Thread by @MuKappa

All or not all: on pro-war sentiments in Russia and collective responsibility

Almost a year and a half into the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia the debate on popular support for the war in Russia continues. 1/

A particularly thorny issue for the many Russia experts is collective guilt and responsibility. The two are closely related topics. Let’s discuss support for the war first.

I personally like citing the Levada polls. It is an easy visual representation. 2/

However, Levada’s and other polls in Russia are intensely criticized as nonindicative of the real sentiment in the country (e.g. ). 3/meduza.io/feature/2016/0…

With some of the criticism I would have to agree – from a purely econometric point of view it is frequently impossible to say that the polled samples are representative of the population. Levada addressed some of the critique as recently as Feb, 2023 (). 4/levada.ru/2023/02/10/voz…

It would seem they follow the accepted methodology similar to Gallup polling. As someone who is not a complete stranger to econometrics, I can say that while having a meaningful error in the magnitude is possible it is unlikely to have one in the trends (value changes). 5/

Since the start of the “special military operation” Putin’s and the government’s approval ratings increased significantly and only took a minor dip in September of 2022 after the announcement of mobilization. 6/

Russian Field conducted another notable sociological survey published by RBC: . It finds that wealthier Russians are more likely to support the war. It was published before the September “partial” mobilization announcement. 7/ https://t.co/1LZXGvHR2Rrbc.ru/politics/18/05…

After the announcement we witnessed two phenomena. First, there was a mass exodus of Russians from the country (). It is safe to assume that most of those who fled are of at least some means with the poorest Russians remaining in the country. 8/bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur…

It is estimated that only 28% of Russians have a passport for foreign travel (). This leaves us with an uncomfortable conjecture – those who fled are more likely to support the war than those who remained. 9/themoscowtimes.com/2014/04/10/60-…

Second, following the multiple phases of mobilization so far, we have not seen any meaningful large-scale protests (I don’t expect any). Those Russians who got called up dutifully lined up at their local voenkomats (recruiting stations, )... 10/bloknot.ru/obshhestvo/och…

while the few who could fled (). I won’t dwell too much on the polls. A more detailed discussion on how to interpret the polls, can be found here: https://t.co/J2fBHcq15k. I don’t necessarily agree with the analysis and provide it for completeness. 11/severreal.org/a/hana-mne-v-s…
carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/07/my-…

Let’s move on to collective guilt and responsibility. The polls, at least on a superficial level, show that not all Russians are in support of the war. However, they should still bear collective responsibility for this war against Ukraine and all previous wars and... 12/

genocides as an exercise in national reflection. It is one of the critical components to break the old culture of switching between stoic apoliticism and zealous ethnonationalism and imperialism when it suits them. Both are accompanied by a culture of violence. 13/

Many Western experts have written books based on a few interviews with the chosen few Russians to form a generalized sociological portrait of the nation (that approach should not survive any academic scrutiny but alas). 14/

Hence, it is acceptable to voice my own generalized picture of the Russians based on the many interactions I had over the last two decades in English and Russian. Observation one: the Russians tailor their tone depending on their interlocutor. 15/

If it is someone from the West, then they are equals; if it is someone from the former colonies, then expect some arrogant disregard. Observation two: they have a characteristic desire to be right. When proven wrong they try to evoke pity. 16/

Observation three: they will act quickly if their personal interests are at stake; if it is for the good of a larger group or community, they are much less likely to act. 17/

Observation four: they tend disassociate themselves from their country of origin if Russia did something naughty and they happen to be abroad or their interlocutor is a Westerner; they would take pride in being Russian if Russia accomplished something of note. 18/

For example, a win at a major sporting event… a victorious war.
I understand such observations are in stark contrast to what some Western observers might have experienced, especially after spending years reading classical Russian literature and interacting with... 19/

the Russian intellectuals. To that I ask you to refer to my first observation and bear in mind that the Russian intellectuals and members of the Moskovskaya/Piterskaya tusovochka (the “liberals”) are not representative of the Russian population. 20/

The same “liberals” are zealously against collective responsibility. Some of them retort with having never voted for Putin as if he alone is guilty of the current war. Some of them equate collective responsibility with ethnic cleansings, for instance Ekaterina Shulman. 21/

Others quickly resort to the age-old construct of malen’kie lyudi, or “little people,” implying they are individually too insignificant to have any impact. What they fail to understand is that their national culture needs to change – when each individual in a group thinks... 22/

that they are insignificant it creates collective apathy agreeing with whatever voice happens to be the loudest. Moreover, many fail to understand that collective punishment is already being applied – the economic sanctions primarily affect the fortunes of the Russian masses. 23/

An average Russian even covers the damages caused by the personalized sanctions targeting Russia’s decisionmakers (). However, the idea of economic sanctions is not to punish an average Russian but to reduce Russia’s economic capacity to wage war. 24/dw.com/ru/%D0%B3%D0%B…

The idea behind collective responsibility is the same in the cultural plane – to make it culturally unacceptable for them to believe in their own lies and exceptionalism either out of convenience through apathy or genuine conviction. 25/

