1️⃣ No matter the cause of the plane crash, everyone will see this as an act of retaliation and retribution, and the Kremlin won't particularly counteract this view. From Putin's perspective, as well as many among the security and military officials, Prigozhin's death should serve as a lesson to any potential successors.
2️⃣ I see no reason why Putin would need Prigozhin in any capacity after the mutiny. The only question was whether to spare his life: I had no doubt that the Kremlin would gradually remove all geopolitical projects out from under him. After the mutiny, Prigozhin ceased to be a partner of the state and under no circumstances could he regain that status. He was also not forgiven. Prigozhin was only needed for some time after the mutiny to smoothly dismantle Wagner in Russia and move it to Belarus under new leadership.
3️⃣ Prigozhin was not a classic traitor: he did not consciously betray his homeland, but rather "lost his mind," having significant merits from Putin's perspective. The question was whether this would be enough to let him live. The issue here is that even if on a personal level, Putin might have been affirmative (which is not a given), on the state level (as Putin perceives it), it would be a vulnerability. And it was. A lively, energetic, and idea-filled Prigozhin was undoubtedly a walking issue for the regime, embodying Putin's political humiliation.
4️⃣ For a significant portion of the politicized, conservative public, Prigozhin's death is a well-deserved outcome. Even those who sympathized with him largely condemned the mutiny, believing it weakened the regime during wartime (and they are right).
5️⃣ Prigozhin's death is a direct threat to everyone who stayed with him till the end or openly supported him. It's more likely to intimidate rather than inspire protests. So, no special reaction should be expected. There will be indignation, but no serious political consequences.
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Some thoughts about the current situation around the Russian war against Ukraine. I am well aware that this post may unsettle Westerners, anger Ukraine, and its allies, and irritate Russia. But I am not here to please people.
1. The West Drifts Towards Pressuring Ukraine into Talks with Russia: The idea that Ukraine should consider talks has gained traction in the West, though this aligns with a strong intention to prevent Russia from “winning.” While Russia is expected to halt its hostilities, it may still receive tangible concessions, likely involving control over territories it currently holds. Proposals vary on issues such as Ukraine’s NATO membership and security guarantees, but all of these ideas appear irrelevant and unrealistic for both Russia and Ukraine at this time. The key takeaway is that this shift reflects Western fatigue with the war and strategic hesitation in supporting Kyiv’s goal of fighting until “victory.”
2. Western Perception of Zelensky’s Plan as Unrealistic: The challenge now is that the West views Zelensky’s victory plan as unrealistic and appears unprepared—militarily, politically, geopolitically, and financially—to commit to it or accept the risks of further escalation, including nuclear. This split within the West regarding Ukraine is likely to deepen.
3. Lack of Politically Viable Alternatives: Any realistic alternative to Zelensky’s plan would be politically divisive in the West and painful for Ukraine and its supporters, making it difficult for politicians to accept responsibility for it. For now, it is politically safer to maintain the status quo or promote the idea of peace talks, despite understanding that the conditions for such talks do not currently exist. I say this not as a critique of the West but to emphasize what is realistically attainable and what is not.
A few brief thoughts on the situation surrounding the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region.
1/It's now evident that Moscow doesn't have an effective or swift military solution to this situation. Redirecting troops from the main front would mean falling into a well-laid trap. Announcing an urgent mobilization (and it’s not feasible to send new recruits straight into battle) would lead to a conflict with society. I’m not sure Putin is ready for that just yet. This implies that the Ukrainian presence in Russian border regions could persist for months, if not years, and eventually, people may become accustomed to it.
2/According to the latest FOM poll, public anxiety has increased slightly, but it’s not comparable to, for instance, the spike in concern following the mobilization in the fall of 2022. The current numbers are similar to those in March of this year, meaning everything remains within the bounds of routine volatility. While anxiety might continue to rise, it's already clear that there won’t be a sharp increase. Of course, the situation on the ground is different, but it’s too localized to have a significant impact on nationwide sentiment. Moreover, even if there is a sharp spike in dissatisfaction with the authorities within a specific, narrow segment (for example, due to problems with evacuation and so on), the overall trend across the country could still favor the authorities: the Ukrainian attack might actually lead to a rallying around the flag and a rise in anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western sentiments (although it may seem hard to imagine those sentiments increasing further).
Vladimir Putin has proposed his “peace plan” to Ukraine, purportedly to halt the war. Here are several thoughts on this manoeuvre.
