In continuation of the conversation regarding the current state of russian bases and available vehicles, today, I will cover one of the bases that belong to the 3rd Motor Rifle Division in Boguchar.
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2/ The current third division was reformed in 2016, moved to Boguchar and Valuiki under the command of the 20th army. Boguchar base hosts the 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, 99th SPG Regiment, 337th Separate Engineer Battalion, 911th Separate Supply BN, and 231st Separate Medical BN.
3/ Current satellite analysis shows a decrease in the numbers of vehicles on the base, mostly due to deployments and losses. There might be inaccuracies due to the limitations in image quality, which can hinder precise vehicle recognition.
4/ Firstly, there has been a significant decrease in the number of tanks and armored fighting vehicles present on the base. In 2021, there were hundreds of these vehicles, which reduced to less than 100 at the beginning of 2023, and as of June 2023, there were only few dozens.
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Secondly, there is a decline in the number of trucks and engineering equipment, although they remain much less affected compared to the heavy armored vehicles.
Lastly, the number of artillery pieces fluctuates, showing an increase or decrease based on unit rotations.
6/ These observations reflect the dynamic development of a combat unit in Ukraine. The absence of vehicles does not necessarily indicate their loss but can also indicate their current deployment. The 3rd Motor Rifle Division operates three bases, and this is one of them.
7/ There's been a reduction in artillery and AFV's numbers, evident from Oryx and imagery. Their inventory is lower than pre-war levels, indicating limited strategic capabilities. However, it remains significant, posing considerable challenges for Crimea and Donbas liberation
8/ Further analysis shows that this provides only a very general idea of the remaining capabilities. Notably, a significant portion of their equipment, including artillery and tank pieces, is primarily supplied to frontline units directly from repair and restoration facilities.
/9 Considering this, I intend to publish an analysis next week, focusing on certain restoration facilities in Russia. These facilities play a crucial role in vehicle restoration and recovery, providing a better understanding of their capacities.
I express my gratitude to all the contributors who donated via Buy Me A Coffee. Thanks to your support, I was able to purchase imagery, including tank repair facilities, which will be published next week with more details on restoration capabilities
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Up to two-thirds (66%) of respondents in Russia believe it is time to move toward peace negotiations, a record high for this indicator. Only 27% say military action should continue, the lowest level. The figures come from the Levada Center, known for its methodological rigor:
2/ Fifty-eight percent of respondents say the war has affected them or their families. Among those “strongly” affected, common issues include the death of relatives or friends, family members participating in combat, injuries/disability, emotional distress, and economic hardship
3/ Higher support for negotiations among: women; young people under 24; rural residents; those who believe national affairs are going poorly; people who disapprove of Putin; those who rely on YouTube or non-state sources for information.
Two days after being conscripted into Russia's army, Maxim Suvorov signed a contract. Less than a month later, he fell on the battlefield - one of many casualties of Russia’s new practice of filling contract ranks with conscripts. A detailed case showcasing recruitment problems:
2/ Frontelligence Insight has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to meet recruitment targets with monetary bonuses, pushing the military to seek alternatives, including pressuring conscripts to sign contracts. The recent death of a conscript allowed us to trace his story
3/ Our investigation begins with an obituary posted on a local Russian social media group dedicated to fallen soldiers in various conflicts. According to the post, Maxim was conscripted on June 25 and signed a contract on June 27. To verify this, we sought additional evidence
Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more:
2/ According to a report by VIGINUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU)
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern:
A recurring question is whether Russia categorizes AWOL cases as a way to conceal combat deaths in its official reports. The short answer is no. The longer answer is more complicated, and requires looking at how AWOL is treated within the Russian military system. 🧵Short thread:
2/ Most AWOL cases can escalate into actual criminal proceedings if all other measures to bring soldiers back fail. High rates of desertion or absence trigger investigations on record - problems that weigh more heavily on commanders and unit statistics than combat losses do
3/ Casualties themselves are rarely the main concern, provided objectives set by higher command are met. By contrast, desertion is seen as evidence of weak leadership and poor control over subordinates. KIA and MIA are regarded as an acceptable cost of war; AWOL is not.
AWOL and desertion cases in the Russian army have doubled and tripled in recent months, with battlefield desertions rising sharply, according to tens of thousands of records reviewed by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵This thread summarizes the key insights drawn from the data:
2/ Before proceeding, we thank the Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com for providing additional documents containing the full list of service members. While the source is trusted, we carried out our own inspection and verification to confirm the list’s authenticity.
3/ Our team randomly selected 21 cases from the file and used third-party services to verify each soldier’s name, date of birth, and address or region. In 19 cases the data fully matched; the two discrepancies were in addresses, likely due to changes before/after enlistment
Since July, our team has published 4 major investigations: on foreign mercenaries and Cuban fighters in Russia’s ranks; procurement and targeting pod issues with the Su-57; and China’s role in Shahed UAV production. We also analyzed Russian losses in units and North Korean arms:
2/ We’ve also completed, but not yet published, data on Russian desertions and losses in several major units. Our research on artillery barrels is wrapping up, after which we’ll also release exclusive investigations into Russia’s weapons production
3/ None of this would be possible without your continued financial support and donations. Some of our earlier investigations have already helped several governments pursue their own inquiries into sanctions evasion