never been achieved before) badly under estimated the Iranians.
"America & Iran are fighting two very different wars and have two different theories of victory. China & others in the authoritarian learning & adaptation bloc are observing closely & learning." An assessment of where we are, & who is learning from the Iran War. 1/6 🧵
2/ This assessment examines the two wars in and around Iran: the military campaign that Washington is fighting, and the economic campaign that Tehran is waging. It then asks the following question: what are the respective theories of victory, and how does that theory play out differently for each belligerent?
3/ A theory of victory is not simply a list of military objectives. It is a coherent account of how the application of military force produces a political outcome that endures. The Trump administration entered Operation Epic Fury with a theory of the means, and a range of constantly changing ends (at least in public). It might be able to use the military to win the war, but it is unclear whether it has a longer-term plan to win the peace.
Wars are never simple. Despite the efforts of governments, war resists the clarity, certainty & clever narratives supported by AI slop videos, we wish to impose on them. The #Iran war & developments in #Ukraine, were exemplars of this during the week. 1/7
2/ Welcome to my weekly update on war and strategic competition. This week, shifting strategic initiative in Ukraine, the war in Iran, politics in the Pacific & my Big 5 reading recommendations.
3/ In #Ukraine, Ukrainian forces achieved some of the most operationally significant gains of the past year, reclaiming territory in the south while striking deep into Russia’s military-industrial complex. Diplomacy continued its chaotic and erratic journey.
"At some point, Putin will have to reckon with the failure of his strategic bombing campaign against Ukraine’s cities to shift Ukraine’s political posture, and the slow-rolling military failure that is Russia’s bloody ground campaign." A comprehensive update of the big #Ukraine & Pacific issues this week. 1/6 🧵🇺🇦
2/ In Europe this week, the annual Munich Security Conference was held. Lots of interesting speeches, but not a lot of progress on ending the war in Ukraine.
And as Zelenskyy stated: "A lot of time now is spent on negotiations. We truly hope that the trilateral meetings next week will be serious, substantive, and helpful for all of us. But honestly – sometimes it feels like the sides are talking about completely different things."
3/ In Ukraine, the armed forces were able to undertake opportunistic counter attacks against Russian forces deprived of Starlink.
But otherwise, as I describe in my assessment of the trajectory of the war in 2026, "the brutal calculus of the past four-years will continue into 2026 unless there is a significant breakthrough in technology, tactics or strategy that changes the deep, close and rear aspects of the overall battlefield dynamic.
The only other thing that might significantly change the trajectory of the war is if there is a significant shift in political will in Kyiv or Moscow."
America has just released its 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Not seeing much press activity from the Dept of Defense/War on this. While I need time to ponder the deeper implications of the document, a few things stand out on first reading. 1/11 🧵
2/ First, the document is consistent with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump Administration in November 2025. Key priorities in the NDS align with the NSS, as you would expect. However, while the NSS has priorities, the NDS has "Lines of Effort". whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
3/ There are four Lines of Effort in the new NDS:
1. Defend the U.S. Homeland. 2. Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation. 3. Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners. 4. Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.