Thread by @WarintheFuture

While the Russians in Ukraine have assumed the defensive over the past couple of months, that does not mean that they have been on the defensive at every level, and in every part of #Ukraine. A thread on Gerasimov's approach, 7 weeks into the Ukrainian offensives. 1/24 🧵

2/ Gerasimov, who we assume retains overall command of the Russian 'special military operation' in #Ukraine, is implementing a defensive strategy. But concurrently he is conducting offensive activities at the tactical and operation levels.

3/ Before we explore Gerasimov’s defensive strategy, let’s review the range of options that were open to him once #Ukraine began its 2023 offensives.

4/ Option 1: Hang Tough. Gerasimov’s first option was to hang tough for the time being and observe the development of the initial phase of the Ukrainian offensive. As such, Gerasimov probably wanted to wait for as long as possible as see where the Ukrainian main effort would be.

5/ Option 2: Hang Tough (plus). Gerasimov’s next option was a variation on Option 1, but with limited offensive jabs at Ukrainian weak spots to hasten any Ukrainian culmination.

6/ Option 3: Reorient the Defence. Perhaps the most politically difficult – but militarily effective – would have been a reorientation of the Russian defence around Crimea and the Donbas. This would mean Russia giving up most of the territory illegally seized since February 2022.

7/ It has become apparent that Gerasimov has decided on Option 2. His main effort is clearly holding onto ground in southern Ukraine, from Donetsk all the way west into Kherson. Gerasimov has several supporting efforts however.

8/ One is the ongoing series of drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets. Recently, this has included strikes against civil targets in #Odesa. Another supporting effort is the defensive efforts in eastern Ukraine around Bakhmut.

9/ While in an overall defensive posture, Gerasimov has also launched attacks in north-eastern Ukraine and in Donetsk. Russia has attacked along the Svatove-Kreminna axis, but as the two maps below from 4 June and 23 July show, Russian progress on this axis has been limited.

10/ While we are yet to see a large part of Ukraine’s combat power committed, Gerasimov has now had over seven weeks to observe and learn from the Ukrainian armed forces and the conduct of their attacks in the south and the east of Ukraine.

11/ As such, what observations might Gerasimov have taken from the first weeks of Ukrainian offensive operations?

12/ 1st, Gerasimov will be reassured that the efforts to develop the defensive positions in southern Ukraine are paying off. Gerasimov probably feels this has given him breathing space to preserve his combat power, while absorbing Ukrainian attacks & degrading Ukrainian forces.

13/ The Ukrainians are making slow progress in the south. There have been some challenges however. Observations by @HoansSolo and @KofmanMichael, in the wake of their recent visit to Ukraine, are worth reading and reflecting upon. warontherocks.com/2023/07/ukrain…

14/ 2nd, Gerasimov will be watching the correlation of forces in the south carefully. While the Russian forces in the south are relatively fresh, the Ukrainians are extracting a significant toll on them.

15/ One area of focus for the Ukrainians is degrading the Russian recon-strike complex, particularly and artillery. Earlier in the war the Russians had a significant advantage in numbers of artillery systems, and them ammunition for them.

16/ But this advantage has been reduced through provision of western towed, self-propelled and rocket artillery systems, as well as supply of Western precision munitions and DPICMs. Gerasimov will be watching this battle of artillery systems in the coming weeks.

17/ 3rd, Gerasimov will be seeking ways to exacerbate the challenges that Ukrainian forces experience in fighting their way through the Russian southern defensive scheme. He probably believes he can win an attritional fight.

18/ 4th, Gerasimov will probably be thinking about options for Russian operations once the Ukrainian offensives have reached their culmination point. His assumption (and hope) will be that Ukraine won’t make a major breakthrough in the south and the east.

19/ Gerasimov still has many challenges. He must deal with high level military #strategy, coordination of Russian military operations, and provide the politico-military interface between the Russian military & Putin. He is also dealing with the aftermath of the Prigozhin mutiny.

20/ A great survivor despite Russian defeats in Ukraine, Gerasimov is likely to continue & evolve his current defensive strategy. The Russian commander will be hoping his plan will result in #Ukraine culminating before they can break through the Russian defences in the south.

21/ Given the length of the front line, the size of respective forces in the field, and the determination of both sides to achieve their objectives, both the Ukrainians and the Russians will have prepared themselves for a long campaign over the northern summer and autumn.

22/ Both sides, after their initial experiences in this Ukrainian 2023 counter offensive, appear to have taken stock, learned, adapted and put their heads down for the long haul of military operations ahead. End.

23/ You can read a more detailed assessment on this topic at my latest post at Futura Doctrina.
mickryan.substack.com/p/gerasimovs-d…

24/ Thank you to the following, whose images and links were used in this thread: @DefenceU @DefenceHQ @ZelenskyyUa @michaelh992 @Ercin_Erturk @TheStudyofWar @criticalthreats @combined2forces @bradyafr @WarOnTheRocks @HoansSolo @KofmanMichael @RALee85