🧵Today I would like to present manual that circulates among soldiers from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. This manual focuses on on-field experience and covers most of the basics for a soldier's training. In this case, focus lies on the section dedicated to defense organization.
2/ The manual covers a wide array of topics, including minefields, communications, infantry firearms training, firearm customization, ambushes, assault tactics, open field and building assaults, and the organization of defense positions.
3/ General recommendations for platoon strongpoints:
Strongpoints depend on essential fire support from attached forces like mortar, ATGM, heavy machine gun, AGS teams, or artillery. These resources should not be positioned directly within the defensive strongpoint's territory.
4/ Traditional firing positions arrangement, consisting of a single trench and cells face constant enemy bombardment, resulting in loses. The rise of enemy drone usage requires dispersing ammunition storage locations.
5/ The main ammunition storage point, extensively fortified and distanced from the primary positions, is typically situated at the base of the previously mentioned attached fire support unit.
6/ Strongpoint types:
- Grebyonka. It resembles the classic trench technique recommended by the MoD, but it differs in that the individual cells are positioned farther forward from the main trench, while the main trench is located in an area not visible to the enemy.
7/ In this version, the troops stationed in these positions can quickly retreat from enemy fire, having their own dedicated communication route to the main trench.
8/ Another strongpoint variation: "Fan Formation"
In the "Fan Formation," the forward-positioned infantry cells have dedicated communication routes to the quick-access ammunition storage point or the first aid station, ensuring rapid ammunition delivery and wounded evacuation.
9/ When it comes to urban defenses, the manual provides recommendations for setting up defenses, which include the following:
- Defense is established in pockets to cover a larger front with fewer personnel. For defense, buildings located on elevated positions are chosen.
10/
- The system of underground communications is studied for possible diversionary raids or the placement of high-power IEDs.
- Machine gunners are positioned deep within buildings, not higher than the 2nd to 4th floor.
11/
- Mortars can be placed on building rooftops or inside tall structures with the roof removed.
- The defense system should be multi-layered, as the enemy may destroy it layer by layer before launching an attack.
12/ In summary, it is crucial to note that the enemy is adeptly adapting to the ongoing challenges of the war, which include the threats posed by drones and constant artillery bombardments.
13/ To request coverage of specific chapter, feel free to leave the name of the topic you'd like to be covered, and I will prioritize the one that receives the most requests. Don't forget to show your support by liking, sharing, and following
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On 5 July, Ukrainian forces carried out a strike on the Borysoglebsk airfield in Russia. Reports indicate that a depot with glide bombs, a trainer aircraft, and possibly other aircraft were hit. Our team has conducted a brief analysis of imagery a fire map - here’s what we found:
2/ NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System detected at least three thermal anomalies at the Air Base. While it's not very precise or comprehensive, the heat sources appear to be located in 2 areas: the central part of the airfield and the logistical section
3/ While not conclusive, this serves as a credible independent indicator suggesting a possible strike on the logistical area - where Russian forces may have stored ammo, or fuel. The fire in the central part of the airfield appears to be near the Radar Landing System
For many in developing countries, Russia offers a chance to earn blood money they might never otherwise see. Hundreds of Cubans have taken that path, and our team Frontelligence Insight used them as a case study to find out how many foreigners are now fighting for Russia.🧵Thread
2/ In 2023, a major data leak exposed records of hundreds of Cuban mercenaries, later investigated by @InformNapalm. We analyzed 176 personal files and found that most recruits were between 30 and 39 years old, followed by those aged 40 to 49 - with a few even over 60.
3/ With their full names in hand, tracing their whereabouts on Russian social media was relatively easy. One mercenary in particular, Enriquez Linares Livan Michel, proved especially useful. His social media profile contained both photographs and geodata.
Ukrainian drone strikes in Izhevsk: Russia’s arms heart, and Luhansk using rocket-drone "Peklo" demonstrates Kyiv’s growing technological abilities. The message to Putin is clear: Ukraine’s strike range and warhead size will only continue to expand as the war continues:
2/ Air defense drones are emerging as a promising counter to Russia’s expanding Shahed (Geran) drone output - no longer just a concept, but an increasingly likely solution that could help offset Moscow’s production surge with scalable and relatively cheap response
3/ Russia’s consistent failure to break Ukrainian front, despite a manpower edge, and mounting economic issues, admitted even by Putin, nullify their bravado shown during the latest Istanbul. Achieving Moscow’s stated goals would require far more resources than it's deploying
Our team has been tracking Russia’s recruitment efforts abroad, with a focus on West Africa and Cuba. Some revealing insights follow in this short thread🧵:
1. While some foreign POWs claim they were misled, documents suggest they joined Russia’s military knowingly
2. The reality is quite prosaic: Moscow offers steady pay that far surpasses local wages, along with the lure of adventure - an exciting offer for young men in economically strained countries. In some cases, recruits receive upfront bonuses as high as $20,000 and more
3. The contracts - often written in languages such as Spanish or French - clearly outline terms, including compensation for injury or death, and explicitly mention “Special Military Operation” zone. This makes claims of recruits being unaware highly implausible
Stories of undercover operatives who stay behind enemy lines and later fight in special ops units, through some of the war’s toughest battles, are usually found in movies or games. But this isn’t fiction. Here are key points from our interview with Artem "Skhidnyi" Karyakin 🧵:
2/ Artem, a native of Donbas, says he witnessed signs of Russian influence long before 2014. In his hometown of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), a mining city in Luhansk Oblast with no historical ties to the Don Cossacks, a so-called “Don Cossack” group appeared in the early 2000s
3/ By 2014, the same “Cossacks” were seizing government buildings in Kadiivka - this time armed and operating under Russian flags. Many weren’t local; they had come from the Russian Federation, as had others who helped take control by force during the spring occupation efforts.
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort