Thread by @MoString

I am here at a hearing for summary judgment motion hearing regarding the dischargeability of the Sandy Hook judgments against Alex Jones in bankruptcy.

Points out that to even be considered for CUTPA you must at least have at least recklessness. Judge Bellis found he had the highest degree of blameworthiness and points that each factor is in Plaintiffs' favor.

Jones's attorneys are likely to argue that his conduct was merely reckless, so he did not commit intentional and malicious conduct. 5th Circuit considers punitive damages when considering this issue and where a court found evil conduct and wanton intent.

Onto the second question of if the judgment was fully and fairly litigated. He points out Jones's argument that the jury could have found him liable for recklessness. In some states they only ask is the defendant liable for defamation? But he says here we have specific findings.

He is now citing to case law where courts found that a trial court did not make findings as to intent, but this is in a different universe. Test under Connecticut law for fair and full litigation is if a defendant had the opportunity to litigate. Jones did.

He thinks this is a textbook case for application of non-dischargeability. He says other cases where there were non-dischargeability: a tweet accusing someone of being promiscuous, an affair that led to alienation of affection, which Chappel says is a very bizarre case.

Chappel now says what happens if I am wrong? He says that they will have to have essentially another trial in this court. Jones would have to prove his actions were only reckless or negligent and that there was no objective foreseeability that his actions would cause serious harm

Chappel says these issues are already litigated, and there is no way to find for Jones that contradicts the Connecticut trial court order on punitive damages. Judge Lopez has no questions.

Now someone from Vickie Driver's firm in Tulsa, Chris Davis is arguing for Jones. He says that Jones's motives are characterized by a video clip that was used by Connecticut Plaintiffs. He quotes.

This is the whole "Anderson Cooper used a green screen" spiel and that people lied to get us in Iraq so they are lying about mass shootings. I would not quote Alex Jones in my argument.

Jones does not trust the government or media. His target is the Deep State, so when Sandy Hook happened it became the latest for which he did not trust the narrative. WOOOOF.

Davis is claiming that Bellis's judgment was an analysis of statutory requirements of Connecticut law and not the high bar of the 5th Circuit. Jones's intent would become clear if Judge Lopez watched videos lol.

I am not convinced. I think Bellis's punitive damages order is highly convincing evidence for a finding that Jones acted maliciously and willfully and the facts she lays out there. To me, highest culpability possible clears that bar easily!

Davis says there is a circuit split because Ninth Circuit requires a finding that defendant knew his conduct was wrong and 5th Circuit does not. He does concede Lopez has to follow 5th Circuit law though.

Davis cites to a case where the court found a debtor who ran her car intentionally into a bar that killed people wasn't dischargable, but then someone whose gun went off when they tapped the window of someone with a gun was.

He says that the 523(a)(6) standard is not met by the requirements of a finding of punitive damages. Davis also states that collateral estoppel is not favored. (Judge after judge has said they ain't never seen a case like this one though)

Davis cites a case, "if there are multiple possible reasons for a judgment then collateral estoppel will not apply." He also cites to a case that states that a judge's findings regarding a judgement is dicta. It would be very funny if Chappel rebutted by saying that is dicta.

Arguing that Judge Bellis's findings that Jones acted willfully and maliciously is dicta is weird to me. I find most "it's dicta" to just mean that they got nothing else and so they can only say "it doesn't count because it is bad for my case."

Especially because the jury had to find for malice and intent to say punitive damages should be ordered at all! Judge Bellis also had to find for that when determining the amount of CUTPA and if punitives under CUTPA should be awarded.

Davis urges Judge Bellis to look at a case that was cited in a case by Chappel. He went back and found that case after briefing. Idk. I simply would do that before and not tell Judge Lopez to go read it for himself.

He says intentional inflictive of emotional distress could find for "known or should have known," which is a reckless standard. The Lafferty complaint merged the defamation and IIED claim, but again I do not find that persuasive in light of the facts of the case.

