🧵Today I would like to present manual that circulates among soldiers from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. This manual focuses on on-field experience and covers most of the basics for a soldier's training. In this case, focus lies on the section dedicated to defense organization.
2/ The manual covers a wide array of topics, including minefields, communications, infantry firearms training, firearm customization, ambushes, assault tactics, open field and building assaults, and the organization of defense positions.
3/ General recommendations for platoon strongpoints:
Strongpoints depend on essential fire support from attached forces like mortar, ATGM, heavy machine gun, AGS teams, or artillery. These resources should not be positioned directly within the defensive strongpoint's territory.
4/ Traditional firing positions arrangement, consisting of a single trench and cells face constant enemy bombardment, resulting in loses. The rise of enemy drone usage requires dispersing ammunition storage locations.
5/ The main ammunition storage point, extensively fortified and distanced from the primary positions, is typically situated at the base of the previously mentioned attached fire support unit.
6/ Strongpoint types:
- Grebyonka. It resembles the classic trench technique recommended by the MoD, but it differs in that the individual cells are positioned farther forward from the main trench, while the main trench is located in an area not visible to the enemy.
7/ In this version, the troops stationed in these positions can quickly retreat from enemy fire, having their own dedicated communication route to the main trench.
8/ Another strongpoint variation: "Fan Formation"
In the "Fan Formation," the forward-positioned infantry cells have dedicated communication routes to the quick-access ammunition storage point or the first aid station, ensuring rapid ammunition delivery and wounded evacuation.
9/ When it comes to urban defenses, the manual provides recommendations for setting up defenses, which include the following:
- Defense is established in pockets to cover a larger front with fewer personnel. For defense, buildings located on elevated positions are chosen.
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- The system of underground communications is studied for possible diversionary raids or the placement of high-power IEDs.
- Machine gunners are positioned deep within buildings, not higher than the 2nd to 4th floor.
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- Mortars can be placed on building rooftops or inside tall structures with the roof removed.
- The defense system should be multi-layered, as the enemy may destroy it layer by layer before launching an attack.
12/ In summary, it is crucial to note that the enemy is adeptly adapting to the ongoing challenges of the war, which include the threats posed by drones and constant artillery bombardments.
13/ To request coverage of specific chapter, feel free to leave the name of the topic you'd like to be covered, and I will prioritize the one that receives the most requests. Don't forget to show your support by liking, sharing, and following
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Recently, I mentioned the issue of Russian colonists replacing Ukrainians, who either fell victim to violence, was forcibly displaced, or had to flee. Today, I will provide several examples of tactics used by Russians to reshape the population on occupied territories.
🧵Thread:
2/ According to the "Interagency Coordination Headquarters for Humanitarian Response," around 40,000 people remain in camps, including over 10,000 children. Russia claims to provide "social security" payments to over 1.4 million people, indicating a larger number of displaced
3/
-Between May and June, around 600 individuals were deported from Dokuchaevsk, Starobilsk, and Debaltseve to Rostov Oblast.
- In Zaporizhia Oblast, teachers who refused to comply with new Russian educational programs faced interrogations, intimidations, and deportation.
In this 🧵thread, I discuss tactics from the captured Russian manual "Recommendations for countering an enemy operating as tank and mechanized columns," with a specific focus on analyzing the section titled "Hugging the explosions of one's own shells."
2/ The AFU maneuver, referred to in the manual as "Hugging the explosions of one's own shells," aims to minimize the time gap between artillery preparation and the infantry reaching the trenches, capitalizing on the defenders' delay in manning their positions.
3/ Infantry, tanks, and BMPs begin their forward movement not after the artillery preparation but during it. Infantry and armored vehicles aim to get as close as possible to the targeted area, considering the limits of safe distances.
A year ago, a russian propaganda memo surfaced on the internet, garnering attention not just for its propaganda content but also for its ridiculousness. It circulated among pro-russian informants and has recently been found among detained pro-Russian agents again. 🧵Thread:
2/ Authors explain Russia's motive to occupy Ukraine in the introduction. One of the highlighted arguments explaining the Ukrainian revolution of 2014 was summarized by authors as follows: "The villagers who broke into Kyiv created a new reality, where they felt like masters."
3/ According to the authors, the war was triggered by the construction of NATO bases. Control over nuclear energy was assumed by Americans and Brits, and the US DoD established biolabs in Ukraine for researching and producing bioweapons, even conducting human experiments
🧵With new satellite imagery from Vuhledar revealing the extent of the catastrophe experienced by the Russian army during the winter, as well as the ongoing counter-offensive, it is crucial to explore the role of minefields and operational planning in shaping assault operations.
2/ The objective of a minefield extends beyond causing harm; it also aims to impose a specific mindset and tactical approach on the opponent, compelling them to act in a manner most advantageous for the party laying the minefield. Minefields limit the enemy's maneuvering options
3/ Mechanized units are used for maneuvering, executing assaults, bypassing enemy positions, and launching flanking maneuvers. Their firepower and off-road speed make them ideal for such operations. However, minefields restrict maneuvering space, hampering the assault's tempo.
In the context of counter-offensive and minefields let's continue the review of the russian manual that offers guidelines for establishing minefields as a countermeasure against Ukrainian mechanized columns. 🧵Thread
2/ The manual recommends installing mines on roads, bridges, and off-road areas near tree lines where vehicles may move. Special attention should be given to intersections, where the installation of mixed groups of mines, obstacles, and barricades is recommended.
3/ The process is described as follows: mixed minefields are installed in the front part of the defense line at night. The mining itself is carried out covertly by groups of sappers consisting of no less than 10-15 individuals, allowing for manual placement of mines.
I have recently obtained a valuable russian document titled "Recommendations for countering an enemy operating as tank and mechanized columns." This thread will include analysis of select section of the manual, extracting insights from its contents.
2/ The manual highlights utilization of combined-arms units and formations by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. According to them, AFU tactics are based on NATO strategy, adapted for local conditions, and implemented by AFU commanders through memorized "NATO combat algorithms”.
3/ The discussed section is titled "Frontal Attack via 'Pierced' Corridor with Armored Vehicles."To enhance clarity, I will blend book visuals with my original graphics.
As per the manual, AFU units initiate the first stage by conducting reconnaissance with small recon groups.