Over the past 18 months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have had to develop the capacity to plan and execute military campaigns and operations on a scale that has not been seen since the US operations in Iraq in 2003. A short thread on the many campaigns of #Ukraine 1/15 🧵
2/ The Ukrainian campaigns possess a complexity that can be difficult to appreciate. They all support Ukraine’s strategy of corrosion against Russia. While much focus is paid to the southern campaign, there are a others of note. What are they, & how can the West learn from them?
3/ There are ground campaigns around Bakhmut as well as a defensive campaign in Luhansk. At the same time, some low level reconnaissance is occurring to the west in Kherson. This could be an interesting one to watch.
4/ There is also an operational strike campaign which is using western air-launched missiles, #HIMARS, drones and maritime semi-submersible uncrewed vessels to conduct strikes. Bridges, HQ, logistics and Russian Army morale are the targets.
5/ There is also a lower tempo, but accelerating strategic strike campaign. This includes Moscow drone attacks, the Belgorod incursions, notifications about Russian ports as targets are all part of this. The target - Putin and the stability of his regime. edition.cnn.com/2023/08/05/eur…
6/ An air, missile and drone defence campaign is also underway, and has been since 22 Feb 2022. It has been evolving constantly to absorb newer western systems, and commercial tech, as well as the kind of targets it covers. This has developed an effective air defence network.
7/ A range of ‘enabling campaigns’ are also underway. These include training personnel, absorption of western equipment and munitions, the Army of Drones campaign, as well as a cyber campaign.
8/ Finally, #Ukraine continues to implement a global influence campaign. This has been vital in securing the military, economic, diplomatic, intelligence and humanitarian support for Ukraine’s defence.
9/ Each of these campaigns is the result of planning as well as opportunistic exploitation of Russian mistakes and other events. In their totality, these many campaigns are crucial to the defence of Ukraine and its people.
10/ There will be a certain integration or alignment between the various campaigns as well. How tight or loose this coupling is will evolve constantly, and is ultimately guided by military strategy, which support’s Ukraine’s political objectives.
11/ Few nations have had to undertake such a complicated series of concurrent campaigns, at speed, in past several decades. These is much Western military and government institutions can learn about modern war from Ukraine.
12/ Key lessons include the necessity of constant, multi-domain operations, development of campaign planning staffs and survivable HQ, investment in campaign enablers, and developing an adaptive stance for campaign execution.
13/ While assisting Ukraine with a wide array of physical, intellectual & moral means, western military organisations need to be rapidly absorbing the many lessons on campaigning from #Ukraine. Such lessons will be invaluable as we confront other authoritarian powers.
15/ Thank you to the following, whose images and links were used in this thread: @ZelenskyyUa @CovertShores @DefenceU @Militarylandnet @FedorovMykhailo @TDF_UA @CNN
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Almost 2 months into the Ukrainian offensives, the tempo of ops has settled into the pulse & pause observed in other large wars. There is a lot going on. Time for a campaign update on the Ukrainian offensives. 1/20 🧵
https://t.co/wqp0qtUvxRmickryan.substack.com/p/the-state-of…
2/ In my 15 July 2023 substack update, I outlined 5 important 'competitions', that would shape the outcome of the Ukrainian & Russian summer/autumn campaigns in 2023. Let's do an update on each of these key ‘battles’. https://t.co/4FiDOV9CkUmickryan.substack.com/p/the-ukrainia…
3/ The Logistic Fight. The battles for logistic and transport hubs continues as part of Ukrainian deep battle. In the east and the south, the Ukrainians continue seek to seize or strike key locations that will provide transport hubs and logistics for the Russians.
While the Russians in Ukraine have assumed the defensive over the past couple of months, that does not mean that they have been on the defensive at every level, and in every part of #Ukraine. A thread on Gerasimov's approach, 7 weeks into the Ukrainian offensives. 1/24 🧵
2/ Gerasimov, who we assume retains overall command of the Russian 'special military operation' in #Ukraine, is implementing a defensive strategy. But concurrently he is conducting offensive activities at the tactical and operation levels.
3/ Before we explore Gerasimov’s defensive strategy, let’s review the range of options that were open to him once #Ukraine began its 2023 offensives.
My article on #Ukraine this week for @abcnews explores the adaptation battle, and the need for Ukraine to keep adapting faster, and better, than Russia. 1/16 🧵 abc.net.au/news/2023-07-1…
2/ Predicting the shape and outcome of future wars is all but impossible. What matters is the ability to learn and adapt better than an adversary.
3/ The adaptation battle plays out every day in Ukraine's strategy and battlefield tactics. While building an advantage in the quantity of firepower and combat forces is crucial, even more important is for Ukraine to generate an advantage by being better at thinking & adapting.
A just and enduring peace is not possible until #Ukraine defeats Russian forces occupying its territory, ejects Russian forces and establishes the deterrent regime that ensures the long-term security of its territory and its people. 1/22🧵
2/ A key part of this is the ongoing Ukrainian offensives. It is now five weeks since the beginning of the Ukrainian offensives was confirmed by President Zelensky. As such, it is time for a campaign update on the 2023 Ukrainian offensives.
3/ In my 10 June Substack post about the Ukrainian offensives, I described three important battlegrounds in the wider Ukrainian 2023 campaign. Nothing has occurred yet which changes these 3 ‘battlegrounds’, although I would add two more: the adaptation and attrition battles.
An interesting report on Ukrainian tactical adaptation, from @olliecarroll, in the operations by the Ukrainian armed forces to breach the Surovikin Line. 1/11 🧵 #FollowTheSapper
2/ While it is uncertain how widespread this adaptation is, the Ukrainian tactical activities to conduct obstacle breaches appear to have assumed a lower signature to increase survivability and effectiveness.
3/ While breaching under armour, using special vehicles based on a tank chassis is a favoured method by Western military institutions, these platforms have easily detectable signatures for ground and aerial forces.
Lots of recent discussion about the ‘slow’ Ukrainian offensives. What is actually occurring now is a steady, deliberate taking down of the Russian 'operational system'. This takes time. 1/25 🧵
2/ What is this operational system? To understand what it is, and how Ukraine is ‘taking down’ the Russian operational system, two foundational concepts are important to understand: the operational art; and, systems destruction warfare.
3/ In war, we talk about strategy (the link of purpose with high level resource allocation & action) & tactics (involving attacks & conduct of specific combat ops). Because of the complexity of modern war, strategy and tactics are linked through what we call Operational Art.