Here is a long thread about conventional missile fuzes. It explains why Taurus offers a qualitative edge over Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG when engaging certain targets, and why it’s one of the most advanced conventional weapons currently in the arsenals of Western states. 👇🧵1/21
A fuze is a device that detonates a munition's explosive material under specified conditions. In other words, the fuze makes sure that your payload explodes when & where you want it to. Not sooner, not later. As such, it is a critical part of the missile’s warhead system. 2/21
Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG and Taurus are cruise missiles primarily designed to engage hardened and buried targets. To do so, they are equipped with a powerful multi-effect warhead consisting of a primary shaped charge and a secondary follow through bomb (FTB) or penetrator. 3/21
Depending on what type of target you are engaging, you may want the follow through bomb not only to penetrate the engaged structure as deep as possible before exploding, but to explode at a very specific depth or moment to maximize the damage caused. 4/21
For example, when engaging a multi-story bunker, you might want the follow through bomb to explode at a certain level. When engaging a bridge, you may want the FTB to penetrate the first layer (the bridge deck) and only detonate in the second layer (the pillar). 5/21
How do you do this? This is where the fuze comes in. Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG’s BROACH warhead system uses the so-called Multi-Application Fuze Initiation System (MAFIS), which you also find in several American weapon systems, such as the AGM-154 JSOW gliding bomb. 6/21
MAFIS is a more or less “traditional” time fuze where the delay of the follow through bomb’s ignition can be manually set in steps from 0-240 milliseconds. I.e., the penetrator is ignited after a predetermined amount of time following the “shock” of the initial penetration. 7/21
The problem with this fuze design is that you have to estimate the delay correctly. For example, if I overestimate the time it will take the follow through bomb to penetrate the layer(s), it will explode too late. If I underestimate the time, it will explode too early. 8/21
This likely happened when Ukraine used Storm Shadow for the first time in late June to engage the Chonhar bridge. The missile managed to penetrate the bridge deck effortlessly but the pillar remained rather untouched, likely because the follow through bomb ignited too early. 9/21
Engaging bridges with time fuzed bombs is especially problematic, given that modern bridge decks are rarely even. Time of penetration will depend on whether the FTB hits a point under which there is only the bridge deck, a girder/beam, or the deck & one side of a girder. 10/21
How can we improve on this less accurate time fuze design? One way would be to count the layers and “void spaces” the FTB penetrates, in order to time the ignition. In doing so, we no longer rely on an estimated penetration time, which is bound to be inaccurate. 11/21
Coincidentally, this is exactly what the fuze of Taurus’ MEPHISTO warhead system does. Taurus’ warhead is equipped with a “void sensing and layer counting” fuze called PIMPF (Programmable Intelligent Multi-Purpose Fuze). 12/21
This fuze counts the layers and void spaces the follow through bomb penetrates to ignite the payload at exactly the right moment. By measuring the speed of deceleration, PIMPF can also recognize different types of layers (concrete, rock, soil, etc.). 13/21
This fuze design also offers benefits when engaging bridges. Rather than relying on an estimated time of penetrating the bridge's first layer (the bridge deck), you can tell the fuze to ignite the follow through bomb once it penetrates the second layer (the pillar). 14/21
In doing so, you not only damage the deck of the bridge, but you can also damage its foundations. One missile equipped with a void sensing & layer counting fuze can therefore cause the damage that previously could only be achieved with two or more accurately dropped bombs. 15/21
I stand by what I said in the past. 90% of why 🇺🇦 needs Taurus is to prevent its long-range strike arsenal from running low. However, Taurus also provides a qualitative edge. If 🇺🇦 receives Taurus, 🇷🇺 bridges will be in an even more precarious spot (👀Kerch bridge). 16/21
This fuze design is also really useful in anti-ship missiles, because you can guarantee ignition of the warhead after the ship’s hulls have been penetrated. Kongsberg’s NSM, which is currently scoring one contract after another, uses the same PIMPF fuze as Taurus. 17/21
Taurus’ advanced fuze system is what renders the cruise missile a state-of-the-art weapon system. While newer cruise missiles, such as JASSM, are likely stealthier due to incorporating more and better low-observability features, Taurus’ warhead design does not lag behind. 18/21
In fact, TDW (the Bavarian/German company manufacturing PIMPF) cooperated with American companies to adapt PIMPF for American purposes. The resulting and adapted fuze is now used in several American weapon systems, including JASSM (FMU-156/B). 19/21
PIMPF is also one of the reasons why South Korea is relying on the Taurus cruise missile as one of its key weapon systems in its "Kill Chain" missile strike system which aims at deterring South Korea's nuclear-armed neighbor by threatening conventional counterforce strikes. 20/21
As it turns out, Oktoberfest is only the second best thing to have come out of Bavaria, after TDW’s PIMPF. Deliver Taurus without targeting restrictions and see Kerch Bridge (and other bridges) go up in flames. #FreeTarus /END
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I published a new Missile Matters post today, offering an initial battle damage assessment of Flamingo’s first combat use.
