Thread by @Tatarigami_UA

In the context of counter-offensive and minefields let's continue the review of the russian manual that offers guidelines for establishing minefields as a countermeasure against Ukrainian mechanized columns. 🧵Thread

2/ The manual recommends installing mines on roads, bridges, and off-road areas near tree lines where vehicles may move. Special attention should be given to intersections, where the installation of mixed groups of mines, obstacles, and barricades is recommended.

3/ The process is described as follows: mixed minefields are installed in the front part of the defense line at night. The mining itself is carried out covertly by groups of sappers consisting of no less than 10-15 individuals, allowing for manual placement of mines.

4/ the squad leader with his sapper squad carries 2-4 mines to the designated area and indicates the placing location. After placing the mines, the squad withdrawы back to the storage of the next batch of mines (not more than 30-50 meters away from the minefield boundary).

5/ According to the practical experience outlined in the manual, FAB-250 bombs and S-300 surface-to-air missile warheads were successfully employed as explosive charges to effectively demolish roads.

6/ Sometimes, mines were deliberately installed without camouflage, forcing the AFU to divert their route towards areas where hidden mines are positioned

7/ Russian manual advises to deploy clusters of anti-tank mines in bypass routes adjacent to obstacles such as disabled vehicles, destroyed road sections, and road-bridge structures.

8/ The manual mentions the utilization of the "Uragan" (MLRS) equipped with KPTM-3 cluster mines, as well as the "Zemledelie" remote mining systems, to effectively obstruct the movement of the AFU convoys

9/ The manual emphasizes the effectiveness of nocturnal operations carried out by small sapper groups equipped with night vision means. These groups move further from defensive lines and lay mines in various areas, including previously mine-cleared zones.

10/ The manual may not introduce groundbreaking innovations, but it highlights the enemy's capability to remotely redeploy cleared minefields or deploy them during offensive operations to impede the movement of assaulting forces. This additional factor complicates the assault

11/ If you found this content valuable, please support by liking, retweeting or following. Your engagement enables me to provide more and better materials.