Brad Setser Profile picture
Aug 12, 2023 16 tweets 5 min read Read on X
China is currently underlying going what @adam_tooze calls "a gearshift in what has been the most dramatic trajectory in economic history" --

And we have to try to understand it with what is by far the worst economic data produced by any of the major global economies.

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China doesn't produce a lot of basic data (seasonally adjusted levels series for the components of GDP, seasonally adjusted trade data so there would be less need to use the y/y numbers, etc). & its data is hard to interpret because there isn't enough underlying detail.

2/
Take one example from the balance of payments, the data set I know best.

As @jnordvig has highlighted, FDI inflows have collapsed -- that fits a lot of different narratives around China's current weakness.

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@jnordvig But guess what else has collapsed?

Outflows from "errors and omissions" (often called hot money).

That's strange ...

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@jnordvig The last time there was a big downshift in FDI inflows tied to an economic downshift (and CNY weakness) back in 2015, errors and omissions surged ... but not this time. @EtraAlex should look into this!

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I noticed this because the gap between the basic balance (current account + net FDI) and errors has been a useful guide to underlying appreciation pressure on the CNY -- and both the basic balance and errors have shifted down ...

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But there is also a question about whether "errors" are now accurate -- errors after all are the gap between China's measured current account balanced and measured capital outflows, and the current account surplus now looks artificially small relative to the goods surplus.

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The current account surplus is now $500 billion below China's (large) goods surplus -- and it isn't mostly because of tourism any more. Rather the gap stems from the income deficit and a discrepancy between the BoP goods surplus and the customs good surplus ...

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The customs surplus is now $250 billion (1-1.5 pp of GDP) smaller than the BoP goods surplus -- which is strange.

And the gap opened up recently b/c of some strange shifts in SAFE's methodology that make no sense (see @adamkwolfe)

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@adamkwolfe Export receipts in the BoP suddenly went from 97% of reported customs receipts to 92%, which meant (mechanically) a big fall in China's reported surplus ...

Funky data for a big economy ...

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The income balance also makes little sense.

Most of China's assets are USD bonds and cross border loans,. Higher Treasury and Agency rates plus higher returns on LIBOR linked lending should have led China to get more investment income from the Row. But no ...

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The income balance includes FDI receipts as well as income from bonds, loans and deposits -- but since China doesn't produce any disaggregated data, there is no way to see what explains the rather funky numbers

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I could go on. For example the BoP shows a $120 billion increase in China's FX reserves over the last 4qs even as the PBOC balance sheet is flat and China says it isn't intervening in the fx market ...

The rise itself of course came even as the CNY has slid. A bit weird.

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But my central point is simple --

There are big questions about the direction of China's economy, & how China impacts the rest of the global economy.

And it doesn't help that there are simultaneously big questions about many basic numbers coming out of China!

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p.s. it should go without saying that I think the IMF needs to do more than just focus on China's "true" fiscal deficit. This surveillance cycle really should delve into the BoP data -- and the Fund should insist the world's #2 economy put out GDP components in levels.
@schwab_clarence And I share the consensus view that the GDP data has been smoothed for a very long time. hence the lack of level series on components.

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More from @Brad_Setser

Oct 24
Unfortunate that Trump started his second term determined to fight trade wars with most of the world.

China's export boom (and its lack of imports) have created the material conditions for a coalition that is directed at forcing some policy shifts in China

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Folks usually think of trade as a two way street: I buy from you, you buy from me ... but it isn't clear what, if anything, Xi's China wants to import over time (other than maybe some commodities).

& Xi has made a mint by exporting over the last 5ys

2/ Image
And no one is doing well selling into China. The IMF WEO data shows zero (slightly negative) import volume growth since the end of 2018, while export volume growth is up 40% ...

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Read 8 tweets
Oct 20
Very useful WSJ report on how China gained control of rare earths processing/ permanent magnet production -- and how it kept control

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The Journal goes through past attempts to revive Mountain Pass/ US rare earths production -- including the now forgotten case of Molycorp from 05 to 14

"Beginning around 2005, China’s government tightened the screws, levying export taxes on rare earths that made it costlier for Western magnet makers to churn out products ... Rare-earth production became so limited in the West that an American company, Molycorp, attempted to revive the Mountain Pass mine and make its own magnets"

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And in 2021 the Biden administration did make an effort to revive interest in US rare earth production as part of a broader supply chain push -- but it foundered when China flooded the market

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Read 6 tweets
Oct 17
Secretary Bessent has a bit of work to do to convince Americans (and perhaps the market) that the bailout of Argentina (and direct peso purchases):

a) will work
b) is a good idea

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My former colleague Mark Sobel

“Were the United States to offer Argentina a longer-term support package to back an unsustainable exchange rate, that would be a major folly and waste of U.S. taxpayer resources"

2/
There is a pretty broad consensus that putting US money into Argentina to backstop the current exchange rate regime (i.e. the peso's current trading band) isn't a good use of taxpayer funds

3/

nytimes.com/2025/10/17/us/…
Read 5 tweets
Oct 15
The US -- not just the Trump Administration -- lost leverage when President Trump over-escalated in April.

The US could not sustain 145% tariffs and more or less had to unilaterally back down. Xi and his team know that

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Somehow I have managed to start using the same words as the Trump administration ("testy")

"“I have a great relationship with Xi,” Trump said, before quickly adding: “But sometimes he gets testy.”"

2/
Read 6 tweets
Oct 14
The IMF needs to take a serious look at its methodology for forecasting the current account balance in key countries -- the current approach is yielding somewhat absurd outcomes that forecast real problems (notably China's surplus) away

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The WEO forecast for China's 2025 surplus is 3.3% of GDP (the h1 surplus) so an upward adjustment from the absurd $370b surplus in the ESR. That surplus is forecast to fall to 2.8% of GDP in 26, and then down to 2% of GDP in 2020. No problem here worth global concern ...

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The basis for the forecast seems to be Chinese policies that now support domestic demand ..

"China and Germany have recently announced and expanded spending measures to boost domestic demand, which will lower net savings and reduce external surpluses"

3/
Read 13 tweets
Oct 11
Building out capacity (including refining capacity) for rare earths/ other critical minerals should indeed by a real priority now, and the risk of weaponization of this this and other supply chains should have been taken more seriously in the past. But it won't be easy

1/
Just as an example of how far the political debate has come -- Bob Lighthizer (no China dove) excluded rare earths and permanent magnets from the 301 tariffs back in 18 and 19 ...

3/
Pharmaceuticals from China too (why raise the price of meds ... )

For rare earths and magnets there was essentially no US supply, so the tariffs just raised costs (absent a plant o build out capacity over time)

4/
Read 19 tweets

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