This thread analyzes the situation at Berdyans'k airport, focusing on russian helicopters. Amid the ongoing offensive, observers may find it puzzling that these helicopters remain unscathed at their base in Berdyans'k, enabling them to swiftly access the frontlines.
2/ The russian air threat persists in this counter-offensive, demanding additional consideration. One strategy involves neutralizing helicopters on the ground before they take flight. While the airfield is within Ukraine's long-range capabilities, the situation is more complex
3/ One major challenge is the significant spacing between helicopters, making it difficult to effectively target them with a single missile. Given the limited availability of long-range weapons, using a missile that may or may not destroy some Mi-24s becomes hard to justify.
4/ The reason why I use "may or may not" is due to the presence of substantial air defense systems both inside and outside the airport perimeter. This means that launching a missile doesn't guarantee success, as it could face countermeasures.
5/ Other options, like a massive missile launch combined with drones to overwhelm defenses, may seem viable, but cost-efficiency becomes a significant concern in such scenarios.
This is where GLSDB (Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb) can prove highly valuable
6/ The weapon's operational range, relatively low cost (compared to ATACMS or Stormshadow), and capability to evade specific countermeasures make it a potential game-changer in situations like this
7/ Until then, significant efforts and creativity will be required to destroy these targets.
This thread and imagery were made possible thanks to your generous donations via Buy Me a Coffee. More imagery is on the way. Thank you once again, and don't forget to like and share!
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Instead of replying to each question, I decided to put together a thread that better explains the context of the recent protest, and why this particular law triggered such an unexpected reaction, especially for those, who don’t follow internal Ukrainian politics. 🧵Thread:
2/ It’s no secret that Ukraine has struggled with corruption. That was one of the main drivers behind the 2013–2014 protests, which eventually led to President Yanukovych being ousted. In the years that followed, Ukraine created specialized anti-corruption institutions to fight it
3/ These institutions were strongly supported, and even required, by the EU and Western partners as conditions for deeper integration and the visa-free regime. The goal was to establish bodies that were independent of presidential control and subject to civilian oversight.
Given the many questions surrounding a recent and highly controversial decision passed by the Ukrainian parliament, led by the President's party, I’ve summarized key points from reports by The Kyiv Independent and The Financial Times. Full article links are provided at the end:
2/ On July 21, several Ukrainian law enforcement agencies - the Prosecutor General’s Office, SSU and the State Bureau of Investigation, conducted searches of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)
3/ Fifteen NABU employees are currently under investigation for various alleged offenses. The SBU cited suspected Russian infiltration and administrative misconduct as justification for the raids, with accusations ranging from minor traffic violations to treason.
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has released a video compilation showcasing the battlefield deployment of Unmanned Ground Vehicles. The video has a range of combat applications, from delivering explosive ordnance to serving as mobile grenade launcher platforms. Key details:
2/ Logistics and ammunition delivery: particularly valuable in current conditions, where troop rotations and resupply are often difficult or impossible. If targeted and destroyed, the loss of a drone is far preferable to that of a soldier.
3/ Delivery of large explosive charges: While small FPV drones offer many advantages, they lack the payload capacity needed in certain cases. Deploying heavier unmanned ground vehicles to deliver sizable explosives to fortified positions or buildings can have a decisive impact
You may have seen a graph circulating that compares the number of bodies returned to Ukraine (blue) and to Russia (red) during humanitarian exchanges, used to argue that casualty ratios can be extrapolated from these figures. The logic is simple: dead bodies equal losses. Thread:
2/ This is little more than manipulation, easily refuted by both calculations and logic. As Ukrainian forces lose ground and retreat under constant drone pressure, they often lack the means to recover their dead. In some cases, units can’t even rotate, let alone retrieve fallen
3/ The problem has become especially acute in 2025, with drones in some cases serving as the only means to deliver water, food, and ammo to frontlines. As troops gradually retreat, bodies are often left behind on territory that falls under Russian control
In light of recent photos and videos drawing public attention to Shahed drone production, a common question has emerged: Why can’t Ukraine simply strike the facility? Hit the archer, not the arrow! The answer, however, is more complicated than it seems. Here are a few key points:
2/ The drone production site is located more than 1,200 kilometers from Ukrainian territory. It's not a modest workshop - the facility occupies roughly 160,000 square meters, with additional ongoing expansion.
3/ Any drone capable of reaching that distance must carry a significant fuel load, which in turn limits its payload capacity. In short, drones that can fly that far typically can't deliver the kind of payload needed to inflict serious or lasting damage to a facility that big
Ukrainian drone strikes continue to be persistent and frequent, yet verified information and detailed BDA assessments remain scarce. Our team conducted a brief review of several known strikes, drawing on recent satellite imagery to make a few preliminary observations:
2/ As with earlier research conducted jointly with RFEL this past winter, we found that when Ukrainian drones have successfully reached and hit their targets, the actual damage to facilities appears limited. The relatively small payloads prevent from chasing lasting disruptions
3/ With years, the frequency of strikes is increasing, in line with Ukraine’s expanded domestic drone production. However, the overall impact remains limited. To meaningfully shift battlefield momentum, Ukraine needs larger payloads and a better delivery means.