🧵With new satellite imagery from Vuhledar revealing the extent of the catastrophe experienced by the Russian army during the winter, as well as the ongoing counter-offensive, it is crucial to explore the role of minefields and operational planning in shaping assault operations.
2/ The objective of a minefield extends beyond causing harm; it also aims to impose a specific mindset and tactical approach on the opponent, compelling them to act in a manner most advantageous for the party laying the minefield. Minefields limit the enemy's maneuvering options
3/ Mechanized units are used for maneuvering, executing assaults, bypassing enemy positions, and launching flanking maneuvers. Their firepower and off-road speed make them ideal for such operations. However, minefields restrict maneuvering space, hampering the assault's tempo.
4/ When encountering minefields, the enemy must allocate extra resources for mine clearance, including engineering vehicles. Yet, even after clearance, the available path remains narrow, compelling large forces to move predictably along a confined route
5/ It is often mistakenly assumed by observers that russians and Ukrainians are not utilizing tank plows to clear paths. However, this is inaccurate as both sides employ tank plows. It's important to note, though, that tank plows are not a universal solution to all the challenges
6/ While not a widely adopted tactic, the utilization of off-route mines, such as the TM-83, is not uncommon. It enables the engagement of tanks from the flank once they are detected by mine sensors, rather than relying on the pressure exerted by the tank's weight itself.
7/ Another alternative is the use of modified mine setups that are designed to resist mine plows. In this specific case, the mine is configured to detonate approximately 1.5 to 2 meters after encountering the plow.
8/ As troops follow the narrow-cleared path, if the clearing tank is immobilized, it significantly hampers or even blocks the movement of the column. This situation presents a perfect opportunity for artillery to target and inflict damage on the immobilized or slowed-down forces.
9/ Reinstalling mines after their detonation or removal by the enemy is a critical factor. This introduces an additional layer of complexity that the assaulting side must plan for, prepare, and counteract.
10/ Insufficient preparation results in a reduction of mechanized firepower advantage in assaulting forces, shifting the battlefield dynamics to artillery duels and infantry assaults. This restricts and challenges maneuverability for the assaulting side.
11/ In summary, the critical role of minefields and AT measures in limiting enemy maneuverability and impeding their mechanized forces from achieving a breakthrough is evident. However, the root cause of this failure lies in the absence of proper planning and bad intelligence.
12/ Minefields add complexity, but with effective planning, they are not detrimental. If planners on the assaulting side fail to allocate resources properly, make incorrect decisions based on bad intel, or order assault despite insufficient resources, they are bound to fail.
If you found this content valuable, please support by liking, retweeting or following. Your engagement enables me to provide more and better materials.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
In the context of counter-offensive and minefields let's continue the review of the russian manual that offers guidelines for establishing minefields as a countermeasure against Ukrainian mechanized columns. 🧵Thread
2/ The manual recommends installing mines on roads, bridges, and off-road areas near tree lines where vehicles may move. Special attention should be given to intersections, where the installation of mixed groups of mines, obstacles, and barricades is recommended.
3/ The process is described as follows: mixed minefields are installed in the front part of the defense line at night. The mining itself is carried out covertly by groups of sappers consisting of no less than 10-15 individuals, allowing for manual placement of mines.
I have recently obtained a valuable russian document titled "Recommendations for countering an enemy operating as tank and mechanized columns." This thread will include analysis of select section of the manual, extracting insights from its contents.
2/ The manual highlights utilization of combined-arms units and formations by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. According to them, AFU tactics are based on NATO strategy, adapted for local conditions, and implemented by AFU commanders through memorized "NATO combat algorithms”.
3/ The discussed section is titled "Frontal Attack via 'Pierced' Corridor with Armored Vehicles."To enhance clarity, I will blend book visuals with my original graphics.
As per the manual, AFU units initiate the first stage by conducting reconnaissance with small recon groups.
In light of the ongoing discussions surrounding the counter-offensive, we need to revisit the topic of mines due to its utmost importance. As I have previously emphasized, the extensive deployment of mines by Russian forces remains a significant threat to our troops.
2/ The mine problem encountered in this counter-offensive would pose a formidable challenge even for NATO or Western militaries if given the same resources. With thousands of heavily mined square kilometers, it is a complex and protracted issue that cannot be easily resolved.
3/ Providing us with more anti-mine means would improve the situation, but it doesn't solve all the challenges. Russians use various methods to lay mines, including manual, mechanized, and remote approaches, adding complexity as different types of mines require various clearance
1/ There are certain aspects regarding OSINT map projects that need discussion. I want to emphasize that my intention is not to criticize, as I recognize and respect the public service you provide for free.
2/ Frequently, brigades are pinned on a map based on video, photo or press release. However, there is an issue where russian brigades are often not comprised of their organic units. It is not uncommon to see battalions from the same brigade positioned hundreds of kilometers apart
3/ Moreover, many brigades consist of a mixture of units. For instance, a VDV regiment might be reinforced by a motor-rifle battalion from another brigade, a tank company from a separate tank regiment, and a Storm-Z company from yet another brigade.
1/ I would like to address instances where some of the world's largest media outlets, such as the @WSJ and @Reuters , have either plagiarized my materials or used them without providing proper credit.
🧵Thread:
2/ The first instance involves Reuters, which utilized information from one of my threads without making significant changes. I could easily recognize my own writing, as I had used general terms like "Camouflaged area" due to uncertainties in translation.
3/ Regarding the @WSJ , in their recent video on Wagner, a portion of their content bears striking resemblance to a video that I had before the WSJ published their investigation. I will share a segment of the video WSJ, alongside my original video, letting the public to judge:
Given the persistent efforts of individuals like David Sacks to pursue a "peaceful resolution" on russia’s terms, it becomes crucial to review some pillars of Russian military strategy, thoroughly analyzed and documented by Michael Kofman in 2021.
🧵Thread:
2/ To gain a comprehensive understanding of the fallacy and manipulation within David Sacks' narrative, it is crucial to examine his words in the context of the ongoing Russian invasion and their military strategy, objectives and core principles.
3/ In his work, @KofmanMichael assesses russian military strategy, including core theoretical pillars like operational concepts and strategic operations. Non-military means, including warfare in the informational space, are essential components of the russian military strategy.