Ok, we're on track to publish something on Ted Postol's analysis of North Korea's Hwasong-18 ICBM. But I wanted to do a short thread that illustrates just how incompetent Ted's analysis is.
I am aware of how this reads, but I’m not wrong. 😉
Ted says the Hwasong-18 is the Topol-M. So let’s start with some facts. The first stage of the Topol-M (RS-12M) is 1.86 m in diameter and 8.04 meters long. Russia had to declare this data under the START Treaty.
That makes the volume of the Topol-M first stage 21.85 cubic meters. The first stage weighs 28.6 tons or about 1.31 tons per cubic meter -- propellant, motor casing, insulation, nozzle, etc.
Ted says the Hwasong-18 is 2.2 m in diameter. That’s much bigger than the Topol-M at 1.86 m. Ted is wrong about the diameter of the Hwasong-18, but more important: 👏Ted does not understand the implication of his diameter for his own argument.👏
Ted is very bad at measuring things. He says a 2.2 m missile corresponds to a 22.7 m long missile “essentially the same length as ... the Topol-M..” When I re-measured his diagram, I realized that he didn’t measure the missile. HE MEASURED HIS OWN YELLOW ARROW.
Ted’s not off to a great start, but let’s humor him. If the missile is 2.2 m in diameter (it isn’t), that makes the first stage 9.04 m long for a volume of 34.4 cubic meters which is … 57 percent larger by volume than the Topol-M first stage.
To put this into perspective, Ted’s first stage would weigh about 45 tons – nearly as much as the 47.2 ton launch weight of the entire three-stage Topol-M. It should have occurred to Ted immediately that something was very, very wrong. Somehow, it did not.
It gets worse. Look at where Ted measured the end of first stage (below left). He didn’t measure to the bottom, where the exhaust comes out. He only measured to the white ring at the top of the skirt!
One of the things we teach students and new researchers when modeling missiles is to use multiple pictures. Being careful means looking at lots of pictures, doing things over and over again, and sharing with colleagues. It’s tedious, which is why a lot of people don’t do it.
When we measure the ENTIRE length of the first stage, it is now 10.02 m or 38.09 cubic meters. (Again assuming Ted's 2.2 m diameter is correct, which it definitely isn’t.) The first stage of Ted’s Hwasong-18 is now … 74 percent larger by volume than the Topol-M.
That is a lot of propellant. Ted's first stage now weighs ~50 tons, larger than the first stage of the US Peacekeeper ICBM and more than the full launch weight of the Topol-M. Somehow none of this occurred to Ted and whoever @BeyondCSISKorea asked to review the analysis.
@BeyondCSISKorea asked someone to review this right? They didn't just accuse a country of violating the New START Treaty and its MTCR commitments without a peer review, right?
Look, Ted is wrong about the size of the Hwasong-18. It is about the same diameter as ... a Topol-M. I agree with @RocketSchiller and others who note some similarities with Topol-M. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.
But Ted's analysis is incompetent.
Ted didn’t model this missile. Because if he’d simply worked out the volumes and propellant masses implied by his own measurements, he would have noticed that his model bore no resemblance to the Topol-M.
Ted can claim to be an expert all he wants—and denigrate us while he’s doing it—but he is comically bad at this. It doesn’t take much expertise to see the missile’s skirt through the hot exhaust and smoke. And it doesn’t take much to see the truth through Ted’s hot air, either.
I don't understand what it means for an imaging satellite to have "no military utility." TBH, this feels like coping rather than rational analysis. A short thread. en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN202307…
The view attributed, but not sourced to, the US and ROK is that military utility is defined as being sub-meter resolution. This is very, very dumb thing to say. (This is so dumb that I can't believe this is an actual view of an actual human.)
The original CORONA satellites had a spatial resolution of initially 8m, then later 2m. The first sub-meter images did not become available until the KH-7 Gambit program between 1963-1967. CORONA was still a "full-fledged spy satellite."
There are three separate issues here: (1) Do we take the Ukrainian claim to have downed 18 targets at face value, (2) is it likely and (3) does PAC-3 make a meaningful contribution to the defense of Ukraine? My answers: No, not likely, and still maybe.
Do we take Ukrainian claims to have intercepted "six X-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, nine Kalibr cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea and three land-based missiles (S-400, Iskander-M)" at face value? OH COME ON. en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/9…
Solid-fuel ICBMs are, as the name suggests, are loaded with propellant in a solid form. Solid-fuel missiles are much easier to handle than missiles that must be fueled with large quantities of toxic and explosive liquid rocket fuel and oxidizer.
While one can use liquid-fuel missiles for mobile launchers like TELs and submarines, it's just easier to use solid-fuel missiles. North Korea was always going to follow the same technical path as the US, Soviet Union, France, China, Israel and India. foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/19/are…
On Putin's comments about deploying Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus: He's right that Russia's actions have broad precedent in NATO nuclear sharing, but sharing nuclear warheads for Belarusian missiles goes beyond what NATO does now and is a precedent Putin may regret reviving.
You can see Putin's full comments (in Russian) here. They occur in a sit down interview with a journalist. smotrim.ru/video/2586445
We already knew that Russia was moving toward adopting a "NATO-like" nuclear sharing arrangement with Belarus by modifying some Belarusian aircraft to carry nuclear weapons and transferring Iskander ballistic missiles. This is nothing new.
One little aspect of the Iran-Saudi deal really struck me: Iran's continuing missile strikes against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia really seem to have exerted coercive leverage over Riyadh. That's probably not a great precedent.
A reminder: Iran has been rocketing the sh*t out of KSA (nominally through proxies in Yemen) since ~2017. The more recent number I could find, from way back in December 2021, was "430 ballistic missiles and 851 drones ... killing 59 Saudi civilians." reuters.com/world/middle-e…
The highest profile strikes included a couple of missile shots at the Riyadh Airport and a missile/drone strike on Aramco facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. *Just imagine if Iran fired ONE missile at JFK airport.* reuters.com/article/us-sau…
Does North Korea have a stockpile of 70 kg of plutonium? Probably. A short thread.
The new ROK Defense White Paper says that North Korea has about 70 kg of plutonium. Not everyone agrees with this estimate. I find it plausible, however. mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/uploa…
There are a bunch of things that go into an estimate like this, including: 1. When did North Korea stop and start the reactor each time it produced Pu. 2. What was the reactor's power level? 3. How often was the reactor "down" during the operating period?
This is the easy part!