🧵With new satellite imagery from Vuhledar revealing the extent of the catastrophe experienced by the Russian army during the winter, as well as the ongoing counter-offensive, it is crucial to explore the role of minefields and operational planning in shaping assault operations.
2/ The objective of a minefield extends beyond causing harm; it also aims to impose a specific mindset and tactical approach on the opponent, compelling them to act in a manner most advantageous for the party laying the minefield. Minefields limit the enemy's maneuvering options
3/ Mechanized units are used for maneuvering, executing assaults, bypassing enemy positions, and launching flanking maneuvers. Their firepower and off-road speed make them ideal for such operations. However, minefields restrict maneuvering space, hampering the assault's tempo.
4/ When encountering minefields, the enemy must allocate extra resources for mine clearance, including engineering vehicles. Yet, even after clearance, the available path remains narrow, compelling large forces to move predictably along a confined route
5/ It is often mistakenly assumed by observers that russians and Ukrainians are not utilizing tank plows to clear paths. However, this is inaccurate as both sides employ tank plows. It's important to note, though, that tank plows are not a universal solution to all the challenges
6/ While not a widely adopted tactic, the utilization of off-route mines, such as the TM-83, is not uncommon. It enables the engagement of tanks from the flank once they are detected by mine sensors, rather than relying on the pressure exerted by the tank's weight itself.
7/ Another alternative is the use of modified mine setups that are designed to resist mine plows. In this specific case, the mine is configured to detonate approximately 1.5 to 2 meters after encountering the plow.
8/ As troops follow the narrow-cleared path, if the clearing tank is immobilized, it significantly hampers or even blocks the movement of the column. This situation presents a perfect opportunity for artillery to target and inflict damage on the immobilized or slowed-down forces.
9/ Reinstalling mines after their detonation or removal by the enemy is a critical factor. This introduces an additional layer of complexity that the assaulting side must plan for, prepare, and counteract.
10/ Insufficient preparation results in a reduction of mechanized firepower advantage in assaulting forces, shifting the battlefield dynamics to artillery duels and infantry assaults. This restricts and challenges maneuverability for the assaulting side.
11/ In summary, the critical role of minefields and AT measures in limiting enemy maneuverability and impeding their mechanized forces from achieving a breakthrough is evident. However, the root cause of this failure lies in the absence of proper planning and bad intelligence.
12/ Minefields add complexity, but with effective planning, they are not detrimental. If planners on the assaulting side fail to allocate resources properly, make incorrect decisions based on bad intel, or order assault despite insufficient resources, they are bound to fail.
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Ukraine has just struck multiple Wildberries logistics hubs. One of them, in St. Petersburg, is engulfed in flames, disrupting Russia's second-largest city.
Here's one of Russia's largest 24/7 news websites (auto-translated). This is the virtual reality many Russians live in.
2/ The only mention of the attack is a brief report claiming that drones were shot down. Here's the auto-translated version:
The crisis in Crimea continues, with conditions worsening. After Crimea's occupation head, Sergey Aksyonov, claimed steps were being taken to address the situation in a recent Telegram post, hundreds of locals flooded the comments, challenging his narrative. 🧵Translations:
2/ "Please, just do something! Have you forgotten about northern Crimea? Have you abandoned the people? Soon people will be starving, and we are already close to breaking down! At least say something! Declare an evacuation, do anything at all! This is not life, this is suffering"
3/ "I wonder if Aksyonov (governor) would be willing to bring his family and come stay with us in Dzhankoy, sitting through the complete blackout that has already lasted a week, while telling us to hold on until mid-August."
The situation in Crimea is becoming critical. As authorities remain largely silent, residents are flooding the Telegram channel of the head of Crimea with complaints about power outages, communication disruptions, fuel shortages, and water supply issues. Thread with translations:
1/ "Why is gasoline so expensive? It's twice the price compared to the mainland! Are people here supposed to be twice as rich or something? 😳"
2/ "The city of Dzhankoy has been without electricity for more than 24 hours. If the situation does not improve in the near future, a collective complaint will be drafted and sent to Moscow tomorrow."
The grooming of Orban's regime as a Trojan horse inside the EU and NATO is no longer speculative: it's now evidence-based, confirmed by leaked Budapest-Moscow communications. Agentstvo reports that roughly half of all Russian embassy staff maintain ties to intelligence services:
2/ The EU officially identifies Russia as one of its primary security threats. Yet Orban has been systematically distancing Hungary from both the EU and NATO, deteriorating relations with neighbors including Ukraine, while growing increasingly reliant on Russian influence.
3/ Moscow has no genuine interest in Hungary itself, or in the country's long-term wellbeing. What it wants is a lever - to undermine EU institutions, erode European support for Ukraine, and seed distrust between member states toward one of their own EU members and NATO allies
There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation