The Russian Army just blasted open a 12-kilometer hole in the Ukrainian front line and captured more terrain in a week than Ukraine has in the last two months of their counteroffensive.
Let's talk about it. ⬇️
This is part of a general Russian push in Lugansk north of the Seversky Donets river that has been going on for about the last two weeks. Smaller gains have been reported in the far north near Kupyansk as well as in the Serebryanski Forest along the river to the south.
It's noteworthy that "O Group" - the same Central Military District grouping that seized the Liman area last spring - has suddenly resurfaced in reporting from the front.
They're probably quite familiar with the terrain.
This push started small, with a modest bridgehead forced over the Zherebets River (a small water obstacle along which part of the front has run for the last several months) around July 17th.
The initial lodgment was tiny (about 2x2km), but the Russians kept up the pressure.
On July 19th - two days after establishing the initial bridgehead - the Russians forced another, smaller one a couple kilometers north.
This gave them some additional room to work with and endangered Ukrainian positions now caught between the two pincers.
By July 22nd additional attacks had expanded the northern bridgehead about two kilometers west, to the point the crossing site was no longer under serious threat from direct fire.
At this point the Ukrainian defenses in the area began buckling, despite reserves being sent in.
On July 23rd the Russians managed to link up both bridgeheads and start pushing west. Ukrainian forces began retreating as their flanks were exposed and they were threatened with encirclement.
The Russians forced another small bridgehead 5km north the next day.
This small bridgehead developed into a large thrust yesterday, gaining more terrain in a matter of hours than had been seized in the entire weeklong battle to that point.
Although fierce fighting developed further south, there seems to have been little resistance to this attack.
I expect the Russians will continue developing this attack into a general push to the Oskol River, which will set conditions to easily move on eastern Kharkov and western Donetsk oblasts as the Ukrainian counteroffensive peters out.
Which, speaking of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it's noteworthy that the Ukrainians do not seem to have effectively responded to this breakthrough yet.
I suspect they have two interrelated problems:
1. Their most combat-capable brigades have been mauled during ongoing and very unsuccessful offensives in Zaporozhe and on the Bakhmut flanks.
While there are probably a couple elite brigades in deep reserve (we haven't seen Challenger 2s yet), deploying them would uncover Kiev.
2. Their "line" brigades are by now filled with poor-quality conscripts and badly underequipped - the kind of units the Wehrmacht would classify as "fit only for defensive operations" where they can shelter in fixed fortifications. They will fare poorly in mobile warfare.
So how are the Russians doing this? I've seen no evidence of any new tactics or huge reserves introduced - they seem to be simply applying their now-well honed tactical methods on a large scale to seize lots of ground.
It's very noteworthy just how low-key and competently-done this attack has been thus far. There have been no movie trailers and no minefield traffic jams - just a methodical, silent push through the Ukrainian defensive line with, as near as I can tell, few Russian losses.
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Somebody at the State Department probably thought they'd come up with a banger when they put out this talking point: "If Russia stops fighting and withdraws, the war ends. If Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine ends."
Too bad it's nonsense. ⬇️
(comments by Jens Stoltenberg of NATO)
Ukraine could end the war tomorrow ("stop fighting") by agreeing to Russia's four demands, which have been constant since the start of the "Special Military Operation." They are: 1. Demilitarization 2. Denazification 3. Neutralization 4. Recognition of Russian annexations
Demilitarization would not be the end of the Ukrainian state or nation. Many countries cope quite well with treaty restriction on their militaries, and in any event in April 2022 the Russians proposed a "demilitarized" Ukraine with a larger army than Germany.
Military ethics, for when soldiers are asked to do something legal under the Law of Armed Conflict but morally disastrous.
They don't really exist - they're certainly not codified and enforced properly in any force I know of - but they should.
Thread ⬇️
But Major Warlord, you say - the US military has ethical requirements!
Yes, it does. They're the same government-employee ethics any civilian bureaucrat has to adhere to. Don't accept lavish gifts, don't make your subordinates run errands, don't commute in government vehicles.
I'm talking about actual professional ethics for soldiers, which I have been told ad nauseum is a real profession but which lacks a key characteristic of such - an ethical code dealing with the profession's actual duties.
Lawyers, doctors and engineers all have ethical codes.
The Ukrainian War isn't going to be "the" war of the 21st century. It's probably going to be remembered as the minor war before WWIII that everyone observed very closely and then proceeded to draw wildly incorrect conclusions from.
Much like the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. ⬇️
The Russo-Japanese War showed exactly how combat was in the early 20th century and presaged the character of the First World War - both the Western Front's static fighting around Port Arthur and the Eastern Front's blood-soaked mobile warfare in Manchuria.
Machine guns, barbed wire, extensive trench works, hellish concentrations of artillery (including the "tactical" use of siege cannons) - and apocalyptic casualties - all featured during the extended Siege of Port Arthur.
Each side lost over 50,000 soldiers in five months.
The Black Sea Grain Deal is dead. The astonishing thing is that it lasted as long as it did... which was in no small part due to Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the United Nations, playing games with the Russians.
Put another log on the bonfire of the institutions. ⬇️
The Black Sea Initiative was negotiated in June 2022 ostensibly to ensure that vulnerable populations in Africa didn't starve for lack of Ukrainian food exports with the war on and the Ukrainian Black Sea ports (through which most of those exports passed) shut down.
It actually consisted of two separate agreements: one between the UN, Turkey, and Ukraine on implementing exports, and one between the UN, Turkey, and Russia to establish a "safe corridor" to Odessa to allow freighters to come and go without threat of attack.
Info came out recently about US training courses for Ukrainian soldiers in Germany, which revealed the US Army has done little to internalize the lessons of the war.
Part of this was discounting drone recon in favor of old-fashioned patrolling.
But is this really a bad idea? ⬇️
To preface this discussion, it's clear that the US military is very far behind the times in integrating UAVs at the small unit level. These things are transforming the battlefield.
However, it seems apparent to me that Ukrainian forces lack some basic infantry skills. They rarely ever seem to patrol on foot or have any particular grasp of stealthy, dismounted movement and infiltration.
These skills are instead the preserve of (rare) foreign fighters.
Every since D-Day on February 24th, 2022, Ukraine has been fighting a total war against Russia.
One of the most ghoulish talking points I see out of Ukrainian shills and Russian doomers is that Ukraine can and will simply take millions of casualties to win.
Can they really?⬇️
History shows that things are far more complicated, and societies fighting existential total wars will run out of acceptable manpower and collapse militarily long before they physically run out of people to conscript into the ranks.
Let's examine such a society: Nazi Germany.
Nazi Germany went into WWII with a population of some eighty million and lost - either killed in action or as POWs - a little over five million soldiers during the course of the war in Europe.