The satellite images I'm presenting offer additional evidence highlighting Ukraine's need for long-range engagement capabilities. This analysis is focused on Luhansk airport, situated over 100 km away from the frontlines, and serving as a base for russian helicopters
🧵Thread:
2/ The airport had been inactive since 2014; however, recently, the russians have repurposed it as a helicopter base for operations in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast. On average, there are approximately 12 to 16 helicopters present at any given time
3/ Russians position themselves to remain outside the effective range of HIMARS when on the ground and beyond the reach of MANPADs when in the sky. They mostly engage through the use of indirectly fired unguided rockets. The airfield primarily hosts Ka-52, Mi-8, Mi-28, and Mi-24
4/ The airport's perimeter is heavily guarded by air defense assets, although it is not impervious. Disabling the helicopters would compel them to vacate the airport, thereby slowing down helicopter logistics and response times.
5/ The presence and movements of helicopters on the base can be monitored through this timelapse video. It illustrates the active utilization of helicopters
6/ Considering the frequent flights and operations of these helicopters, with many of them return to the base unharmed, it becomes evident that a heightened requirement exists for more air-defense systems as well. This is crucial to enhance the air protection for our troops.
7/ I express my gratitude to all the generous contributors who donated via Buy Me A Coffee service. Your contributions have enabled the acquisition of imagery and the provision of further insights into Russian air capabilities within the region.
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Ukrainian drone strikes in Izhevsk: Russia’s arms heart, and Luhansk using rocket-drone "Peklo" demonstrates Kyiv’s growing technological abilities. The message to Putin is clear: Ukraine’s strike range and warhead size will only continue to expand as the war continues:
2/ Air defense drones are emerging as a promising counter to Russia’s expanding Shahed (Geran) drone output - no longer just a concept, but an increasingly likely solution that could help offset Moscow’s production surge with scalable and relatively cheap response
3/ Russia’s consistent failure to break Ukrainian front, despite a manpower edge, and mounting economic issues, admitted even by Putin, nullify their bravado shown during the latest Istanbul. Achieving Moscow’s stated goals would require far more resources than it's deploying
Our team has been tracking Russia’s recruitment efforts abroad, with a focus on West Africa and Cuba. Some revealing insights follow in this short thread🧵:
1. While some foreign POWs claim they were misled, documents suggest they joined Russia’s military knowingly
2. The reality is quite prosaic: Moscow offers steady pay that far surpasses local wages, along with the lure of adventure - an exciting offer for young men in economically strained countries. In some cases, recruits receive upfront bonuses as high as $20,000 and more
3. The contracts - often written in languages such as Spanish or French - clearly outline terms, including compensation for injury or death, and explicitly mention “Special Military Operation” zone. This makes claims of recruits being unaware highly implausible
Stories of undercover operatives who stay behind enemy lines and later fight in special ops units, through some of the war’s toughest battles, are usually found in movies or games. But this isn’t fiction. Here are key points from our interview with Artem "Skhidnyi" Karyakin 🧵:
2/ Artem, a native of Donbas, says he witnessed signs of Russian influence long before 2014. In his hometown of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), a mining city in Luhansk Oblast with no historical ties to the Don Cossacks, a so-called “Don Cossack” group appeared in the early 2000s
3/ By 2014, the same “Cossacks” were seizing government buildings in Kadiivka - this time armed and operating under Russian flags. Many weren’t local; they had come from the Russian Federation, as had others who helped take control by force during the spring occupation efforts.
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible:
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...
The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds
That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization