🧵Today I would like to present manual that circulates among soldiers from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. This manual focuses on on-field experience and covers most of the basics for a soldier's training. In this case, focus lies on the section dedicated to defense organization.
2/ The manual covers a wide array of topics, including minefields, communications, infantry firearms training, firearm customization, ambushes, assault tactics, open field and building assaults, and the organization of defense positions.
3/ General recommendations for platoon strongpoints:
Strongpoints depend on essential fire support from attached forces like mortar, ATGM, heavy machine gun, AGS teams, or artillery. These resources should not be positioned directly within the defensive strongpoint's territory.
4/ Traditional firing positions arrangement, consisting of a single trench and cells face constant enemy bombardment, resulting in loses. The rise of enemy drone usage requires dispersing ammunition storage locations.
5/ The main ammunition storage point, extensively fortified and distanced from the primary positions, is typically situated at the base of the previously mentioned attached fire support unit.
6/ Strongpoint types:
- Grebyonka. It resembles the classic trench technique recommended by the MoD, but it differs in that the individual cells are positioned farther forward from the main trench, while the main trench is located in an area not visible to the enemy.
7/ In this version, the troops stationed in these positions can quickly retreat from enemy fire, having their own dedicated communication route to the main trench.
8/ Another strongpoint variation: "Fan Formation"
In the "Fan Formation," the forward-positioned infantry cells have dedicated communication routes to the quick-access ammunition storage point or the first aid station, ensuring rapid ammunition delivery and wounded evacuation.
9/ When it comes to urban defenses, the manual provides recommendations for setting up defenses, which include the following:
- Defense is established in pockets to cover a larger front with fewer personnel. For defense, buildings located on elevated positions are chosen.
10/
- The system of underground communications is studied for possible diversionary raids or the placement of high-power IEDs.
- Machine gunners are positioned deep within buildings, not higher than the 2nd to 4th floor.
11/
- Mortars can be placed on building rooftops or inside tall structures with the roof removed.
- The defense system should be multi-layered, as the enemy may destroy it layer by layer before launching an attack.
12/ In summary, it is crucial to note that the enemy is adeptly adapting to the ongoing challenges of the war, which include the threats posed by drones and constant artillery bombardments.
13/ To request coverage of specific chapter, feel free to leave the name of the topic you'd like to be covered, and I will prioritize the one that receives the most requests. Don't forget to show your support by liking, sharing, and following
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The grooming of Orban's regime as a Trojan horse inside the EU and NATO is no longer speculative: it's now evidence-based, confirmed by leaked Budapest-Moscow communications. Agentstvo reports that roughly half of all Russian embassy staff maintain ties to intelligence services:
2/ The EU officially identifies Russia as one of its primary security threats. Yet Orban has been systematically distancing Hungary from both the EU and NATO, deteriorating relations with neighbors including Ukraine, while growing increasingly reliant on Russian influence.
3/ Moscow has no genuine interest in Hungary itself, or in the country's long-term wellbeing. What it wants is a lever - to undermine EU institutions, erode European support for Ukraine, and seed distrust between member states toward one of their own EU members and NATO allies
There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation
With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
Thread 🧵:
2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.