In continuation of the conversation regarding the current state of russian bases and available vehicles, today, I will cover one of the bases that belong to the 3rd Motor Rifle Division in Boguchar.
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2/ The current third division was reformed in 2016, moved to Boguchar and Valuiki under the command of the 20th army. Boguchar base hosts the 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, 99th SPG Regiment, 337th Separate Engineer Battalion, 911th Separate Supply BN, and 231st Separate Medical BN.
3/ Current satellite analysis shows a decrease in the numbers of vehicles on the base, mostly due to deployments and losses. There might be inaccuracies due to the limitations in image quality, which can hinder precise vehicle recognition.
4/ Firstly, there has been a significant decrease in the number of tanks and armored fighting vehicles present on the base. In 2021, there were hundreds of these vehicles, which reduced to less than 100 at the beginning of 2023, and as of June 2023, there were only few dozens.
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Secondly, there is a decline in the number of trucks and engineering equipment, although they remain much less affected compared to the heavy armored vehicles.
Lastly, the number of artillery pieces fluctuates, showing an increase or decrease based on unit rotations.
6/ These observations reflect the dynamic development of a combat unit in Ukraine. The absence of vehicles does not necessarily indicate their loss but can also indicate their current deployment. The 3rd Motor Rifle Division operates three bases, and this is one of them.
7/ There's been a reduction in artillery and AFV's numbers, evident from Oryx and imagery. Their inventory is lower than pre-war levels, indicating limited strategic capabilities. However, it remains significant, posing considerable challenges for Crimea and Donbas liberation
8/ Further analysis shows that this provides only a very general idea of the remaining capabilities. Notably, a significant portion of their equipment, including artillery and tank pieces, is primarily supplied to frontline units directly from repair and restoration facilities.
/9 Considering this, I intend to publish an analysis next week, focusing on certain restoration facilities in Russia. These facilities play a crucial role in vehicle restoration and recovery, providing a better understanding of their capacities.
I express my gratitude to all the contributors who donated via Buy Me A Coffee. Thanks to your support, I was able to purchase imagery, including tank repair facilities, which will be published next week with more details on restoration capabilities
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Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”
The catastrophic situation of Russian forces trapped in Kupyansk, who continue to lose ground, together with a second consecutive year of failure to fully seize Pokrovsk, represents one of the more optimistic scenarios for 2025.
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2/ As war fatigue increasingly affects Russia, the prospect of enforcing a rapid, unfavorable capitulation of Ukraine through Washington, DC now appears even more remote, not not entirely excluded
3/ While Russia has used the negotiation process primarily to delay new sanctions and slow support for Kyiv, its economic situation continues to deteriorate, and tactical gains have failed to translate into strategic breakthroughs.
Information about a new modification of Russia’s Geran-2 drone has been published by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, including a detailed technical breakdown. According to the analysis, the Geran drone has been fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile mounted on its fuselage:
2/ The missile, fitted with an APU-60-1MD (P-62-1MD) aircraft launcher, is mounted on a special bracket located on the upper front section of the Geran’s fuselage.
3/ The most likely employment of rocket involves transmitting images from the drone’s cameras to an operator via the modem. If a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter enters the engagement zone, the operator sends a launch command to the missile’s control unit.
Analysis: New Data Suggests Russia Is Sustaining Mi-8 Output Despite Wartime Losses
According to non-public Russian procurement documents obtained and analyzed by the Frontelligence Insight team, current Mi-8 production appears sufficient to offset wartime losses. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the Soviet era, more than 12,000 Mi-8 helicopters of all types have been produced. It’s a versatile military transport platform that can move troops, cargo, serve as a flying hospital or EW asset, and conduct attack missions with unguided rockets and 100–500 kg bombs.
3/ Correspondence between Aviafarm and ZOMZ the Defense Ministry and ZOMZ show a request for 40 IS-264A thermometers: 20 for Kazan and 20 for Ulan-Ude, where Mi-8s are produced.
Most know Kirill Dmitriev as the Russian president’s envoy. But to more than 200 investors in Ukraine, he is known for taking part in a Kyiv real estate project that ended in a fraud and criminal case. Using articles from 2011, I was able to find more details. 🧵Thread:
2/ The story begins in 2000s, when N. Lahuna and A. Dmitriev (Kirill Dmitriev’s father) planned the elite suburban “Olympic Park.” Construction was to be carried out by Traverz-Bud, a subsidiary of "Evropa", in which, according to "Argument," Kirill Dmitriev held a majority stake
3/ Based on court documents cited in the media, in 2011 (links at the end), a prosecutor’s audit found that construction of the properties, which under agreements with the developers of the “Olympic Park” was due to be completed by the end of 2008, has not been carried out