Buffett called it "one of the best businesses I ever saw." Munger called it "the best deal I ever saw." Pritzker bought it and made ~260X.
Here's the story…
—April 3, 1984—
Conwood, the US's second-largest smokeless tobacco maker, was 'in play'. Management had scrapped a planned merger. Now Conwood needed a friendly buyer. And they had to find one before a raider made a hostile bid for the company.
The solution: Call Jerry Seslowe.
Seslowe, a well-connected accountant-turned-investor, was the GP of Resource Holdings ("RH"). RH ran money for some of the sharpest guys on the planet. It also offered deal advisory services. Conwood hired RH to find a friendly buyer.
Buffett on tobacco economics:
- "It costs a penny to make."
- "It sells for a dollar."
- "It's addictive."
- "And there's fantastic brand loyalty."
What'd Buffett & Munger think of Conwood?
- WB: "One of the best businesses I've seen.
- CM: "The figures were unbelievable."
Conwood's figures (1972-1984 CAGRs):
- Unit growth: 6%
- Price increases: 9%
- Tobacco revenues: 15%
- Net profit: 17%
Cash conversions: ~100%
Conwood was, in fact, a near-perfect analog to Buffett & Munger's favorite holding:
See's Candies
CONWOOD VS SEE'S (1972-1984 CAGRs)
- Unit growth: 6% vs 4%
- Price increases: 9% vs 9%
- Revenues: 15% vs 13%
- Net profit: 17% vs 17%
Cash conversions: ~100%
Why'd Berkshire pass?
Buffett:
"I'm not sure the logic is perfect, but we wouldn't have trouble owning stock in a [tobacco] company. We wouldn't want to manufacture [tobacco]. We might own a retail company that sells [tobacco]…The lines aren't perfect on this sort of thing."
Enter Jay Pritzker.
Pritzker and Seslowe had history. Seslowe was Pritzker's accountant at Peat Marwick. When Seslowe left Peat, he became Pritzker's deal scout. Pritzker was also a big investor in RH.
Jay got the Conwood pitch.
His reaction: "He snapped it up so fast."
The purchase price: $350 million (net)
- Consideration: $401 million
- Less net cash: $51 million
= Purchase price: $350 million
Here's how Pritzker financed the deal:
- $120 million term loan
- $210 million debentures
- $20 million equity
= $350 million purchase price
DEBT/EBIT
- LTM: 6.3X
- NTM: 6.1x
EBIT/INTEREST
- LTM (PF): 1.2x
- NTM (A): 1.4x
LTV: 94%
Conwood was the perfect LBO.
Why? Pricing power.
Pricing power allowed Conwood to:
- Grow earnings in the mid-teens.
- Convert ~100% of earnings into cash.
Conwood was also:
- Recession-proof
- Less exposed to litigation
- Retail's highest GMROI SKU
Just how important was pricing power?
Pritzker top-ticked Conwood's core market: non-moist snuff tobacco. From the purchase date, non-moist snuff unit volume declined at a MSD rate. Yet price increases of 10% a year allowed Pritzker to pay off all the LBO debt within six years.
How'd the deal turn out?
Conwood continued to…
Raise prices at a HSD rate
…For twenty years.
Then Pritzker sold Conwood for $3.6 billion.
RESULTS
- Purchase (1985): $20 million
- Sale (2005): $3.6 billion
- Dividends (est): $1.5 billion
RETURNS
- TPVI: 260X
- IRR: 49%
Footnote #1
Pritzker bought Conwood through Dalfort. Dalfort was the NOL shell that emerged from the Braniff bankruptcy. It had $400 million in total tax assets.
Also: Dalfort got 95% of the Conwood equity for a cash outlay of $3 million!
[They borrowed the other $16 million]
Footnote #2
Seslowe had an interest in the deal:
Footnote #3
Fayez Sarofim got equity in the deal:
Footnote #4
Conwood owns the "oldest continually used US trademark": Garrett Scotch Snuff. Garrett dates back to 1782.
Footnote #5
Non-moist snuff volumes:
Footnote #6 — Pritzker sale to RJR
Lender docs:
Footnote #7 — Pritzker sale to RJR
Rating agency slides:
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In April 1989, KKR bought RJR for $30.8 billion. The deal was 6x larger than any other buyout and exceeded "the $29.5 billion cash value of the seven other biggest LBOs." It remained the largest buyout for eighteen years.
Here's the story...
It starts with RJR's CEO—Ross Johnson. By October 1988, Johnson had a solid three-year operating record:
+20% sales
+50% earnings
+66% EPS
The problem: RJR's stock price
"The company was going like gangbusters but the [stock] got beaten down."
Johnson's solution: An LBO
Here's his LBO pitch to RJR's board:
"It's plain as the nose on your face that this company is wildly undervalued. We're sitting on food assets worth 22-25 times earnings and we trade at 9 times. We've studied ways of increasing value. I believe the only way is through an LBO."
- Buy a failing mutual savings bank
- Hire a "brilliant manager"
- Obtain a "no-lose guarantee"
- Use "extreme financial leverage"
That's how he made a "50% annual return" from Bowery Bank during the S&L crisis.
See below for more…
The Bowery fell on hard times back in the seventies when rising interest rates began eroding the bank's balance sheet. There was no looting of Bowery's assets. Just managers who dozed as the cost of deposits kept outstripping the yield on mortgages and government bonds.
"The Bowery deal was very unusual for me. It may be the only I've done like that as a private deal."
In 1965, Jerry Kohlberg formed a group to buy Stern Metals. The deal, which earned 4.7x within two months and 8.0x over a two-year hold, became Kohlberg's "blueprint" for buyouts at his future firm.
That firm: KKR
Here's the story…
HJ Stern, the owner of Stern Metals, had a problem. He needed to monetize his Stern equity w/o:
- Selling to his ill-equipped kids
- Losing control in an IPO
He consulted with his neighbor Jerry Kohlberg. Kohlberg, then head of IB at Bear Stearns, proposed a solution:
An LBO
Kohlberg thought Stern was an ideal LBO candidate. He wanted a business that:
- Sold low-tech industrial products
- Produced steady sales and profit growth
- Required minimal capital expenditures
In January 1982, Bill Simon bought 33% of Gibson for $330K. The value of that $330K investment when Gibson went public in May 1983: $66.7 million.
That's a 202X return in 17 months.
Here's how he did it…
Bill Simon, a trader-turned-statesman, left his job as Treasury Secretary in 1977.
His financial position:
- Salary: $66 thousand
- Net Worth: $2.5 million
He spent the next five years:
- Consulting
- Value investing
- Commodity trading
Then he found his niche: LBOs
In 1981, Bill Simon and Ray Chambers, an accountant-turned-investor, formed Wesray. The plan: Use Simon's contacts and Chambers's analytical skills to buy good companies with borrowed money.
In 1976, the California Newspaper Service Bureau, a mutually-owned public notice ad sales agency, settled a restraint-of-trade lawsuit. The settlement terms required that they (a) pay the plaintiff $1.5M and (b) sell their 100% interest in the Daily Journal Corp ("DJCO").
Munger's New America Fund ("NAF") bought the DJCO for $2.2M in 1977. DJCO had circulation of 18,000 and $4M of revenues, making it:
- The US's largest legal publisher
- SoCal's dominant legal daily