During night 3 civilian ships seem to have successfully challenged Russian threats to Black Sea navigation.
Ams1, Sahin 2 & Yilmaz Kaptan sailed direct routes, openly advertising destination Ukraine over AIS.
Their origins: Israel, Greece and Turkey/Georgia.
The origins are interesting in that they are all potential sources of weapons.
Yet, these ships seems to navigate freely over Black Sea, in contempt of the alleged threat that Russia will treat any ship, civilian or not, heading for Ukraine as potential targets.
Usual AIS-caveats apply. AIS-data is possible to manipulate. Further, there might be more ships that I have not found. I will try to find more during day. If anyone cares to, it might be possible to corroborate tracks on Sentinel-passes, strengthening this case. @MT_Anderson ?
AIS-tracks corroborated. Positions broadcasted matches with sat pics.
Ams1 can be found on a Sentinel1 pass north of Bosporus.
Yilmaz Kaptan is seen on both S1 and S2 passes in anchorage outside Sinop, Turkey.
Sahin 2 is caught by S1 in Istanbul anchorage.
Screenshots below
Ams1 north of Bosporus 230729 04:15U Sentinel 1
Yilmaz Kaptan, Sinop anchorage, Turkey. 230727 08:36U Sentinel 2 and 15:36U Sentinel 1
Sahin 2, Istanbul anchorage, Turkey. 230729 04:15U Sentinel 1
High military aviation activity on Black Sea coast. High for a Sunday, including AWACS.
Ams1 changed her AIS-destination for Romania a few hours before arriving to the Danube anchorage. She broadcasted Ukraine the 4 days before that. Yilmaz Kaptan, similar.
Looking at other traffic inbound today for Ukraine ports we have Tanzania-flagged Sofilarex and Ukraine-flagged Orel 3 and Orel 5. They have all hugged the coast, staying inside NATO territorial waters on their way to Ukraine (Orel 3 maybe Bulgaria?)
There are numerous other vessels inbound for Ukraine ports. They use various methods to mitigate the Russian threat and I will respect these mariners wishes to stay hidden.
Once safe in port I will try and show without endangering them, it is a testament to the ongoing crimes.
Cute! One little Ukraine-bound ship has a very sharp-eyed eagle looking out for them.
But, Yilmaz Kaptan seems to have started broadcasting another name??? She now shows up as ”Kudret Gezer” on all AIS-services I use. Strange, will follow.
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South Baltic sea is experiencing a newish type of GNSS-jamming. It is affecting units at sea level far and wide, much further than one ground based jammer can reach.
The most intense attack so far took place as the political elite of Denmark and 100k visitors met at Bornholm.
Data for animation above is the signal levels that RINEX stations receive from various GNSS-constellations.
Last year a limited span of frequencies were affected. 2025 all frequencies/bands are affected. BeiDou, not illustrated (noisy).
The Bornholm station is used as example.
Looking per station we can see the geographic and temporal reach.
South-east corner of Baltic is affected (but not all stations!) and with an intensified period right now.
It is also evident that the ongoing 2025 attacks result in a much more degraded signal to noise ratio.
There is an estimated 1 in 10k-100k years chance that all 8 of the Nov 2024 - Jan 2025 Baltic Sea cable breaks are coincidental.
Data is hard to get by but no matter which real data or reasonable assumption one picks it is very unlikely all 8 of them are explained by chance.
🧵
Illustration of a 1 in 108 908 years chance that all 8 of the Nov 2024 - Jan 2025 Baltic Sea cable breaks happens with present background levels. Above is 1 in 10 609 years illustrated.
Two alternative ways of illustrating the extremely low probability of the Baltic Cable breaks being normal. Red dots in each, promise!