Thread by @shashj

New WOTR podcast w/ Michael Kofman & Rob Lee reflecting on their trip to Ukraine. Early June attacks were not probing, says Lee. "It was the real counter offensive...an attempt to conduct a rapid breakthrough [&] exploit that as quickly as possible"
warontherocks.com/2023/07/ukrain…

Lee: "during this phase, Ukraine used a lot of its new modern equipment...new NATO trained brigades played a key role in the beginning. And ultimately...the first phase of this operation was not a success...That's the conclusion we've reached after talking to a number of people"

Kofman: in Bakhmut, with fluid battle, Russia dug in at battalion level. In south dug in at division and combined arms army level. "There's an effort at manoeuvre defence & the ability to counter attack any gains in those initial tree lines." Notes use of fake trenches.

Kofman points to innovation in Russian mine tactics. "They also have less traditional approaches e.g. stacking multiple anti tank mines on top of each other to destroy and rip off mine clearing tanks or vehicles that have essentially rollers that you typically see for breaching"

Kofman: "this is fundamentally a battle of tree lines. If Ukr forces advance to take a tree line, Russian armour moves out & begins to engage that entire tree line within the at the range of a couple of kilometres." Ukr can't reach Ru armour without ATGMS. Area behind them mined.

Lee: "what we're seeing now is Russia's reaction to what happened in Kharkiv and an attempt to not be embarrassed the same way they were that time. And ultimately, they've learned lessons...and they're fighting in a competent way...they're fighting in a doctrinal way."

Lee: It's not about mines as much as having minefields under observation—"and within Russian fires...And so anytime Ukr has to breach a minefield [Ru] can observe these areas [&] use artillery, anti tank guided missiles, attack helicopters...and that's what creates the problem."

Lee: "The issue is that the new [Ukrainian] brigades, their performance thus far has not lived up to the expectations. And it was always going to be difficult because these brigades were formed on short notice."

Lee points to examples where Ukr unit got disoriented at nighttime, didn't follow in mine-cleared lanes. In one case: bgde advance delayed by hours, advance started at dawn, in more light, & artillery bombardment didn't shift, so preceded attack by hours. Ru ATGMs not suppressed.

Seems like a very good worked example of what people mean when they talk about the difficulty of conducting combined-arms manoeuvre, or "fire and manoeuvre" as opposed to fire *and then* manoeuvre.

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1682132479090597888?s=20

Kofman: "This offensive, while prosecuted by brigades, in practice [was] a series of reinforced companies...So a battalion might deploy company or two forward and third behind them." One reason "why many may have mistaken the initial assault for just probing."

What stands out for me:
(1) Hugely important role played by mines, now & last yr in Kherson
(2) NOT just about mines, but way they expose Ukr to anti-tank missiles, artillery & attack helicopters
(3) Importance of tactics *and training/experience to implement them* to counter (2)

And, yes, none of this bit is really very new. Fair to say that the basic problem of how to manoeuvre across well-defended terrain under observation and covered by firepower would be familiar a century ago, even if technology amplifies the challenge in several ways?

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1682134527345410050

Anyway, I recommend listening to the whole thing, which has considerably more detail than my summary here. warontherocks.com/2023/07/ukrain…