A year ago, a russian propaganda memo surfaced on the internet, garnering attention not just for its propaganda content but also for its ridiculousness. It circulated among pro-russian informants and has recently been found among detained pro-Russian agents again. 🧵Thread:
2/ Authors explain Russia's motive to occupy Ukraine in the introduction. One of the highlighted arguments explaining the Ukrainian revolution of 2014 was summarized by authors as follows: "The villagers who broke into Kyiv created a new reality, where they felt like masters."
3/ According to the authors, the war was triggered by the construction of NATO bases. Control over nuclear energy was assumed by Americans and Brits, and the US DoD established biolabs in Ukraine for researching and producing bioweapons, even conducting human experiments
4/ The memo continues, stating that Ukraine became a Mecca for foreign mercenaries from Georgia and Chechen criminal organizations. It also states that Syrian terrorists were brought into Ukraine under the cover of humanitarian aid.
5/ Another highlighted sentence claims that "Since 2014, illiterate and barely speaking in Ukrainian veterans started visiting schools and colleges to teach youth about patriotism." Now, let's examine some of the practical recommendations outlined in the memo.
6/ Among the recommendations, some are serious, while others are absurd. For instance, it suggests speaking Ukrainian slowly to make the other person switch to Russian during conversation.
7/ It also suggests that they should refrain from participating in any "patriotic" events and avoid purchasing literature or any publications in the Ukrainian language. Instead, it recommends obtaining information from “reputable” online outlets.
8/ The memo continues with specific recommendations based on one's position or role in society. For managers in administrative work, it suggests organizing frequent meetings, refraining from fighting corruption, and assigning unachievable tasks.
9/ For governmental workers, the instructions are as follows: prolong tasks, avoid refilling resources until they are completely exhausted (e.g., ink or paper in the printer) as this can halt the entire process.
10/ Governmental workers are also advised to prioritize secondary tasks over main ones, discourage efficient workers, and promote the least effective ones. Moreover, the memo suggests increasing reports and bureaucracy as part of their approach.
11/ Office workers are encouraged to take more breaks, spend extra time in the bathroom, spread rumors about potential layoffs, refrain from sharing experience, complain about computer, and request repairs frequently. Other users’ documents and files are advised to be deleted.
12/ Police workers are advised to inform individuals who are planned to be detained and to assist those who have already been detained. Additionally, the memo suggests destroying collected evidence whenever possible.
13/ The most intriguing part targets "people in 3rd countries." The instructions suggest creating social media accounts in the local language, commenting on foreign media, sending letters to news agencies requesting objective coverage of Russia, and joining local communities.
14/ It is suggested to organize demonstrations with supporters of traditional values, freedom of speech, and opponents of "NATO aggression". These demonstrations should always be documented with photos and videos, which are then to be forwarded to TASS, RIA-Novosti, or Interfax.
15/ In conclusion, this document appears to be one of the most absurd ones I've encountered on the subject. Perhaps, after reading it you might discover that your office coworker, who excessively uses printer ink and takes extended bathroom breaks, could be a Russian spy.
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The dynamics of the battlefield have shifted even further in 2025. With manpower shortages and infiltration tactics, the frontline in some areas has become far less defined and certain. That’s one of the reasons I haven’t posted any tactical updates for a while:
2/ It has reached the point where even soldiers on both sides are uncertain about the frontline - at least beyond their own unit’s tactical area. As a result, sources once considered reliable for mappers are no longer as dependable.
3/ The fog of war is nothing new, of course, but in recent years people grew accustomed to accurate maps to the point of taking them for granted. Unfortunately, even I’ve noticed that many OSINT maps have become markedly less accurate lately.
Up to two-thirds (66%) of respondents in Russia believe it is time to move toward peace negotiations, a record high for this indicator. Only 27% say military action should continue, the lowest level. The figures come from the Levada Center, known for its methodological rigor:
2/ Fifty-eight percent of respondents say the war has affected them or their families. Among those “strongly” affected, common issues include the death of relatives or friends, family members participating in combat, injuries/disability, emotional distress, and economic hardship
3/ Higher support for negotiations among: women; young people under 24; rural residents; those who believe national affairs are going poorly; people who disapprove of Putin; those who rely on YouTube or non-state sources for information.
Two days after being conscripted into Russia's army, Maxim Suvorov signed a contract. Less than a month later, he fell on the battlefield - one of many casualties of Russia’s new practice of filling contract ranks with conscripts. A detailed case showcasing recruitment problems:
2/ Frontelligence Insight has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to meet recruitment targets with monetary bonuses, pushing the military to seek alternatives, including pressuring conscripts to sign contracts. The recent death of a conscript allowed us to trace his story
3/ Our investigation begins with an obituary posted on a local Russian social media group dedicated to fallen soldiers in various conflicts. According to the post, Maxim was conscripted on June 25 and signed a contract on June 27. To verify this, we sought additional evidence
Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more:
2/ According to a report by VIGINUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU)
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern:
A recurring question is whether Russia categorizes AWOL cases as a way to conceal combat deaths in its official reports. The short answer is no. The longer answer is more complicated, and requires looking at how AWOL is treated within the Russian military system. 🧵Short thread:
2/ Most AWOL cases can escalate into actual criminal proceedings if all other measures to bring soldiers back fail. High rates of desertion or absence trigger investigations on record - problems that weigh more heavily on commanders and unit statistics than combat losses do
3/ Casualties themselves are rarely the main concern, provided objectives set by higher command are met. By contrast, desertion is seen as evidence of weak leadership and poor control over subordinates. KIA and MIA are regarded as an acceptable cost of war; AWOL is not.
AWOL and desertion cases in the Russian army have doubled and tripled in recent months, with battlefield desertions rising sharply, according to tens of thousands of records reviewed by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵This thread summarizes the key insights drawn from the data:
2/ Before proceeding, we thank the Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com for providing additional documents containing the full list of service members. While the source is trusted, we carried out our own inspection and verification to confirm the list’s authenticity.
3/ Our team randomly selected 21 cases from the file and used third-party services to verify each soldier’s name, date of birth, and address or region. In 19 cases the data fully matched; the two discrepancies were in addresses, likely due to changes before/after enlistment