With all of the concern about indicting former presidents who are active politicians, it seems worth discussing what the danger is if you categorically do not do so.
And that means discussing the January Crisis - no, not that one, the one in 49 BC with Julius Caesar! 1/
Because the events of 49 BC - Caesar crossing the rubicon, re-opening the civil war and all of that - were a product of both Caesar's need to remain forever immune from prosecution and also his success at evading a courtroom for so long. 2/
We need to back up though, to the year of Caesar's consulship, in 59 BC.
Sitting consuls (indeed, any magistrate with imperium) like sitting presidents could not be prosecuted in Rome, which matters because Caesar broke all sorts of laws. 3/
Caesar had, in that year, staked his political future on an alliance with Crassus and Pompey where his role, as consul, was to move some legislation.
And so he was going to move that legislation, whatever it took. 4/
Caesar ignored the other consul (M. Calprunius Bibulus) veto when bulldozing his legislation through. When Bibulus with two tribunes attempted to block the bill, a mob of Caesar's supporters beat him up, smashed his fasces and poured literal crap on him. 5/
When Bibulus then attempted to use his legal authority as consul to simply shut down state business, Caesar ignored him, leaving Bibulus shut up in his house for fear of violence. 6/
(I should note, I am aware of Morstein-Marx's recent efforts to reinterpretion of this; I don't find it persuasive; our sources for Caesar are not hostile to him (unwise to be in the post-Augustus era) and yet they are clear about the lawbreaking and violence of this year) 7/
The result of all of the law-breaking was that Caesar effectively locked himself in to a strategy of needing to be permanently immune to prosecution.
The solution was a remarkable five-year command in Gaul - having command would keep Caesar immune from prosecution. 8/
But by not having Caesar account for his actions, this just created a situation where any effort to limit or end Caesar's command created a threat of civil war, first in 56/5, headed off by Crassus and Pompey using force in the consular elections to get elected. 9/
Where they then further extended Caesar's command.
The thing is, kicking the can endlessly down the road just made the danger both of holding Caesar accountable or *never* holding him accountable greater and greater. 10/
The explosion comes, of course, in 49, when Caesar's command was set to expire. By this point Caesar, having put off prosecution for nearly a decade, now had a loyal, battle-hardened army and opted to re-open civil war rather than face the inside of a courtroom. 11/
The resulting war was devastating; Caesar was fighting almost non-stop from 49 to his assassination in 44, which didn't end the violence.
Almost no Roman of any prominence in 49 when it started was alive in 30 when it finally ended. 12/
So when journalists point out - accurately - that is in fact common for democracies to indict former leaders () they are correct and for good reason - kicking the can down the road endlessly just leads to a bigger explosion. 13/foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/18/dem…
If the reason the leader of a political faction supposedly can't or shouldn't face the inside of a courtroom today is because there would be mob violence - well, how much worse is that violence going to be if that leader is given years more to cement power? 14/
How much worse is it going to be if, like Caesar, they are given control of the armed forces operating in the certain knowledge that if they ever return power to the democracy, they'll end up facing a jury that they obviously have no intention of facing? 15/
There are a lot of lessons in the catastrophe of the 50s BC (including lessons about the foolish stubbornness of the Senate), but one of them is that it is in fact important to prosecute former leaders for crimes, that you should not just let that problem fester. 16/
In the event, of course, once Caesar - by military force - removed the threat of prosecution, he didn't magically moderate and become a good democratic leader.
He made himself dictator for life, sidelined Rome's popular assemblies and ruled by fiat and force as a quasi-king. 17/
Because of course that was how it turned out, because that was the only way it could have turned out once someone settled on a strategy of always holding political power forever simply to avoid personal accountability. 18/
Had the Romans imposed a delay, had they put Caesar before a court in 58, before he got the command of an army, disaster might have been averted, regardless of if he was convicted or not.
Acquittal too removes the need to keep political power to avoid a courtroom. 19/
But creating a system whereby political figures are forever immune from prosecution - always 'wait, wait' another office, another election, the fear of violence - just makes the problem worse and signals to other bad actors that violence is the way to power. 20/
And remember that former officials who have their day in court aren't being judged by the current president or some appointed official but by a jury of their peers and with a chance to present their own evidence and defense.
