Here is a long thread about conventional missile fuzes. It explains why Taurus offers a qualitative edge over Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG when engaging certain targets, and why it’s one of the most advanced conventional weapons currently in the arsenals of Western states. 👇🧵1/21
A fuze is a device that detonates a munition's explosive material under specified conditions. In other words, the fuze makes sure that your payload explodes when & where you want it to. Not sooner, not later. As such, it is a critical part of the missile’s warhead system. 2/21
Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG and Taurus are cruise missiles primarily designed to engage hardened and buried targets. To do so, they are equipped with a powerful multi-effect warhead consisting of a primary shaped charge and a secondary follow through bomb (FTB) or penetrator. 3/21
Depending on what type of target you are engaging, you may want the follow through bomb not only to penetrate the engaged structure as deep as possible before exploding, but to explode at a very specific depth or moment to maximize the damage caused. 4/21
For example, when engaging a multi-story bunker, you might want the follow through bomb to explode at a certain level. When engaging a bridge, you may want the FTB to penetrate the first layer (the bridge deck) and only detonate in the second layer (the pillar). 5/21
How do you do this? This is where the fuze comes in. Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG’s BROACH warhead system uses the so-called Multi-Application Fuze Initiation System (MAFIS), which you also find in several American weapon systems, such as the AGM-154 JSOW gliding bomb. 6/21
MAFIS is a more or less “traditional” time fuze where the delay of the follow through bomb’s ignition can be manually set in steps from 0-240 milliseconds. I.e., the penetrator is ignited after a predetermined amount of time following the “shock” of the initial penetration. 7/21
The problem with this fuze design is that you have to estimate the delay correctly. For example, if I overestimate the time it will take the follow through bomb to penetrate the layer(s), it will explode too late. If I underestimate the time, it will explode too early. 8/21
This likely happened when Ukraine used Storm Shadow for the first time in late June to engage the Chonhar bridge. The missile managed to penetrate the bridge deck effortlessly but the pillar remained rather untouched, likely because the follow through bomb ignited too early. 9/21
Engaging bridges with time fuzed bombs is especially problematic, given that modern bridge decks are rarely even. Time of penetration will depend on whether the FTB hits a point under which there is only the bridge deck, a girder/beam, or the deck & one side of a girder. 10/21
How can we improve on this less accurate time fuze design? One way would be to count the layers and “void spaces” the FTB penetrates, in order to time the ignition. In doing so, we no longer rely on an estimated penetration time, which is bound to be inaccurate. 11/21
Coincidentally, this is exactly what the fuze of Taurus’ MEPHISTO warhead system does. Taurus’ warhead is equipped with a “void sensing and layer counting” fuze called PIMPF (Programmable Intelligent Multi-Purpose Fuze). 12/21
This fuze counts the layers and void spaces the follow through bomb penetrates to ignite the payload at exactly the right moment. By measuring the speed of deceleration, PIMPF can also recognize different types of layers (concrete, rock, soil, etc.). 13/21
This fuze design also offers benefits when engaging bridges. Rather than relying on an estimated time of penetrating the bridge's first layer (the bridge deck), you can tell the fuze to ignite the follow through bomb once it penetrates the second layer (the pillar). 14/21
In doing so, you not only damage the deck of the bridge, but you can also damage its foundations. One missile equipped with a void sensing & layer counting fuze can therefore cause the damage that previously could only be achieved with two or more accurately dropped bombs. 15/21
I stand by what I said in the past. 90% of why 🇺🇦 needs Taurus is to prevent its long-range strike arsenal from running low. However, Taurus also provides a qualitative edge. If 🇺🇦 receives Taurus, 🇷🇺 bridges will be in an even more precarious spot (👀Kerch bridge). 16/21
This fuze design is also really useful in anti-ship missiles, because you can guarantee ignition of the warhead after the ship’s hulls have been penetrated. Kongsberg’s NSM, which is currently scoring one contract after another, uses the same PIMPF fuze as Taurus. 17/21
Taurus’ advanced fuze system is what renders the cruise missile a state-of-the-art weapon system. While newer cruise missiles, such as JASSM, are likely stealthier due to incorporating more and better low-observability features, Taurus’ warhead design does not lag behind. 18/21
In fact, TDW (the Bavarian/German company manufacturing PIMPF) cooperated with American companies to adapt PIMPF for American purposes. The resulting and adapted fuze is now used in several American weapon systems, including JASSM (FMU-156/B). 19/21
PIMPF is also one of the reasons why South Korea is relying on the Taurus cruise missile as one of its key weapon systems in its "Kill Chain" missile strike system which aims at deterring South Korea's nuclear-armed neighbor by threatening conventional counterforce strikes. 20/21
As it turns out, Oktoberfest is only the second best thing to have come out of Bavaria, after TDW’s PIMPF. Deliver Taurus without targeting restrictions and see Kerch Bridge (and other bridges) go up in flames. #FreeTarus /END
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There's a discussion on missile production capacities in Europe. I have a forthcoming piece on that, but the tldr is that it's a huge problem.