Proof of concept was established, but the strike also revealed likely shortcomings.
Access the post via the link in my bio. Summary below.
1/6
High-resolution satellite imagery shows two impacts.
Depending on the nominal aimpoints, missile one probably missed by 15 to 40 meters and missile two by 80 to 200 meters.
Missile three did not reach the target area, whether due to outside influence or internal failure.
2/6
Fire Point stated that the Flamingo has a CEP of 14 meters, meaning 50 percent of missiles should land within 14 meters of their aimpoint, about 93 percent within 28 meters, and the remainder outside the 28-meter radius.
3/6
With recent focus on Ukrainian missiles, from Flamingo to "Long Neptune" and others, I thought I'd provide context by tracing the evolution of Ukraine's missile programs.
Link in bio, short summary below.
1/6
Ukraine’s missile industry has moved through several distinct phases since 2014, from modest post-Soviet capabilities and problem-ridden pre-war programs to wartime improvisation, foreign reliance, and now ambitious attempts at independent production.
2/6
From relying almost entirely on Western partners in 2023 for long-range strike capabilities, Ukraine by 2025 fields a diverse but still imperfect missile arsenal, with lighter drones and mini-cruise missiles forming the backbone.
3/6
I published my latest newsletter post earlier today, offering an initial assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo’s specifications, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications.
You can find the full post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/6
The FP-5 Flamingo is the first "heavy" missile system in Ukraine's indigenous missile arsenal, combining long range with a large payload.
This offers significant advantages in terms of missile lethality through improved warhead penetration and greater explosive yield.
2/6
The ultimate impact of the Flamingo on the battlefield will depend on Ukrainian production levels and its survivability against Russian missile defenses.
Ukrainian output goals of more than 200 units per month by the end of the year are certainly ambitious.
3/6
I estimate U.S. and European production of ballistic missile interceptors and compare it to Russia’s output of conventional ballistic missiles.
Access the post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/7
Russia is currently estimated to produce a total of 840 to 1,020 ground-launched 9M723 and air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal short- to medium-range ballistic missiles annually, or 70 to 85 per month.
This represents roughly a 15 to 40 percent increase compared to 2024.
2/7
In contrast, combined Patriot interceptor production (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) stands at 850 to 880 in 2025.
By 2027, this will increase to over 1,100 interceptors, and to over 1,400 by 2029 (if Rheinmetall starts producing PAC-3 MSE interceptors).
3/7
I sent out my latest newsletter post this morning, discussing the state and viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent in 2025.
You can access the post via the link my bio.
Below a short summary.
1/5
Russia's nuclear arsenal faces two primary challenges: maintaining its nuclear warheads and sustaining a viable fleet of delivery vehicles, particularly ICBMs.
While both pose difficulties, warhead maintenance is likely the lesser challenge for Russia.
2/5
In contrast, Russia’s inability to move beyond Soviet-era technology and field a next-generation ICBM presents a more serious challenge over the medium to long term.
To be clear, several nuclear-armed states face difficulties in replacing Cold War-era systems.
3/5
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:
My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.
1/6
The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.
2/6
After the attack, Iraq shifted its strategy, dispersing facilities and focusing on secret, military-oriented nuclear development. The attack also increased Iraq's determination, driven by national pride, the desire for a security deterrent, and fear of future strikes.
3/6