Which is how it is supposed to work. /end
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Alright, let's talk about the interaction between the Spartans and the actual best Greek-speaking fighters of antiquity (the Macedonians).
The Spartans go 0-for-3 against the Macedonians and get shade heaped on them by no less than Alexander III ('the Great'). 1/
The Kingdom of Macedon wasn't always militarily strong; through the fifth century the Macedonians can hold their core territory and not much else. They've got good cavalry, but weak infantry.
This is the Macedon that shows up in Thucydides (e.g. Thuc. 2.99ff). 2/
The Macedonians spend the late-400s playing an opportunistic diplomatic game, mostly backing Sparta in the Peloponnesian War because Athenian encroachment on their territory was a security threat, but allying with Athens when convenient. 3/
I'm not sure if this will convince anyone new, but I want - after all the back and forth - to present the grounds for my negative judgement of Sparta at its simplest:
The real contention here is that Sparta was an unusually - perhaps uniquely - unfree society. 1/
That contention in turn depends on two factual pillars: 1) That the Spartan form of slavery (Helotry) was unusually cruel and violent, even by the low standards of ancient slavery and 2) That Sparta had a far higher percentage of people enslaved than other societies. 2/
Of these, pillar (2) is not meaningfully disputed by anyone. Simply what we know about the balance of kleros/non-kleros land (tabulated by Figueira) combined with the subsistence math of supporting the spartiate lifestyle effectively mandate a large helot population. 60%+ 3/
Alright, Twitter, this video recapitulates something in the public-facing Roman/Italic military equipment talk that has been bugging me for a while, so we're going to talk about the pectoral cuirass and why it never looked like how it was certainly drawn for your textbook. 1/
First, let's talk about how we go about understanding ancient arms and armor. A lot of what we're trying to do is correlate literary descriptions of things with artistic representations of those things with surviving archaeological examples of the same thing. 2/
Literary sources on equipment alone can be really deceptive; they sometimes outright lie (see all of the Greek authors saying La Tene/Gallic/Celtic swords are all very bad and bendy; total BS).
So you line up literary sources with the real thing to fully understand it. 3/
I find students often struggle to understand how centralized power in post-Roman Europe could fragment so badly.
But ask yourself: if you are a Russian oligarch right now, what lesson did you just learn about the value of having your own private army?
And of course as private armies of that sort proliferate, they draw resources away from the central army, forced to rely more and more for security on maintaining favorable relationships with warlords.
Shades of the fifth century in the Western Roman Empire.
That does not mean further fragmentation and decentralization is a given here, of course - states sometimes *re*-centralize (see: Diocletian). But if Prigozhin is seen as a winner here - or even a survivor - it alters the interest calculations of a lot of actors.
One thing I find odd with the "the Ukraine War was caused by NATO expansion" argument is that it tends not to engage very seriously with the counter-factual.
What if we didn't enlarge NATO eastwards? Would the likely outcome have been good for the USA? Eastern Europe? 1/
Counter-factuals are tricky, of course - it is all too easy to see what you want in the 'history that didn't happen.'
But I think in this case asking, "what is the range of plausible outcomes and are any of them good" is pretty useful. 2/
Of course 'good' depends on the measuring stick; we can start by asking the question through the realist frame: does any plausible set of events improve security outcomes for the USA or the Eastern European countries now in NATO?
Additional Diablo 4 thought: I understand it is series standard now, but it will never cease to annoy me that they insist on pronouncing 'Baal' like 'bale' or 'bail' rather than as Ba'al (two syllables, Bah-al) as is, to my understanding, more correct.
I assume they got the pronunciation they opted to use for Diablo II (and then all games subsequently) from how the word tends to be pronounced by Christians, because that's the context where I've also heard the 'bail' pronunciation. 🤷♂️
Though I think it's also an interesting consequence of our contemporary times that until very recently it would probably have been pretty hard to actually figure out the correct original pronunciation of a word like that.