🧵Today I would like to present manual that circulates among soldiers from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. This manual focuses on on-field experience and covers most of the basics for a soldier's training. In this case, focus lies on the section dedicated to defense organization.
2/ The manual covers a wide array of topics, including minefields, communications, infantry firearms training, firearm customization, ambushes, assault tactics, open field and building assaults, and the organization of defense positions.
3/ General recommendations for platoon strongpoints:
Strongpoints depend on essential fire support from attached forces like mortar, ATGM, heavy machine gun, AGS teams, or artillery. These resources should not be positioned directly within the defensive strongpoint's territory.
4/ Traditional firing positions arrangement, consisting of a single trench and cells face constant enemy bombardment, resulting in loses. The rise of enemy drone usage requires dispersing ammunition storage locations.
5/ The main ammunition storage point, extensively fortified and distanced from the primary positions, is typically situated at the base of the previously mentioned attached fire support unit.
6/ Strongpoint types:
- Grebyonka. It resembles the classic trench technique recommended by the MoD, but it differs in that the individual cells are positioned farther forward from the main trench, while the main trench is located in an area not visible to the enemy.
7/ In this version, the troops stationed in these positions can quickly retreat from enemy fire, having their own dedicated communication route to the main trench.
8/ Another strongpoint variation: "Fan Formation"
In the "Fan Formation," the forward-positioned infantry cells have dedicated communication routes to the quick-access ammunition storage point or the first aid station, ensuring rapid ammunition delivery and wounded evacuation.
9/ When it comes to urban defenses, the manual provides recommendations for setting up defenses, which include the following:
- Defense is established in pockets to cover a larger front with fewer personnel. For defense, buildings located on elevated positions are chosen.
10/
- The system of underground communications is studied for possible diversionary raids or the placement of high-power IEDs.
- Machine gunners are positioned deep within buildings, not higher than the 2nd to 4th floor.
11/
- Mortars can be placed on building rooftops or inside tall structures with the roof removed.
- The defense system should be multi-layered, as the enemy may destroy it layer by layer before launching an attack.
12/ In summary, it is crucial to note that the enemy is adeptly adapting to the ongoing challenges of the war, which include the threats posed by drones and constant artillery bombardments.
13/ To request coverage of specific chapter, feel free to leave the name of the topic you'd like to be covered, and I will prioritize the one that receives the most requests. Don't forget to show your support by liking, sharing, and following
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У США спалахнув гучний скандал після того, як Конгресовий комітет опублікував переписку Джеффрі Епштейна, відомого організатора зустрічей із неповнолітніми та впливовими людьми. Серед тих, хто згадується у листах - Дональд Трамп. Крім того, у документах не обійшлось без росіян:
2/ Зокрема, у листі Джеффрі Епштейна до Торб’єрна Ягланда від 24.06.2018 р. він зазначав: «Чуркін був чудовим. Після наших розмов він зрозумів Трампа. Це не складно - йому потрібно лише побачити щось, щоб зрозуміти, усе дуже просто». (Чуркін на той час був постпердом РФ при ООН)
3/ Його наступна відповідь звучала так: "Я думаю, ви могли б запропонувати Путіну, щоб Лавров поспілкувався зі мною і отримав необхідне розуміння. Віталій Чуркін раніше це робив, але він помер. ? !"
На той час, Торб'єрн був Генеральним секретарем Ради Європи
A few broad observations on the course of war, based on observations, discussions with officers, soldiers, and analysts, data, and other relevant sources. I will begin with a high-level sociopolitical overview before gradually moving toward operational-tactical level. 🧵Thread:
2/ Overall, the situation for Ukraine has not improved since last year. Ukraine has markedly increased its long-range strike capabilities, which have very tangible effects across Russian society. However, the battlefield initiative remains with Russia, much as it did most of 2024
3/ A plausible Ukrainian "victory" approach can be summarized as: disrupt logistics, degrade the Russian economy, and avoid catastrophic operational collapses. Russia’s apparent approach is simpler: keep pressing until Ukraine exhausts its will or physical capacity to resist.
According to Russian milblogger Fighterbomber, who has a wide network within the Russian Air Force, an Il-76 was shot down in Sudan on November 4 by the Rapid Support Forces. According to him, the aircraft had been purchased in Kyrgyzstan a month and a half ago for $12 million
2/ A video showing a burning object falling from the sky, likely the claimed Il-76, has also been recorded and published
3/ While I do not have solid sources in Sudan, one of my contacts located there has confirmed that reports about a downed Il-76 have been circulating within the RSF since yesterday. Government forces are actively using the Air Force to supply besieged cities
Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding for another year, would have required diverting significant resources from other sectors of the front, a tradeoff that would result in disastrous situation elsewhere.
North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread:
2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.
3/ In the summer of 2024, Russia confirmed plans to build a road bridge over the Tumen River, with construction led by Russia’s TunnelYuzhStroy. The project is budgeted at ~9 billion rubles (~$110M), spanning 4.7 km in total, with the bridge itself about 1 km long
A multi-day analysis of battlefield dynamics and internal Russian data: both public and non-public, points to multiple trends and key points which we summarized. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine’s deep strike drone campaign has inflicted significant direct and secondary damage across Russia, contributing to a perceptible shift in perceptions of the war’s trajectory and its cost benefit among both military command and law enforcement senior leadership.
3/ According to analyzed communications from dozens of senior Russian officers in Moscow and in the field, there is a growing perception that the war has effectively reached a strategic and political dead end - sustained primarily by President Putin’s personal insistence