Defamation per se does not change the analysis is a wild thing to say. (Defamation per se means essentially that the statement is on its face obviously defamatory).

It doesn't change the analysis in a sense, but also I'm more willing to believe that defamation per se rather than basic defamation shows more than just recklessness.

"A willful and malicious harm is one caused intentionally without just cause or excuse." Well, there we go. LOL. He also says the jury checks the box on whether to award punitive because wantonness is recklessness. Bellis just determines the amount.

Not a terrible argument there. But again I think as we parse out the meaning of malice as Davis is doing, I think him saying not all malice is the same and that recklessness as malice cannot meet 5th Circuit standard.

So he is saying we cannot tell if the jury found for recklessness or intent when they wanted to award punitive damages. We cannot tell what the jury was thinking! I think the damages speak for themselves. This whole pretend we don't know what is going on, cutesy act, I don't like

He is also saying even if there is malice, then we don't know what kind of malice. Davis wishes that he could airbrush over Judge Bellis's findings but her findings on culpability are dicta when it comes to 5th Circuit standard.

Davis concedes that he is not fighting over if it is dischargeable or not, but if it is not, then collateral estoppel is not how we get there.

If Plaintiffs win today, then what will happen is it is non-dischargeable. If they lose then Judge Lopez will hear factual evidence in making the determination if these are dischargeable or not.

Davis should not have done this. "The very thing he was shackled and muzzled from doing is testifying as to his intent." But then backs up and says he does not think the court violated his due process, but the 5th Circuit standard of intent wasn't the job of the trial court.

For collateral estoppel analysis, you have to ignore Judge Bellis's opinion is kind of wild, but what else is there? Anyways, Davis for Jones is done.

Chappel now rebutting. He points out there were two types of punitive damages in Connecticut. It is true that the jury instructions apply to the common law punitive damages.

Again, this is what I was saying, he pointed out the jury never decided on CUTPA, that is for the judge to analyze. What about the word intentional? Chappel points out that Davis never answered about "highest degree of culpability."

To survive appeal the Court had to find recklessness is what that CUTPA case cited by Davis said. That is the test for whether a CUTPA judgment can be affirmed on appeal. The question here is whether that judgment depended on the facts of the case. It did.

At best if you accept that argument that Jones just does not trust the media and had no ill intent, then that still does not meet the objective test of would those acts reasonably cause harm? That is an objective standard, not going by what was in Jones's mind!

Chappel is now using the defamation per se point that I made earlier! Defamation per se is so bad that the law presumes injury, so it is substantially certain to cause harm (I also would add it shows intent and willfulness).

Miller reformulated the test for malice for collateral estoppel in bankruptcy in the 5th Circuit a bit and adopted implied malice as the malice needed. They say this is similar to "knew or should have known" standard.

RE the case from 1956 that Davis urged Lopez to read, Chappel says that there are much more recent cases that clearly articulate the standards.

Chappel now addressing the argument that Jones was not able to testify about the intent. Davis cited no case law, so even if Lopez has misgivings then no reason to disregard them. Jones could not testify about intent because of his own actions that led to the default.

Chappel: that was a collateral attack on the Connecticut court couched as issues not being fairly litigated. Bellis's opinion has 5 ways that it meets the objective and subjective standards needed here, so they should find now that debts are not dischargable.

We are on a break. Judge Lopez is taking the matter under advisement. When we come back we will hear the Texas Plaintiffs' attorney.

Think of it like this: on dischargeability, the Plaintiffs are trying to go ahead and get a ruling that the debts are not dischargeable based on the law because they already litigated issues that would matter for making that determination during the trials.

Jones's attorneys just need to keep the Plaintiffs from winning on their motion today. Then later it would be determined if the debts are dischargeable or not.

Texas Plaintiffs' lawyer is now speaking. Repeating same standard as before on the objective and subjective standard. Under Texas law: facts are fully and fairly litigated, essential to the judgment, and the parties were adversaries.

