Lots of recent discussion about the ‘slow’ Ukrainian offensives. What is actually occurring now is a steady, deliberate taking down of the Russian 'operational system'. This takes time. 1/25 🧵
2/ What is this operational system? To understand what it is, and how Ukraine is ‘taking down’ the Russian operational system, two foundational concepts are important to understand: the operational art; and, systems destruction warfare.
3/ In war, we talk about strategy (the link of purpose with high level resource allocation & action) & tactics (involving attacks & conduct of specific combat ops). Because of the complexity of modern war, strategy and tactics are linked through what we call Operational Art.
4/ Operational Art is the planning, orchestration, sustainment and adaptation of tactical actions over long period of time and, often, across a large geographic area as well. It ensures military forces are in a good position for tactical activity that achieves strategic outcomes.
5/ One element of the operational art that is debated is whether there is an operational ‘level’ of war. Critics argue that the operational level undermines strategy & relegates tactics to a less important aspect of war. Perhpas, but most nations recognise this level in doctrine.
6/ Systems Destruction Warfare. A RAND report notes that: “thinking about systems pervades virtually every aspect of the PLA’s approach to training, organizing, and equipping for warfare… the system-of-systems construct is the mode of modern fighting for the PLA."
7/ PLA theorists view modern war as a confrontation between opposing systems in a multidomain battlespace. As such, the Chinese seek to build their own systems to attack enemy systems. An important component of this is degrading and destroying the enemy ‘operational system’.
8/ An operational system is the components of a military force – above units and brigades – that binds a force together, allows for concurrent and sequential tactical activities, and underpin its ability to conduct operational level maneuver that achieve strategic objectives.
9/ For the Russians in #Ukraine, there are 6 key elements of their operational system: the command system, the firepower-strike system, the information system, the reconnaissance-intelligence system, the support system (logistics etc); and, the learning and adaptation system.
10/ In essence, this is the brain and nervous system of the Russian forces in Ukraine. This operational system will have been a first-order target when planning and executing military campaigns.
11/ The reason for this is that if the Ukrainians can attack the Russian brain (such as it is) and nervous system, the limbs are unable to be coordinated, and can be isolated and destroyed.
12/ Therefore, when the Ukrainians have asked for modern fighters, long range strike (and probably classified cyber and IW capabilities as well), they have been requesting the capabilities to attack, degrade and destroy the Russian operational system.
13/ All six elements of the Russian operational system have been attacked in the lead up to the Ukrainian offensive beginning in June, and they continue to be attacked. The cumulative effect of Ukrainian attacks on the Russian system will be aggregated & measured regularly.
14/ There will be a time when Ukraine assesses the Russian operational system has been sufficiently degraded, its ability to support tactical forces damaged & the ability to move reserves has been limited. This decision point will inform when large-scale ground combat begins.
15/ Unfortunately, in the west, the only model we have for taking down an enemy operational system is the US in the 1991 Gulf War. A 42-day campaign using thousands of aircraft was needed. We then have to look back further into history to see a campaign of this complexity.
16/ So, in short, there is no modern comparator for what Ukraine is trying to do. It lacks control of the air, and western nations have failed to provide the kinds of modern fighters, or the quantity of long range attack systems (eg. ATACMS), needed.
17/ Therefore, Ukraine has had to think & plan creatively for a different way to take down the Russian operational system. This has involved HUMINT in rear areas, use of civil and military intelligence collection, and selective tactical actions to prompt Russian responses.
18/ Russian responses aren't just tactical. Ukraine will be hoping to also see how Russian operational level C2 makes decisions & how its communication networks work. They will also want to find key reserve units, assess triggers for their deployment, and how long it takes.
19/ Other objectives of this current phase of degrading the Russian system including finding & destroying logistics / engineers (who lay minefields) as well as fire support units. Given the size of the Russian force in Ukraine, this is a considerable undertaking & takes time.
20/ While this is occurring, information & lessons are being fed back into the Ukrainian system to improve targeting and their knowledge of the Russian operational system. And, it provides time for Ukrainian units to be raised, trained and rehearsed for their roles in later ops.
21/ That time will come. But before then, #Ukraine will do everything it can to make these ground combat operations as uneven as possible in their favour. That means they must steadily, methodically take down the Russian operational system over the coming weeks.
22/ One final element of this approach is important. In holding back most of their tactical forces, the Ukrainians have a lot of flexibility about where they eventually make their main effort in subsequent phases.
23/ This Russian system, perhaps the most complex multi-domain system ever constructed, includes EW, air defence, long range fires, multiple protected N2 nodes, etc. No country on earth, besides the US, could attack and degrade such a system. Except #Ukraine.
