Thread by @WarintheFuture

Almost 2 months into the Ukrainian offensives, the tempo of ops has settled into the pulse & pause observed in other large wars. There is a lot going on. Time for a campaign update on the Ukrainian offensives. 1/20 🧵
https://t.co/wqp0qtUvxRmickryan.substack.com/p/the-state-of…

2/ In my 15 July 2023 substack update, I outlined 5 important 'competitions', that would shape the outcome of the Ukrainian & Russian summer/autumn campaigns in 2023. Let's do an update on each of these key ‘battles’. https://t.co/4FiDOV9CkUmickryan.substack.com/p/the-ukrainia…

3/ The Logistic Fight. The battles for logistic and transport hubs continues as part of Ukrainian deep battle. In the east and the south, the Ukrainians continue seek to seize or strike key locations that will provide transport hubs and logistics for the Russians.

4/ Recently, there has been the 29 July Ukrainian strike on the Chongar Bridge. Ukraine’s armed forces continues to strike these deep targets, while its tactical assaults seek to capture such hubs as part of the close fight.

5/ Seizing the Initiative. In the south, Ukraine has the tactical initiative & is conducting attacks on two axes of advance. In the east, Ukraine has the initiative now in the Battle of Bakhmut. In the north, Russia is conducting an mini-offensive along the Kreminna-Svatove axis.

6/ At the operational level, I believe the Ukrainians still retain the initiative, with some forces in reserve. However, with some of their reserves committed to the south, and some potentially being held back against Russian ops in Luhansk, this will be a careful balancing act.

7/ The Adaptation Battle. In the south, the Russians have adapted, including the construction of fake trenches which are booby trapped, designed to lure in and kill Ukrainian soldiers. The Russians have also been using their attack helicopters with more effectiveness.

8/ Ukraine is adapting tactics to get through Russian defences. More adaptation will be needed to more rapidly get through these. As I wrote previously, we need a Minefields Manhattan Project to transform the technology & tactics of minefield detection, mapping & clearing.

9/ The Ukrainians continue to adapt their long-range strike activities in air & sea domains. Ukraine now appears to be able to generate small-scale periodic strikes against Moscow with drones. The Ukrainian Navy’s maritime strikes with drones evolves. https://t.co/HFEKDb4fJihisutton.com/Ukraine-Mariti…

10/ The Attrition Battle. Western industry is only slowly adapting to Ukrainian needs. The U.S. alone is unlikely to meet Ukrainian needs. A recent @FT article notes that while Ukraine needs 8000 arty rounds per day, the US is will only ramp up to 90,000 a month by 2025.

11/ Recent Russian announcements about force generation indicate that keeping the Russian Army at a desired strength is also proving to be challenging. They are increasing the maximum age for conscription from 27 to 30, and upper limit for callout of reservists to 70.

12/ Despite this, there remains only anecdotal information at present on how either side is going in larger attrition battle.

13/ The Strategic Influence Fight. Finally, beyond the battlefield in Ukraine, both sides are seeking to gain ascendancy in the battle of strategic influence. Putin’s new narrative is that the Ukrainian offensive is preventing peace negotiations.

14/ The Russians have also been leaflet dropping over Ukrainian lines, encouraging Ukrainian soldiers to surrender. One effect is that that there is probably no longer any shortage of toilet paper in Ukrainian ground forces units in the south!

15/ In my latest article at Futura Doctrina, I also update the seven key measures of success for Ukraine's counteroffensive. You can read the full piece here:
https://t.co/qwVhDrbzU5mickryan.substack.com/p/the-state-of…

16/ As with all wars, there remains an abundance of uncertainty. The degree to which both sides are having their combat power degraded in the Ukrainian 2023 offensives has some data but overall it is difficult to come to definitive conclusions.

17/ That said, the Ukrainians probably have the operational initiative at the moment and have secured the tactical initiative in some parts of the eastern and southern fronts.

18/ But the Russian mini-offensive in northern Luhansk remains an operational risk for Ukraine. Even if the Russians do not gain significant territory, it offers them the ability to draw in Ukrainian forces needed in the south.

19/ Both sides demonstrate the will to continue fighting for some time to come. The outcomes of the five battles described earlier in this thread will largely determine the success or otherwise of Ukraine’s 2023 offensives. End.

20/ Thank you to the following whose images and links are used in this thread and the article: @War_Mapper @DefenceU @DefenceHQ @Tatarigami_UA @CovertShores @Liberov @Militarylandnet @BBCWorld @combined2forces @ManuBrabo