We are going through those standards backwards. Verdict was 27 times greater than statutory cap and Judge Maya Guerra-Gamble said the cap did not apply because Jones knowingly and willfully acted to violate the penal code by causing damages to vulnerable persons.

We are going backwards. He is saying this illustrates the intent and willfulness being essential to the damages. Clearly the parties are adversaries, so no need to discuss that at argument.

Texas Penal Code 22.04 is the one that busted the punitive damages cap. But the recklessness in the statute can be crossed out here because Texas law requires the cap to be busted only when someone intentionally/knowingly violated the law. codes.findlaw.com/tx/penal-code/…

In the remaining Texas Plaintiffs' case their complaint only alleges the intent of malice. Jones defaulted. Therefore, the court is awarding exemplary damages and the jury is asked how much.

The jury was only asked to come up with a number much like Garner in 1995 in the 5th Circuit. The defendant defaulted and malice was the sole basis of intent in the complaint, so collateral estoppel applied.

The creditor had a death penalty default in another malice 5th Circuit case, and they held that collateral estoppel applied. The default judgment was enough to say there was malice.

Judgments for various defamation and IIED cases held that those judgments are not dischargeable under collateral estoppel. (North Carolina law also holds this, which he mentions)

Jones's attorneys have not cited to a single case that found that defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress judgments are dischargeable in bankruptcy!

One more collateral estoppel standard is the fully and fairly litigated. In Heslin, the court entered a default on liability and then held a 2 week damages trial, he appeared, he testified. The jury awarded the damages. Court ordered that award stands.

Jones wants the court to look at what happens after the default, but you have to look at what happened before the default. Jones failed to comply repeatedly in the cases that have not gone to trial yet.

"He's not complying because he has no defense. Anything he hands over in discovery will not help him, it will sink him."

The 5th Circuit said death penalty sanctions count as fairly and fully litigated for their purposes. "The debtor had his chance, he blew it, and he wants a mulligan."

The debtor is attacking the judgment of the court, but judgments are entitled to full faith and credit unless appeals. The judgments of the court and any criticisms of it are not issues for Lopez to decide.

BTW that attorney was Lombardi with Akin & Gump.

Now co-counsel for Texas Plaintiffs is speaking. He is speaking about the subjective and objective standard of the 5th Circuit. Default judgments come up in different contexts. Paradigm Oil is a Texas Supreme Court case that differentiates.

There is default that happens when someone does not answer a lawsuit, you also have where a defendant does litigate but then does not show up. But this is different from those, this was a last resort in response to repeated refusal to comply and abuse of discovery.

The court can actually enter default to say "these issues are assumed as true, but these are not." But here all of the issues were deemed as admitted and true. Again jury just said how big of a check Jones needed to write.

You cannot cure an admission, whether express or by default. It is deemed to be litigated and true. He goes over various paragraphs where it is admitted that defendants knew and intended to cause distress to the plaintiffs.

I believe the attorney speaking now is Avi Moshenberg. Moshenberg says if we do not give the default judgment its effect, then we will be awarding him for his willful failure to comply with discovery.

When you have repeated failure to comply with discovery, essentially default is awarded because it is assumed that you turning over that evidence would be so bad that failure to do so is an admission.

Moshenberg goes back to the person who drove a car into a bar. The court did not look to see if the driver meant to hurt anyone to find they acted willfully and intentionally. They looked to see if they intentionally drove into the bar.

In another case, someone stated they punched someone but did not mean to hurt them. Does not matter if they did not mean to hurt them. If you slap someone then maybe not substantially certain to cause harm, but punching someone is.

In even civil cases, it is the same. Someone continued using the 20th Century Fox name on their website after no longer working for them. Court found substantial certainty to cause harm.

How could you look at someone say their murdered children are actors and say that is not going to substantially cause harm? He told his viewers that a parent was going to take away their rights. He had a stalker as a result, who was on Alex's show.