24/ When they do, the Ukrainians will have disconnected tactical units from achieving Russia’s strategic objectives in Ukraine. They will have given their soldiers the best chance of breaking through the Russia defensive lines & unhinging their operational scheme of defence. End
25/ For those who are interested, I will be publishing a longer piece at my substack that explores this topic. . Thank you to the following whose images were used in this thread: @Militarylandnet @combined2forcesmickryan.substack.com
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This week, the Chinese Foreign Minister told Europe's Union’s top diplomat that China can't afford a Russian loss in #Ukraine because the U.S. would then shift its whole focus to Beijing. China wants the war in Ukraine to continue for as long as possible. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
2/ Despite Chinese protestations they are not a party to the war and that it seeks peace talks, Wang Yi has confirmed the strategic lens through which China actually views the war. Their calculus is this: China benefits from prolonging the war in Ukraine.
3/ There are three main reasons why Xi and his advisors view a continuation of the war in Ukraine as an advantage for China in the medium and long term. These elements of advantage rest in the strategic, economic, and ideological domains.
Ukraine is teaching the rest of us what 'innovation in contact' looks like. While there are many nations exploring human-machine teaming for military operations, none are able to conduct the ultimate test of their ideas and technology like Ukraine does in combat every single day. 1/4🧵🇺🇦
2/ What we are witnessing from the Ukrainian armed forces is world-leading learning and adaptation on how crewed and uncrewed systems can operate together to achieve military objectives in very tough operational circumstances.
3/ This Ukrainian learning and adaptation is occuring across the land, air and sea domains, and features the evolution in operational concepts, organisations, training, technology, military-industrial collaboration as well as how military institutions can learn how to learn better.
Ukraine and Russia have learned and adapted at multiple levels since 2022. Over the last couple of years however, the adaptation battle between Ukraine and Russia has metastasized into a global adaptation war. Democracies now confront an ‘authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc’. 1/7
2/ For some time, it has been clear that the four major authoritarian regimes – Iran, North Korea, China and Russia – have a shared interest in degrading American influence and destroying the post-WW2 order. This has led to a range of different agreements, leader summits and collaborative relationships between these four nations. It may have begun years ago but has been accelerated since 2022 by the war in Ukraine.
3/ This evolving ‘learning and adaptation bloc’ has resulted in its four key participants sharing battlefield lessons, collaborating in technology development and sanctions evasion, while also sharing and collaborating on methods of coercion, subversion, misinformation and, of course, learning and adapting.
In war, stupidity and intellectual laziness gets punished. So, selection and development of good leaders matters. But, also punished is a suboptimal learning and adaption culture. A special assessment of what Iran should have learned from military conflicts in the past year - and didn't. 1/4
2/ To attack Iran, Israel had to first work its way through proxies closer to Israel, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. At some cost, Israel was able to remove these two organisations as consequential threats, which then left Iran as Israel’s key adversary. But Iran, through its lack of learning from how Israel destroyed the Iranian proxy forces around Israel, left itself open to the kind of attack that it is now enduring.
3/ Over the past few days, the Israeli’s have exploited the Iranians inability to systemically learn and adapt from the very obvious and accessible lessons about leadership vulnerability, air defence, and partner reliability presented in the past year.
Operationg Rising Lion is now in its second day. What insights can be gleaned, and what are the key questions about the ongoing Israel-Iran war? 1/8
2/ I think these are the ten key issues, and questions, at the 24 hour mark of the war. I will cover a couple briefly.
- Israel’s decapitation operations.
- The U.S. reaction.
- The battle of narratives.
- Has Iran learned from Russia?
- Have Israel and Ukraine Been Collaborating on Creative Drone Operations?
- Lessons for crewed-uncrewed teaming.
- Reinforcing the need for national air, drone and missile defence.
- How long can Israel sustain operations?
- Impact on Ukraine?
- Who else might exploit this opportunity?
3/ Israel’s decapitation operations. Israel targeted multiple military and scientific leaders in the first wave of attacks. Israel’s decapitation operations. There are short-term and long-term reasons for this. First, the immediate desired impact was to degrade strategic decision-making.
The spectacular Ukrainian attack on multiple airbases today highlights the progress that #Ukraine has made building an effective long-range strike capability since 2022. There are many lessons that western military organisations might take from this. But there are also some insights on this war, and the future of war, as well. 1/5 🇺🇦 🧵
2/ The attacks, part of a longer campaign to place cumulative pressure on Russia’s economy, political leaders and war-making capacity, will probably not be a decisive turning point in the war. They will however have a military impact.
3/ Military impacts include a reduction in Russian missile carrying / launching aircraft, a reassessment of the locations of these aircraft, possible changes in the air and drone defences at Russian bases, as well as a nice morale bump for the Ukrainians.