🧵Today I would like to present manual that circulates among soldiers from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. This manual focuses on on-field experience and covers most of the basics for a soldier's training. In this case, focus lies on the section dedicated to defense organization.
2/ The manual covers a wide array of topics, including minefields, communications, infantry firearms training, firearm customization, ambushes, assault tactics, open field and building assaults, and the organization of defense positions.
3/ General recommendations for platoon strongpoints:
Strongpoints depend on essential fire support from attached forces like mortar, ATGM, heavy machine gun, AGS teams, or artillery. These resources should not be positioned directly within the defensive strongpoint's territory.
4/ Traditional firing positions arrangement, consisting of a single trench and cells face constant enemy bombardment, resulting in loses. The rise of enemy drone usage requires dispersing ammunition storage locations.
5/ The main ammunition storage point, extensively fortified and distanced from the primary positions, is typically situated at the base of the previously mentioned attached fire support unit.
6/ Strongpoint types:
- Grebyonka. It resembles the classic trench technique recommended by the MoD, but it differs in that the individual cells are positioned farther forward from the main trench, while the main trench is located in an area not visible to the enemy.
7/ In this version, the troops stationed in these positions can quickly retreat from enemy fire, having their own dedicated communication route to the main trench.
8/ Another strongpoint variation: "Fan Formation"
In the "Fan Formation," the forward-positioned infantry cells have dedicated communication routes to the quick-access ammunition storage point or the first aid station, ensuring rapid ammunition delivery and wounded evacuation.
9/ When it comes to urban defenses, the manual provides recommendations for setting up defenses, which include the following:
- Defense is established in pockets to cover a larger front with fewer personnel. For defense, buildings located on elevated positions are chosen.
10/
- The system of underground communications is studied for possible diversionary raids or the placement of high-power IEDs.
- Machine gunners are positioned deep within buildings, not higher than the 2nd to 4th floor.
11/
- Mortars can be placed on building rooftops or inside tall structures with the roof removed.
- The defense system should be multi-layered, as the enemy may destroy it layer by layer before launching an attack.
12/ In summary, it is crucial to note that the enemy is adeptly adapting to the ongoing challenges of the war, which include the threats posed by drones and constant artillery bombardments.
13/ To request coverage of specific chapter, feel free to leave the name of the topic you'd like to be covered, and I will prioritize the one that receives the most requests. Don't forget to show your support by liking, sharing, and following
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The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has published new details about the Russian “Geran-3” UAV. The “U” series model is equipped with a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine, allowing it to reach speeds of 300–370 km/h and an estimated operational range of up to 1,000 km.
2/ The “Geran-3” reaches its maximum speed of up to 370 km/h mainly in areas covered by Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare systems, in zones where interceptor UAVs are deployed, and during the terminal phase of flight as it descends toward its target.
3/ Electronic units are largely the same as in the gasoline-powered versions of the “Geran-2” UAV of the “Ы” series. It includes, in particular, the standard SADRA inertial navigation system, an air data computer (ADC), a power distribution unit (PDU), and other components
The dynamics of the battlefield have shifted even further in 2025. With manpower shortages and infiltration tactics, the frontline in some areas has become far less defined and certain. That’s one of the reasons I haven’t posted any tactical updates for a while:
2/ It has reached the point where even soldiers on both sides are uncertain about the frontline - at least beyond their own unit’s tactical area. As a result, sources once considered reliable for mappers are no longer as dependable.
3/ The fog of war is nothing new, of course, but in recent years people grew accustomed to accurate maps to the point of taking them for granted. Unfortunately, even I’ve noticed that many OSINT maps have become markedly less accurate lately.
Up to two-thirds (66%) of respondents in Russia believe it is time to move toward peace negotiations, a record high for this indicator. Only 27% say military action should continue, the lowest level. The figures come from the Levada Center, known for its methodological rigor:
2/ Fifty-eight percent of respondents say the war has affected them or their families. Among those “strongly” affected, common issues include the death of relatives or friends, family members participating in combat, injuries/disability, emotional distress, and economic hardship
3/ Higher support for negotiations among: women; young people under 24; rural residents; those who believe national affairs are going poorly; people who disapprove of Putin; those who rely on YouTube or non-state sources for information.
Two days after being conscripted into Russia's army, Maxim Suvorov signed a contract. Less than a month later, he fell on the battlefield - one of many casualties of Russia’s new practice of filling contract ranks with conscripts. A detailed case showcasing recruitment problems:
2/ Frontelligence Insight has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to meet recruitment targets with monetary bonuses, pushing the military to seek alternatives, including pressuring conscripts to sign contracts. The recent death of a conscript allowed us to trace his story
3/ Our investigation begins with an obituary posted on a local Russian social media group dedicated to fallen soldiers in various conflicts. According to the post, Maxim was conscripted on June 25 and signed a contract on June 27. To verify this, we sought additional evidence
Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more:
2/ According to a report by VIGINUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU)
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern:
A recurring question is whether Russia categorizes AWOL cases as a way to conceal combat deaths in its official reports. The short answer is no. The longer answer is more complicated, and requires looking at how AWOL is treated within the Russian military system. 🧵Short thread:
2/ Most AWOL cases can escalate into actual criminal proceedings if all other measures to bring soldiers back fail. High rates of desertion or absence trigger investigations on record - problems that weigh more heavily on commanders and unit statistics than combat losses do
3/ Casualties themselves are rarely the main concern, provided objectives set by higher command are met. By contrast, desertion is seen as evidence of weak leadership and poor control over subordinates. KIA and MIA are regarded as an acceptable cost of war; AWOL is not.