Given the current focus on minefields and mines due to the ongoing counter-offensive, I decided to illustrate a representative minefield layout. While I am unable to share the actual document, I made a comparable graphical representation to convey the specifics.
🧵Thread:
2/ In this case, the positioning of minefields is tied to surface features, including bodies of water, roadways, and settlements. It is important to note that there are two categories of minefields: "groups of mines" and controlled minefields (can be managed remotely).
3/ Minefields commonly consist of an array of distinct mines, namely the OZM-72 Bounding fragmentation anti-personnel mine, the PMN anti-personnel pressure mine, the MON Directional Anti-personnel Mine, the TM-62 Anti-tank blast mine, and the YaRM anti-landing mine.
4/ As a common approach, russians usually mix different types of mines rather than using just one. To make things clearer and easier to understand, I've assigned a different color to each mine type and grouped them accordingly for visual representation.
5/ In areas where our recon teams could potentially land after crossing water bodies, YaRM anti-landing mines are placed. Pathways to treelines and probable landing zones are secured with OZM and MON mines. The remaining areas typically covered with PMN anti-personnel mines.
6/ As evident, the positioning of minefields varies in depth, leaving gaps that give russians the flexibility to navigate, manage fields, and withdraw. Nevertheless, rough calculations suggest that this area is estimated to have approximately 10,416 mines of different types
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Overnight, Ukraine carried out a series of missile strikes on Khalino Airbase in Kursk Oblast, reportedly using ATACMS missiles. Here’s what we can anticipate based on previous data gathered by Frontelligence Insight:
🧵Thread
2/ In recent months, the airfield had been spotted to home SU-25 close air support jets, helicopters, and UAVs.
3/ For some time, the airfield hasn’t been heavily utilized by Russia in the same way as other air bases. Instead, it has primarily hosted helicopters and Su-25 for close-air support, rather than for KAB deployments like those conducted from bases in Voronezh or Lipetsk.
Gallup, the famous analytics firm known for its public opinion polls, recently released a study titled "Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War." The data might sound controversial, with many citing the headline without delving deeper into the survey. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the latest survey, conducted in August and October 2024, an average of 52% of Ukrainians now favor a swift, negotiated resolution to the war. This a notable increase from 2023, when only 27% expressed this sentiment, reflecting a 25% increase in just one year
3/ At first glance, it might seem as though Ukrainians are giving up. However, the phrase "negotiated end to the war" is ambiguous: many, including myself, want peace and negotiations, but without capitulation. This nuance becomes clearer in the follow-up question of the poll.
The announcement permitting Ukraine to strike inside Russia with ATACMS came just yesterday, but evidence suggests Russia has been fortifying the Kursk military airbase since early October. Analysis from Frontelligence Insight🧵:
2/ Satellite imagery shows new aircraft revetments being built, expanding the airfield's capacity for jets. Both the new and existing revetments are being reinforced with what appears to be concrete blocks for added protection.
3/ The changes are clearly visible when compared to imagery of the same airfield spot from 2022. These newly built revetments offer limited protection, primarily against shrapnel and shockwaves, aiming to minimize damage from missile or drone strikes in the vicinity
Early reports suggest that Ukraine's use of ATACMS missiles may come with specific geographic limitations.
This nuance might significantly influence the outcomes of their use. Here’s a breakdown of what we can expect, given that the information about limitations is correct🧵:
2/ As reported before by our team Frontelligence Insight, Russian forces have moved many key air assets beyond ATACMS range, leaving mainly helicopters and close-support jets at the Kursk airfield within striking distance, reducing high-value targets
3/ Russia has a vast network of makeshift ammo depots, command posts, rail stations, and other tactical sites in Kursk oblast. However, their sheer number far outstrips the limited missiles available to Ukraine.
The second part of Frontelligence Insight's investigation, based on leaked emails and documents provided by @CyberResUa, reveals new details about Russia's 2022 struggles to produce critical Su-57 components due to reliance on Western parts. 🧵Thread with investigation details:
2/ In the first part of our investigation, we examined the correspondence between Almaz-Antei's affiliate "Red Banner" and Joint Stock Company "Mikropribor" discussing how a critical component, the MPPU-50, put state contracts for Su-57 production at risk
3/ As we discovered, the MPPU-50 module is used in the L-band antenna system (N036L-1-01) for the radar complex of the Sh-121 weapon control system on Su-57. The leaked documents reveal a decision to expand production to additional facilities to fulfill the contract.
One point of tension between Zelensky and the Biden admins was the issue of allowing ATACMS strikes inside Russia. Frontelligence Insight conducted geospatial analysis and spoke with former U.S. officials and experts from leading US think tanks. Summary of our report🧵:
2/ When a Pentagon spokesperson suggested that Russia had moved assets capable of KAB strikes from airfields within ATACMS range, the statement was correct. Our research confirms that Russia relocated Su-34/35 jets from bases like Voronezh Air Base.
3/ At the same time, our analysis of satellite imagery from September 28 reveals that at least 14 combat and transport helicopters, along with eight Su-25 close-air-support jets, were stationed at the Kursk airport when the images were captured.