I’ve been having a bit of a deep dive into the Ukrainian offensive.
The main message is:
KEEP CALM AND CARRY ON 💪
This offensive started in June and has had a couple of phases.
At first - the Ukrainians tried a fairly direct style of assault - perhaps buoyed by all the expectations both internal and external
These initial weeks in June saw the taking of some Russian front line positions, and in some areas a few kilometres of territory - but the main Russian lines were breached and there was perhaps a 5-10% vehicle destruction rate.
(NYT reported 20% but this doesn’t take into account vehicles recovered, repaired and reissued to the troops)
This is broadly what phase 1 looked like. The three blue arrows are where the Ukrainians pushed forward.
L - > R
Orikhiv towards Tokmak (and then Melitopol?)
Velyka Novosilka towards Mariupol
Bahkmut
The blue circle on the left is where Ukraine has established a bridgehead over the River Dnipro south of Kherson. This and the Bahkmut axis should be considered fixing assaults to draw Russian forces away from the main axes which are Tokmak and Velyka Novosilka
The reason Tokmak and Velyka Novosilka are the main axes are shows in this diagram.
Successful assaults in this area get to the coast and will split the Russian forces in two.
The final piece of phase 1 is the red arrow - which is a Russian counteroffensive in the Kupyansk area - the Russians are trying to fix as many Ukrainians as possible up there to take the pressure off the Russian forces in the South.
How can we assess phase 1?
Not bad is the basic judgment. It would have been nicer had it been a bit more successful but in some cases up to 10km of territory was taken back (more than the Russians have taken in the rest of the year by the way), but it came at a cost in men and materiel.
And Ukraine, above all else, is being careful with its people - it cannot afford to lose them, and it certainly can’t afford to throw them willy-nilly against Russian defences that, let’s be honest, were probably much stronger that was assessed before hand.
So Ukraine switched it up. Phase 2.
Here the Ukrainians went back to what they are very good at, but with a twist.
Throughout this war - the Ukrainians have been very good at finding and destroying Russian logistics, and transport nodes (like bridges) that the logistics flow across.
This, more than anything else, led to their successes in forcing a Russian pull out from Kherson - the Russians simply couldn’t supply their forces anymore.
The Ukrainians (aided by western intelligence) have developed a very good system for identifying these targets and then hitting them - particularly with guided rocket artillery, drones, and now cruise missiles (initially supplied by the UK and now other countries)
To the target set of logistics and bridges the Ukrainians added Russian artillery pieces (that’s the twist), and particularly high value ones like rocket artillery.
The Ukrainians have spent the last few weeks going hunting for Russian artillery and logistics.
It’s relatively easy:
1) Ukrainian probing assault 2) See where the Russian artillery comes from 3) Hit the Russian artillery pieces with HIMARs / drones etc. 4) Use communications intelligence / satellites to work out where their logistics are. 5) Hit the logistics 6) Repeat
Rates of Russian artillery losses are now at their highest since the war began.
So what, you think?
Well - the Russians, more than almost anyone else (expect perhaps the North Koreans) practice a very artillery centric type of warfare for both offence and defence.
Take out the artillery and they can’t fight anymore
Look at all these red circles - these are all bridges or transport hubs that have been hit by storm shadow cruise missiles over the last few weeks.
It makes it increasingly difficult for Russian to do anything if they can’t supply their troops.
Now - in the last week or so there has been a flutter of excitement amongst western media outlets that the ‘proper’ counteroffensive was kicking off and that Ukraine was committing its reserve etc.
I don’t really see any evidence of this.
There has been a bit more activity on the Orikhiv axis, and Ukraine has managed to capture the settlement of Staromaiorske (on the Velyka Novosilka axis).
These are hardly big strategic muscle moves.
What I suspect has happened is western capitals were getting a bit jittery about the pace of progress, and Ukraine realised it needed to release some good news.
But really I see the last week as more of the same - phase 2 as described in this thread.
The Ukrainians aren’t going to be rushed in this making them lose more people.
They know they need to show progress before the end of the year.
Last year is a better analogy - all through the summer everyone was saying Ukraine was losing and the Kharkiv and Kherson happened in the Autumn and late Autumn.
The reality is that the scene is being set now. Wait until the Autumn once Russia has run out of artillery and its logistics don’t work.
That’s all for now. Thanks for reading.
If you find these analyses interesting, you might like to try my book.
How to Fight a War (out now in the UK, coming out soon in US, India, China, South Africa, etc).
I wrote to David Brazier @KentHighways two weeks ago asking him to urgently reconsider the 6 week closure of Pembury Road in Tunbridge Wells, and at the very least to give more information to local residents (who have received next to nothing by way of explanation).
For those who don’t live in Tunbridge Wells, the Pembury Rd is one of the four main trunk roads into TW. Closing it for 6 weeks is severely disruptive to locals.
It’s a summer of chaos brought to you by the Kent Conservatives. @GregClarkMP absent too.