In continuation of the conversation regarding the current state of russian bases and available vehicles, today, I will cover one of the bases that belong to the 3rd Motor Rifle Division in Boguchar.
Don't forget to like and share to help with algorithm.
🧵Thread:
2/ The current third division was reformed in 2016, moved to Boguchar and Valuiki under the command of the 20th army. Boguchar base hosts the 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, 99th SPG Regiment, 337th Separate Engineer Battalion, 911th Separate Supply BN, and 231st Separate Medical BN.
3/ Current satellite analysis shows a decrease in the numbers of vehicles on the base, mostly due to deployments and losses. There might be inaccuracies due to the limitations in image quality, which can hinder precise vehicle recognition.
4/ Firstly, there has been a significant decrease in the number of tanks and armored fighting vehicles present on the base. In 2021, there were hundreds of these vehicles, which reduced to less than 100 at the beginning of 2023, and as of June 2023, there were only few dozens.
5/
Secondly, there is a decline in the number of trucks and engineering equipment, although they remain much less affected compared to the heavy armored vehicles.
Lastly, the number of artillery pieces fluctuates, showing an increase or decrease based on unit rotations.
6/ These observations reflect the dynamic development of a combat unit in Ukraine. The absence of vehicles does not necessarily indicate their loss but can also indicate their current deployment. The 3rd Motor Rifle Division operates three bases, and this is one of them.
7/ There's been a reduction in artillery and AFV's numbers, evident from Oryx and imagery. Their inventory is lower than pre-war levels, indicating limited strategic capabilities. However, it remains significant, posing considerable challenges for Crimea and Donbas liberation
8/ Further analysis shows that this provides only a very general idea of the remaining capabilities. Notably, a significant portion of their equipment, including artillery and tank pieces, is primarily supplied to frontline units directly from repair and restoration facilities.
/9 Considering this, I intend to publish an analysis next week, focusing on certain restoration facilities in Russia. These facilities play a crucial role in vehicle restoration and recovery, providing a better understanding of their capacities.
I express my gratitude to all the contributors who donated via Buy Me A Coffee. Thanks to your support, I was able to purchase imagery, including tank repair facilities, which will be published next week with more details on restoration capabilities
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
🧵Thread
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories
One of the most critical yet unresolved questions of this war is the true impact of drone attacks inside Russia. Our team has been working with media organizations and volunteers to tackle this. But finding the answer isn’t easy, and we need your support. Here’s how you can help:
2/ The simplest and most effective way to support our investigation is through donations. This helps cover essential expenses like satellite imagery, expert analysis, and time. You can donate via BuyMeaCoffee:
3/ We’re also looking for volunteers to assess the damage, particularly those with expertise in damage surveys, industrial building damage assessments, and the oil and gas industry: especially in evaluating potential refinery damage. Feel free to contact us at
frontel@proton.me
As we move into the second month of the year, Frontelligence Insight has prepared an early assessment report covering recent developments on the frontlines and within both Ukrainian and Russian military forces. Below are some key highlights from the report. 1/ 🧵Thread:
2/ The frontline dynamics for Ukraine remain challenging, with setbacks in Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Toretsk. While leadership is working to address organizational and recruitment issues, it will take time for these changes to be implemented and impact the battlefield.
3/ Russian forces are facing high losses, with tens of thousands of AWOL cases and a significant depletion of armored vehicles, which are being replaced by civilian transport. Nevertheless, they continue advancing in areas where Ukrainian defenses are stretched with few people