Moshenberg points out exhibits of clips for the judge to view. He said they are full exhibits so no one can say they are out of context. These clips are of Alex saying Sandy Hook was fake, children are actors, saying he was going to personally visit a parent, showing his address

"Jones was supposed to say one last thing and move on, and of course he didn't." He started to apologize if he hurt any parents, but then said "the only problem is I know when something is fake and when something is real."

Moshenberg: Is saying their children are not real? Is saying these parents are not real? Their grief is not real? Is that not substantially likely to cause harm?

Judge Lopez ends Moshenburg's argument. He is at the forty five minute mark and wants to keep it fair. Derric McClellan is now arguing for Jones.

*Deric McClellan my bad.

His argument is giving big "in this essay, I will," which fine but after a passionate argument, it really is not the best move.

Derric is talking really fast and the delivery is very in this essay I will, but whatever. He is talking about the Texas jury instructions. He is saying they used a reckless disregard of the truth standard for defamation as an option.

Now onto IIED he says that the jury instruction says the defendant acted intentionally or with reckless disregard that resulted in "extreme and outrageous conduct."

This guy is talking a million miles an hour. I tend to also talk fast, but there ain't no way because a judge would've told me "slow down, Jesus."

Omg he is arguing that because this is a damages hearing, then you cannot say that there was a finding of intentional or willful behavior. So it was not fully and fairly litigated.

He is citing to a case, and he calls it Pancake. Please use the other party's name or something. It is deeply unserious.

"The pancake court" is something that has now been said.

McClellan claims Pancake says that allegations in the petition cannot be used to show malicious injury was a decided issue. He also tells Judge Lopez he is not required to go through the facts of the case in the record to come to his decision.

Basically Jones's lawyers want to relitigate all this again in bankruptcy court. He also says Jones signed a declaration that he believed what he said, so I guess no intent and willfulness.

Lopez interrupts to ask a question. He says if he follows McClellan's logic to its conclusion then he is saying Lopez could never say that defamation is not dischargeable so long as the defendant did not speak. He asks for a response.

McClellan says if there is a whole trial then the Defendant would testify that they acted with recklessness and the court could make a decision based on that ??????????

So it seems like McClellan's logic is actually that Lopez could never not discharge debts for defamation judgments so long as the defendant just refuses to participate in discovery.

Now he is going to the cap being busted. McClellan points out Heslin amended the complaint after the trial to add a claim that the penal code was violated by damaging disabled persons. This is a weird procedural thing.

The state court judge made the finding that this was violated by implication according to McClellan. He says this violated Jones's rights so the judgment should not have full faith and credit. Again, I would say this is an issue for appeals not the bankruptcy court.

In Re Pancake is easily distinguishable. I just read it. In that case, the defendant did answer but the answer was struck which led to a default. It clearly states if Plaintiffs make an evidentiary case then collateral estoppel applies. There was evidence put on in the Jones case

McClellan says that Lopez cannot overturn trial court judgments but asks for him to find that they are unconstitutional and so they should not be recognized by the bankruptcy court.

In Re Pancake actually was a situation where plaintiffs did not put on any substantial evidence and just relied on the default. The plaintiffs in Jones put on evidence about what he did. Completely different!

McClellan just said the trial transcripts are hearsay????

McClellan encourages Judge Lopez to watch all the videos they attached. Please do not make this very nice man watch a bunch of InfoWars.

McClellan said Jones always showed empathy for the victims and all Jones did was be skeptical. How many Americans question JFK assassination?

OMG McLellan just said a leading Republican candidate for president, Rivek Ramaswamy doubts the story about 9/11 and we are seeing skepticism more and more, so I guess that is why Jones should owe nothing.

He asks if Ramaswamy was being malicious. I love calling these people's bluff because my response would be "yeah, probably."

Hearing is done. We are out of here. No ruling from the bench, which I expected because there are a lot of issues here.

Goodnight to you all.

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