Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Aug 14 13 tweets 4 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
During times of war, determining the enemy's production capacity, often shrouded in secrecy, is a challenging task. As promised, today's focus involves employing satellite imagery analysis and OSINT to approximate production numbers at BTRZ-103 (Armored Repair Plant). 🧵Thread: Image
2/ Before delving into specifics, let's clarify the role of BTRZ-103. Situated near Chita in Russia's East, this plant specializes in repairing and modernizing vehicles. The facility's current emphasis centers on T-62, BRDM, and BMP vehicle modernizations.
3/ T-62 tanks undergo complete disassembly, with engine replacements, rust removal, installation of new wiring, fire control, sight systems, and upgraded armor with ERA blocks. A contract was awarded to BTRZ-103 for the modernization of 800 T-62 tanks over a 3-year span. Image
4/ Based on satellite imagery from mid-April and late June, we observe 11 and 17 recently modernized tanks respectively, evident by distinct appearances and darker paint, a distinguishable detail from faded paint on other vehicles. Image
5/ Significant portions of the scrapyard appear relatively untouched, implying many vehicles are in poor condition, designated for last-resort storage or deemed irreparable, corroborated by recent satellite imagery and photos from nearly a decade ago. Image
6/ Despite relocation of vehicles to the facility's interior, not all will undergo modernization, as interviews with factory workers reveal assessment for repair feasibility or potential use as parts. Image
7/ Considering Gurulev's prior remarks, coupled with accessible satellite imagery illustrating a two-month gap and internal facility videos, my assessment suggests a production range spanning from a conservative estimate of 7 tanks per month to a more generous estimate of 17. Image
8/ These estimates, 7 to 17 tanks per month, provide a general overview of production scale, with a range of uncertainties. This falls below the Russian target of 16 tanks per month, translating to 576 tanks in three years, fewer than the stipulated 800. Image
9/ It's important to note this facility isn't the sole repair/modernization center in Russia. There other factories and BTRZ plants (22, 61, 81, 103, 144, 153), albeit it appears that their production scale could be even lower. Image
10/ Despite ERA blocks, the T-62's armor remains vulnerable to contemporary anti-tank weaponry. Nevertheless, they retain utility in offering indirect fire support and presenting a formidable challenge to mobile forces attempting to advance or flank the secondary defense line.
11/ It's worth noting that our destruction of russian tanks currently surpasses their repair and production capabilities. Nonetheless, this threat persists for our units, particularly those with limited resources. Maintaining assistance to Ukraine is vital to keep this trend
12/ Your contributions via Buy Me A Coffee have enabled the availability of this satellite imagery and others. If you found this thread valuable, please support by liking and retweeting the first message of the thread. Your engagement enables me to provide better materials
A typo here. I meant to say that the goal was set at 800, and with current production tempo it won’t reach 800 in 3 years.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Tatarigami_UA

Tatarigami_UA Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @Tatarigami_UA

Aug 12
When our troops liberated Kherson and advanced to the Dnipro River, the russians dispersed and relocated their equipment, helicopters, and C2 to various bases beyond the reach of HIMARS. Why is this significant, and what can be learned from this situation?
🧵Thread Image
2/ In this instance, compiled satellite imagery reveals the establishment of a new base to the south of Henichesk. Its construction commenced around November, aligning with our troops' liberation of Kherson and the departure of russian forces from Chaplynka.
3/ Their decision was correct - shortly after our forces secured Kherson, Chaplynka base experienced several strikes. Nevertheless, most of the equipment, the command and control center, and the helicopters had been relocated. Only minimal logistical operations were still there. Image
Read 8 tweets
Aug 11
Given the current focus on minefields and mines due to the ongoing counter-offensive, I decided to illustrate a representative minefield layout. While I am unable to share the actual document, I made a comparable graphical representation to convey the specifics.
🧵Thread: Image
2/ In this case, the positioning of minefields is tied to surface features, including bodies of water, roadways, and settlements. It is important to note that there are two categories of minefields: "groups of mines" and controlled minefields (can be managed remotely). Image
3/ Minefields commonly consist of an array of distinct mines, namely the OZM-72 Bounding fragmentation anti-personnel mine, the PMN anti-personnel pressure mine, the MON Directional Anti-personnel Mine, the TM-62 Anti-tank blast mine, and the YaRM anti-landing mine. Image
Read 7 tweets
Aug 9
In light of recent developments in Western Africa and the confirmed interest of Wagner Group in Niger, it is imperative to gain an accurate understanding of Wagner's actual capabilities and their strategic approach. 🧵Thread: Image
2/ While Wagner Group does present a genuine security concern in Africa, supporting military juntas and involving itself in genocidal practices, its military capabilities are notably limited. Image
3/ While Wagner was known to numerous military and political analysts, its true international fame came during the Bakhmut assault, which was a personal ambition of Prigozhin to demonstrate to Putin that his private force was more effective than the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Read 11 tweets
Aug 8
The satellite images I'm presenting offer additional evidence highlighting Ukraine's need for long-range engagement capabilities. This analysis is focused on Luhansk airport, situated over 100 km away from the frontlines, and serving as a base for russian helicopters
🧵Thread: Image
2/ The airport had been inactive since 2014; however, recently, the russians have repurposed it as a helicopter base for operations in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast. On average, there are approximately 12 to 16 helicopters present at any given time Image
3/ Russians position themselves to remain outside the effective range of HIMARS when on the ground and beyond the reach of MANPADs when in the sky. They mostly engage through the use of indirectly fired unguided rockets. The airfield primarily hosts Ka-52, Mi-8, Mi-28, and Mi-24 Image
Read 7 tweets
Aug 6
Amid numerous global events, tracking everything is challenging. Considering globally important developments in Niger - a strategic location with French and US military presence, and potential Wagner involvement, I made a summary with contributions from other OSINTers. 🧵Thread Image
2/ This thread chronologically summarizes events starting from a coup in Niger, escalating to a potentially larger conflict involving multiple countries, and potential growth of Wagner and jihadists in the region. Key points in chronological order by day are as follows:
3/ July 26th

- On July 26th, at 5:30 am local time, the Presidential Palace in Niger's capital, Niamey, was blocked by presidential guard vehicles. This was followed by a public statement announcing the creation of CNSP (junta body) with Tchiani appointed as its leader. Image
Read 18 tweets
Aug 5
In continuation of the conversation regarding the current state of russian bases and available vehicles, today, I will cover one of the bases that belong to the 3rd Motor Rifle Division in Boguchar.

Don't forget to like and share to help with algorithm.

🧵Thread: Image
2/ The current third division was reformed in 2016, moved to Boguchar and Valuiki under the command of the 20th army. Boguchar base hosts the 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, 99th SPG Regiment, 337th Separate Engineer Battalion, 911th Separate Supply BN, and 231st Separate Medical BN.
3/ Current satellite analysis shows a decrease in the numbers of vehicles on the base, mostly due to deployments and losses. There might be inaccuracies due to the limitations in image quality, which can hinder precise vehicle recognition. Image
Read 10 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(