The propaganda lies produced hourly by the Russian media are not new. If you are an especially astute observer of Russia you will have noticed that none of the current narratives are new as according to the Russians there were fascists and chemical weapons in Moldova... 26/

in 1991, heavy artillery and jets purchased in hardware stores by the “separatists” in Georgia in 1993, bandits in Ichkeria in 1994 and Al Qaeda in 1999, NATO aggression against Serbia in 1998, bioweapon labs and nazis in Georgia in 2008, and there is oppression of... 27/

Russian speakers everywhere at all times. The Russians never shy away from revising history to suit their needs. For example, here is a Nobel Peace Prize winner Muratov speaking of Kadyrov being elected by the Chechens and forgetting the Second Chechen War: 28/

Russian propaganda is a grotesque bacchanalia of lies, its primary goal is to produce lies. The ideological messages are secondary, but they are there and they work. They are a great power, they deserve respect. Everybody owes them, they are allowed to take what’s theirs. 29/

Everyone tries to humiliate them, they must seek revenge. It is enough to tell the Russians that they are exceptional, they are allowed to do whatever they want. 30/

That background messaging works because it is their culture – messages of national exceptionalism, victimhood, and having a special place in history resonate with them. 31/

Western pundits call it "national exceptionalism," but remember in the Russian language nationality does not stand for what it does in English. Nationality, or rather национальность, means ethnicity. 32/

In a 2013 article, David Satter explains the idea of Russian exceptionalism quite well. However, he argues that it is the exceptionalism of the Russian state. The Russians view themselves as the "Third Rome," granting them "the quasi-divine status." 33/ fpri.org/article/2013/1…

Putin's messianic speeches are not shocking if you've been following Russia for at least a few years. Putin is a symptom of the deeply rooted ideas of exceptionalism in the Russian psyche. Hence, I’d argue that it goes far deeper – it is not that the Russians... 34/

think that their state is exceptional, it is that their ethnicity is exceptional. It is reflected in their ethnocentric rhetoric promoted within Russia. It is not unique to contemporary Russia. It is a consequence of centuries of the colonial imperial policy of ethnocentrism. 35/

While I could give you many examples of Russian ethnic exceptionalism expressed by their poets, novelists, and philosophers (e.g. ), I think than an average Russian of today is ill-acquainted with the works of such figures, unless they are used by... 36/

https://twitter.com/MuKappa/status/1597442426188500992?s=20

modern propaganda such as Pushkin or Brodsky.
Contemporary Russian folklore is better represented by their cinema. It is no coincidence that Brother 2 (2000) was picked up by the state propaganda machine in the current war (). 37/

https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1535633348651016193?s=20

It is a cult classic with a strong anti-American feel with a gratuitous anti-Ukrainian scene. . Brother (1997) has a similarly important place in the Russian popular culture. The main character, Danila, has recently returned from the First Chechen War. 38/

On a bus he has the following interaction with caricature characters from the Caucasus:

Note that black*ss is an ethnic slur for all the ethnic groups from the Caucasus. If you are American, don’t worry, the Russian have one for you too: pindos (a relatively recent invention).
Overt racism is not unusual in Russian cinema. Here’s a clip from Dead Man’s Bluff (2005):

It is not the only time racist jokes are cracked at the only black character’s expense. The movie is set in Nizhny Novgorod, 1995. It does not have the same cult status as Brother but is still highly regarded. The two main characters are gang soldiers (not in the clip)... 41/

and remind the audience on at least three separate occasions that they are ethnic Russians. The more religious and shrewder of the main duo ends up becoming a state Duma deputy. 42/

The final movie that is worth mentioning is Bumer (2003). Its status in Russia rivals Brother's. Set in 1999 Moscow Oblast, four lowlifes try to make it by committing a series of crimes. One of the scenes in the movie is a good yet sanitized depiction of negotiations that... 43/

one could observe in Russia at the time. Context: the shortest character in the center of the scene is a trucker, the four main characters shown in the opening are his protection escort, a rival gang attempts to “offer” their protection services to the trucker. 44/

In another poignant scene in the movie, the main characters are told by a middle-aged woman sheltering them that their adventure won’t end well. Their response: “we are not like that, life is like that.” 45/

Culture of violence and disregard for their own lives in Russia manifests in no regard for any life or human values on the frontlines and occupied territories in Ukraine, before that in Syria, and before that in Ichkeria. 46/

Even those who were “outside of politics” and end up mobilized are likely to become the Kremlin’s willing executioners. Soldatov and Borogan recently summarized how the Russian culture of violence and loss tolerance is expressed in their military: 47/cepa.org/article/russia…

To conclude it would be best to cite Pyotr Chaadaev, a Russian philosopher who is hated by some Russian nationalists even to this day: “Until a confession of all the mistakes of our past bursts out from our lips against our will, until a cry of pain and... 48/

repentance is torn from our depths... we will not see salvation.” So, are all Russians guilty? No, not in the legal sense but they are collectively guilty of not changing culturally.
Ultimately collective responsibility is part of granting agency to every Russian. 49/

Because baba Marfa from Mukhosransk might just act to prevent the next war of aggression by Russia if she knows that she would be personally held responsible for it, as per my third observation they tend to act when their personal interests are at stake. 50/50