1. This is not a peace plan but a series of maximalist demands directed at the West and Ukraine in exchange for ending hostilities. Moscow offers no concessions; there is no scope for compromise.
2. The "plan" is timed to coincide with the Swiss conference starting tomorrow with the intention of devaluing it. One might wonder why Putin would focus so much on an event that is turning out to be less successful than anticipated and is, frankly, failing. Contrary to the popular belief that "Putin has time," he urgently needs to consolidate Russia's military advantage in Ukraine through a "peace process" to render this superiority irreversible, as Russia may lose its military advantage in the coming year. Thus, Moscow views the Swiss conference as an escalating action against Russia, an effort to solidify an anti-Russian stance globally, and the Kremlin is determined to thwart this.
In my recent piece in Foreign Affairs, I argued that nobody in Moscow is looking for an exit strategy from the war; rather, people are prepared to fight as long as it takes. Many interpreted this as a thesis that Moscow will not negotiate with Ukraine or agree to a ceasefire. That is not what I was saying. Here are several points to make my understanding more nuanced: 1/ foreignaffairs.com/russia/russias…
There is no discussion among senior officials in the Kremlin about negotiating with Ukraine or what compromises could be reached with Kyiv or the West. Decision-making on this issue is monopolized by Putin, and many senior officials simply guess what he wants but do not dare to initiate anything. The common belief is that Russia is winning, advancing successfully, and has the upper hand in Ukraine. Hence, they see no point in talking to the West, let alone Ukraine. 2/
Putin does not aim to storm Odessa, Kyiv, or even Kharkiv. First, he lacks the army for that. Second, he does not want to engage in large-scale battles. His strategy is to impose on Ukraine military pressure, diminish military infrastructure, and intimidate locals to coerce Kyiv into surrendering and accepting Russian demands. He will only take what he believes he can, given his limited military capacity and wait when Ukraine falls. 3/
Andrey #Belousov’s appointment as Defense Minister is a direct result of the ongoing conflict between the ministry, as the customer, and the military-industrial complex as the producer (#Shoigu vs #Chemezov/#Manturov). Questioning who won or lost misses the point—#Putin's goal is to enhance arms production effectiveness and optimally meet military needs. In this context, Belousov is a logical choice. 1/5
Importantly, #Belousov will not manage military combat operations; this responsibility will bolster the autonomy of the General Staff. Although the Kremlin confirms that Valery #Gerasimov remains in his post, there are uncertainties about the permanence of his position.2/5
#Shoigu has been appointed Secretary of the Security Council. To understand this move, consider why Putin appointed Dmitry #Medvedev as his deputy at the Security Council in January 2020: to keep him close yet detached from the 'system' where finding an alternative role would be challenging. This appointment also indicates that the actual significance of the Security Council in the hierarchy may not be as great as observers typically assume.3/5
The Federal Penitentiary Service has announced the death of Alexei. However, it remains crucial to await confirmation from his legal team and family. So far, here are my reflections on the matter:
First, politically speaking, it's a difficult truth, but Navalny's decision to return to Russia significantly heightened the risk of a tragic end in prison. Renowned for their austere conditions, Russian penal institutions inflict profound and lasting physical and psychological harm on inmates, effectively maiming their lives and rendering many individuals permanently disabled. Navalny was already vulnerable due to his 2020 poisoning. The harsh detention conditions and cruel treatment he received underscore a deliberate indifference, if not consent, from Putin and the authorities for a dire outcome, employing imprisonment in its most severe form.
Second, following Navalny's return and subsequent imprisonment, along with the complete disbandment of the FBK and the non-systemic opposition, especially after the commencement of the war, there ceased to be any advocates for him within the system. This was not about the possibility of commuting his sentence—as it was widely understood that Navalny would remain incarcerated as long as Putin was in power—but rather about preventing his death and the potential political fallout. Demonstrating compassion towards Navalny was perceived as too perilous and out of sync with the prevailing political climate. Consequently, the deterioration of his living conditions and the systematic undermining of his health went unchecked. Today, there is no grounds to believe that anyone within the system would stand up for him.
Third, I maintain that Putin did not fear Navalny, despite some opposing views, which I do respect. Putin's disdainful perception of Navalny as a minor criminal unworthy of respect and as an adversary manipulated by the West to undermine national and state interests dictated a merciless systemic response, which “programmed” the tragic end. According to my knowledge, Putin admitted that cruel conditions could be fatal for Navalny and dismissed it as a problem. But Putin will have to deal with the consequences of Navalny’s death.