After @biden's tough call to provide Ukraine with 100s of 1000's of rounds of cluster munitions, Ukrainian MOD @oleksiireznikov provides rationale & assurances (in 5 statements) of how they will be used.
But the debate continues, as some US senators now question that call. 1/8
Reznikov's 5 principles:
-only used for "deoccupation" of UKR territory
-won't use in urban areas (unlike Russians)
-UAF will keep records of where rounds are fired
-those areas will be "prioritized" for de-mining after the war
-UKR will report effectiveness to allies. 2/
There are pros & cons to providing cluster munitions.
It was a tough moral call by @POTUS to decide to provide this ammo now...primarily based on UAF running low of arty ammo they need today.
The DPICM rounds will bridge a gap while more precision rounds are built. 3/
It was a tough call because the military - & NATO allies - understand what these rounds can & can't do.
The CAN seriously damage some equipment & they WILL cause casualties on groupings of personnel.
They CAN'T clear minefields & they AREN'T effective in clearing trenches. 4/
Additionally, once fired into an area (an enemy position), that area then POSES RISKS to friendly personnel maneuvering through that area.
The locations where they are fired MUST be marked and avoided.
There WILL BE duds. 5/
Dept of Defense suggests the dud rate will be 1-3%. I believe that may be conservative, but I hope it's true.
But in each artillery shell there are 72-88 "bomblets" (each smaller than a hand grenade).
2% of 88 is about 2-3 "duds" per round.
100k rounds = approx 2-300K duds 6/
The dud rate for DPICM rockets fired from HIMARS - the M26 rockets has over 600 bomblets - covers a much larger areas & also has a much higher dud percentage.
That's why Ukrainian HIMARS will not be firing DPICM
Duds & unintended civilian casualties are the moral issue. 7/
@POTUS says he "talked to" our allies about it, but suspect most didn't agree. Especially some in NATO.
But I can understand the US rationale for action & believe Reznikov's messaging of UKR principles is helpful. I also understand why some senators (& allies) are upset. 8/
With war, some long term values and political objectives are often subject to short term requirements and the requirement to execute distasteful actions.
This is the center of this complex issue.
Ukraine's sovereignty and freedom take priority. 9/9
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The great @ErinBurnett did a lead in to this story tonight at 7 ET, and I was hoping she'd ask me about this.
This could either be a big deal, or no big deal.
Suvorikin is an RU air force general. He's been with Prigozhin in several conflicts. 1/4 cnn.com/europe/live-ne…
"General Armegeddon" & "Putin's Chef" share the same approach...scorched earth, terrorize civilians, commit unchecked war crimes, pay no attention to the rules of land warfare or international law.
Oh, and they don't really care for/lead their own troops, either. 2/4
Surovikin (and others) may be on some "Wagner VIP list," but I suspect that may only means they are "honorary members of the PMC."
Hell, I'm an "honorary member" of the 3d ACR, the German 12th Armored BDE, and a few others. This is an honorific in the military. 3/4
"The greatest distance on the battlefield is the 6 inches between the ears of the commander...and that's the commander at EVERY level."
Words of wisdom from a much respected military mentor of mine.
What's that mean & how does it relate to the weekend's events in RU? A 🧵 1/13
Good commanders of military organizations serve their country, their leaders, the people (in the US case, that is why we "support & defend the Constitution").
That service is based -to paraphrase 1 of Clausewitz's many trinities of war - on "trust." 2/
1. Soldiers trust each other...that makes for cohesion & effectiveness.
2. Military leaders trust government/civilian leaders to do what's right in policy, strategy, accountability.
3. The people trust their government leaders to keep the nation secure, to be legitimate. 3/
It hit me we're thinking of Prigozhin in the wrong way.
His actions have confused us these last 48 hours (and beyond) because we see him as the leader of a large mercenary body, fighting for pay (or freedom from jail) instead of what soldiers fight to defend (the state). 1/4
After some research, I'm now concluding he fits the definition of a modern day warlord, with these attributes:
Here are the characteristics of a warlord: · an individual with limited military skills, who is accountable to no one, who has no true ideology... 2/4
...who rules through patronage, who flourishes only when the central government is weak, and who further fragments the politics, the unified military action, and the economics of a central government.
There is no contribution to a nation's power, only the individual's. 3/4
2 decades ago, I met a unique person at West Point.
An Ivy League English Literature Professor teaching Plebes (Freshmen), Elizabeth Samet was writing a book about how cadets were facing the wars that would define their generation. 1/11
In that book, she describes what it was like coming to a place like @WestPoint_USMA, and learning the military culture.
She would teach cadets about war, masterfully using literature to describe what they would soon face.
But she would also learn so much from her students...and graduates, as they wrote to her after experiencing what she had only read about in the classics.
The book, "Soldier's Heart," is one of my favorites, and it holds a special place on my bookshelf as she signed it for me. 3/