Neither UK's Storm Shadow, nor Germany's KEPD 350 Taurus are currently produced and haven't been so for a while. 1/5
Greece ordered additional SCALP-EG cruise missiles in 2021 & 2022 as part of a weapons package for its Rafale aircraft fleet (also includes Meteor air-to-air missiles and Exocet anti-ship missiles). Given the value of the contract, Greece may have ordered some 50-100 SCALP. 2/5
This implies that there is a SCALP-EG production line currently open, unless France has sureplus stock of SCALP-EG lying around that it is willing to transfer (very unlikely).
Theoretically, MBDA could try to expand that production line in order to meet new demand. 3/5
BREAKING: Exactly two months after the UK announced the delivery of Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine, Macron stated that 🇫🇷 would follow suit and deliver the French equivalent “SCALP-EG”. Here is a thread with everything you need to know about the implications: 👇🧵1/12
First, and most importantly, numbers: I estimate that 🇫🇷 currently has a stockpile of 440-460 SCALP-EG missiles. 🇫🇷 has procured approximately 500 missiles over the last two decades, but also used them repeatedly, most recently against 🇸🇾 chemical weapons facilities in 2018. 2/
It is unclear what part of France’s SCALP-EG stockpile is currently operational. Of Germany’s Taurus stockpile only 150 of 600 are reported operational, for example. It is likely that a larger share of France’s SCALP-EG arsenal is currently operational. 3/ thedrive.com/the-war-zone/g…
Zwei kurze Gedanken zur Lieferung von Streumunition an die Ukraine.
1. Wir in Deutschland müssen uns darüber Bewusst sein, dass das Abrüsten und das Verbot verschiedener Waffen ein sicherheitspolitischer Luxus ist. 1/
Es ist bezeichnend, dass Länder wie Südkorea und Israel, die sich einer klaren sicherheitspolitischen Bedrohung gegenüber sehen, sich nie für eine Unterzeichnung des Verbotsvertrags entschieden haben. Streumunition hat einen klaren militärischen Nutzen. 2/
Das gleiche gilt übrigens auch für Atomwaffen auf deutschem Boden. Die Verschiebung der NATO-Grenze hat es uns erlaubt, über eine Abrüstung oder gar den Verbot dieser Waffen nachzudenken. Die osteuropäischen Staaten haben diesen Luxus nicht. 3/
I did some calculations on the lethality of ATACMS (M57 variant), as well as its single-shot kill probability (SSKP) against different types of targets. The results are quite interesting. 👇 1/4
Unsurprisingly, ATACMS' lethal radius increases quite drastically against softer targets (1-4 psi), but the weapon is still effective against harder targets (5-10 psi). If the official 10m CEP is correct, ATACMS has an SSKP of 86% for 10 psi targets. 2/4
The SSKP approaches 100% for 1-4 psi targets. Interestingly, if we assume the real CEP is 8m (not 10m) - not unthinkable considering the overperformance of US-equipment in this war so far -, the SSKP is consistently above 95%, even for 10 psi targets. 3/4
The key question is what option does NATO have left once Russia starts employing nuclear weapons against Ukrainian targets that result in large-scale civilian casualties? Leaving such escalation unanswered would constitute the death of the liberal world order. 1/5
Importantly, intervention does not necessarily mean boots on the ground. Personally, I believe we would see a large-scale cruise missile strike against key Russian military assets in Ukraine and potentially extending into Russian territory near the border. 2/5
NATO would, at this point, likely close the airspace over Ukraine and redeploy substantial IAMD capabilities to the border and potentially into Ukrainian territory. It's not necessary to deploy tanks and other ground forces. 3/5
Weil man jetzt wieder vermehrt liest, dass Lieferungen von Marschflugkörpern und Kampfjets (wie Panzer zuvor) uns „dem Atomkrieg einen Schritt näherbringen“. Hier ein (langer) Thread, warum eine nukleare Eskalation NICHT in Putins Interesse ist. 1/18
Putin hat drei Optionen zur nuk. Eskalation. Einen Signalschlag gegen unbewohnte Ziele, einen taktischen Nuklearschlag gegen mil. Ziele & einen Signalschlag gegen bewohnte Ziele. @walberque & ich haben bereits März 2022 über diese Optionen berichtet. 2/18 washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/…
Ein Signalschlag gegen unbewohnte Ziele, zum Beispiel über dem Schwarzen Meer, hätte das Ziel, Russlands Bereitschaft zur nuklearen Eskalation zu demonstrieren und den Willen der Ukraine zur Landesverteidigung zu brechen. 3/18