This thread analyzes the situation at Berdyans'k airport, focusing on russian helicopters. Amid the ongoing offensive, observers may find it puzzling that these helicopters remain unscathed at their base in Berdyans'k, enabling them to swiftly access the frontlines.
2/ The russian air threat persists in this counter-offensive, demanding additional consideration. One strategy involves neutralizing helicopters on the ground before they take flight. While the airfield is within Ukraine's long-range capabilities, the situation is more complex
3/ One major challenge is the significant spacing between helicopters, making it difficult to effectively target them with a single missile. Given the limited availability of long-range weapons, using a missile that may or may not destroy some Mi-24s becomes hard to justify.
4/ The reason why I use "may or may not" is due to the presence of substantial air defense systems both inside and outside the airport perimeter. This means that launching a missile doesn't guarantee success, as it could face countermeasures.
5/ Other options, like a massive missile launch combined with drones to overwhelm defenses, may seem viable, but cost-efficiency becomes a significant concern in such scenarios.
This is where GLSDB (Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb) can prove highly valuable
6/ The weapon's operational range, relatively low cost (compared to ATACMS or Stormshadow), and capability to evade specific countermeasures make it a potential game-changer in situations like this
7/ Until then, significant efforts and creativity will be required to destroy these targets.
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Ukraine successfully hit two refineries with drone strikes early on September 20. Geolocated videos show both the Novokuybyshevsk and Saratov refineries damaged and on fire. Ukraine has successfully targeted these facilities earlier this year. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to Rosneft, the Saratov Refinery has a designed capacity of 7.0 million tons of oil per year. It processes Urals crude, crude from the Saratov field via pipeline, as well as crude from the Orenburg fields by rail. It produces gasoline, vacuum gas oil, and bitumen
3/ Ukraine has struck Saratov Refinery multiple times in the past - once in August and twice in September (including today’s strike). The August strike halted oil intake, and the September 14 strike led to operational disruptions, though the full scale of impact remains unclear.
The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has published new details about the Russian “Geran-3” UAV. The “U” series model is equipped with a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine, allowing it to reach speeds of 300–370 km/h and an estimated operational range of up to 1,000 km.
2/ The “Geran-3” reaches its maximum speed of up to 370 km/h mainly in areas covered by Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare systems, in zones where interceptor UAVs are deployed, and during the terminal phase of flight as it descends toward its target.
3/ Electronic units are largely the same as in the gasoline-powered versions of the “Geran-2” UAV of the “Ы” series. It includes, in particular, the standard SADRA inertial navigation system, an air data computer (ADC), a power distribution unit (PDU), and other components
The dynamics of the battlefield have shifted even further in 2025. With manpower shortages and infiltration tactics, the frontline in some areas has become far less defined and certain. That’s one of the reasons I haven’t posted any tactical updates for a while:
2/ It has reached the point where even soldiers on both sides are uncertain about the frontline - at least beyond their own unit’s tactical area. As a result, sources once considered reliable for mappers are no longer as dependable.
3/ The fog of war is nothing new, of course, but in recent years people grew accustomed to accurate maps to the point of taking them for granted. Unfortunately, even I’ve noticed that many OSINT maps have become markedly less accurate lately.
Up to two-thirds (66%) of respondents in Russia believe it is time to move toward peace negotiations, a record high for this indicator. Only 27% say military action should continue, the lowest level. The figures come from the Levada Center, known for its methodological rigor:
2/ Fifty-eight percent of respondents say the war has affected them or their families. Among those “strongly” affected, common issues include the death of relatives or friends, family members participating in combat, injuries/disability, emotional distress, and economic hardship
3/ Higher support for negotiations among: women; young people under 24; rural residents; those who believe national affairs are going poorly; people who disapprove of Putin; those who rely on YouTube or non-state sources for information.
Two days after being conscripted into Russia's army, Maxim Suvorov signed a contract. Less than a month later, he fell on the battlefield - one of many casualties of Russia’s new practice of filling contract ranks with conscripts. A detailed case showcasing recruitment problems:
2/ Frontelligence Insight has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to meet recruitment targets with monetary bonuses, pushing the military to seek alternatives, including pressuring conscripts to sign contracts. The recent death of a conscript allowed us to trace his story
3/ Our investigation begins with an obituary posted on a local Russian social media group dedicated to fallen soldiers in various conflicts. According to the post, Maxim was conscripted on June 25 and signed a contract on June 27. To verify this, we sought additional evidence
Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more:
2/ According to a report by VIGINUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU)
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern: