Given the current focus on minefields and mines due to the ongoing counter-offensive, I decided to illustrate a representative minefield layout. While I am unable to share the actual document, I made a comparable graphical representation to convey the specifics.
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2/ In this case, the positioning of minefields is tied to surface features, including bodies of water, roadways, and settlements. It is important to note that there are two categories of minefields: "groups of mines" and controlled minefields (can be managed remotely).
3/ Minefields commonly consist of an array of distinct mines, namely the OZM-72 Bounding fragmentation anti-personnel mine, the PMN anti-personnel pressure mine, the MON Directional Anti-personnel Mine, the TM-62 Anti-tank blast mine, and the YaRM anti-landing mine.
4/ As a common approach, russians usually mix different types of mines rather than using just one. To make things clearer and easier to understand, I've assigned a different color to each mine type and grouped them accordingly for visual representation.
5/ In areas where our recon teams could potentially land after crossing water bodies, YaRM anti-landing mines are placed. Pathways to treelines and probable landing zones are secured with OZM and MON mines. The remaining areas typically covered with PMN anti-personnel mines.
6/ As evident, the positioning of minefields varies in depth, leaving gaps that give russians the flexibility to navigate, manage fields, and withdraw. Nevertheless, rough calculations suggest that this area is estimated to have approximately 10,416 mines of different types
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When our troops liberated Kherson and advanced to the Dnipro River, the russians dispersed and relocated their equipment, helicopters, and C2 to various bases beyond the reach of HIMARS. Why is this significant, and what can be learned from this situation?
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2/ In this instance, compiled satellite imagery reveals the establishment of a new base to the south of Henichesk. Its construction commenced around November, aligning with our troops' liberation of Kherson and the departure of russian forces from Chaplynka.
3/ Their decision was correct - shortly after our forces secured Kherson, Chaplynka base experienced several strikes. Nevertheless, most of the equipment, the command and control center, and the helicopters had been relocated. Only minimal logistical operations were still there.
In light of recent developments in Western Africa and the confirmed interest of Wagner Group in Niger, it is imperative to gain an accurate understanding of Wagner's actual capabilities and their strategic approach. 🧵Thread:
2/ While Wagner Group does present a genuine security concern in Africa, supporting military juntas and involving itself in genocidal practices, its military capabilities are notably limited.
3/ While Wagner was known to numerous military and political analysts, its true international fame came during the Bakhmut assault, which was a personal ambition of Prigozhin to demonstrate to Putin that his private force was more effective than the Russian Ministry of Defense.
The satellite images I'm presenting offer additional evidence highlighting Ukraine's need for long-range engagement capabilities. This analysis is focused on Luhansk airport, situated over 100 km away from the frontlines, and serving as a base for russian helicopters
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2/ The airport had been inactive since 2014; however, recently, the russians have repurposed it as a helicopter base for operations in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast. On average, there are approximately 12 to 16 helicopters present at any given time
3/ Russians position themselves to remain outside the effective range of HIMARS when on the ground and beyond the reach of MANPADs when in the sky. They mostly engage through the use of indirectly fired unguided rockets. The airfield primarily hosts Ka-52, Mi-8, Mi-28, and Mi-24
Amid numerous global events, tracking everything is challenging. Considering globally important developments in Niger - a strategic location with French and US military presence, and potential Wagner involvement, I made a summary with contributions from other OSINTers. 🧵Thread
2/ This thread chronologically summarizes events starting from a coup in Niger, escalating to a potentially larger conflict involving multiple countries, and potential growth of Wagner and jihadists in the region. Key points in chronological order by day are as follows:
3/ July 26th
- On July 26th, at 5:30 am local time, the Presidential Palace in Niger's capital, Niamey, was blocked by presidential guard vehicles. This was followed by a public statement announcing the creation of CNSP (junta body) with Tchiani appointed as its leader.
In continuation of the conversation regarding the current state of russian bases and available vehicles, today, I will cover one of the bases that belong to the 3rd Motor Rifle Division in Boguchar.
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2/ The current third division was reformed in 2016, moved to Boguchar and Valuiki under the command of the 20th army. Boguchar base hosts the 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, 99th SPG Regiment, 337th Separate Engineer Battalion, 911th Separate Supply BN, and 231st Separate Medical BN.
3/ Current satellite analysis shows a decrease in the numbers of vehicles on the base, mostly due to deployments and losses. There might be inaccuracies due to the limitations in image quality, which can hinder precise vehicle recognition.
This thread analyzes the situation at Berdyans'k airport, focusing on russian helicopters. Amid the ongoing offensive, observers may find it puzzling that these helicopters remain unscathed at their base in Berdyans'k, enabling them to swiftly access the frontlines.
2/ The russian air threat persists in this counter-offensive, demanding additional consideration. One strategy involves neutralizing helicopters on the ground before they take flight. While the airfield is within Ukraine's long-range capabilities, the situation is more complex
3/ One major challenge is the significant spacing between helicopters, making it difficult to effectively target them with a single missile. Given the limited availability of long-range weapons, using a missile that may or may not destroy some Mi-24s becomes hard to justify.