🧵Sometimes it’s worth restating the obvious, so that the “pivot to Asia/China first” crowd hopefully finally gets the message. So here it is: #Russia is allied with #China against the U.S. Hence, #Ukraine’s victory is a defeat for Moscow, but also a defeat for Beijing. 1/7
So those who are calling for cutting off aid to #Ukraine are demonstrating strategic myopia of the first order. The Ukrainians are not only sequencing the two-frontier threats we face. They are buying the West time to rearm. They are grinding down the #Russian land forces. 2/7
As we enter the primaries in the US, partisanship is beginning to supplant sound judgment, without nary a thought given to the loss of US credibility in Asia should we abandon #Ukraine, and the impact #Russia’s victory would have on our alliances in Europe and globally. 3/7
Protecting America’s security is not a kiddie soccer game where you run from one end of the field to the other at will. The US is a quintessentially naval power and to ensure its security and prosperity we need to be forward deployed in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. 4/7
This geopolitical reality is as simple and straightforward as it gets, unless one believes that the US is in terminal decline—and judging by all key indices of power we are not. Does the US need to rebuild its manufacturing base and its defense industry? Yes, absolutely. 5/7
But the reason our Joint Force is too small for two major theaters is not a resource issue—it is so because of policy decisions by a number of administrations over the past three decades. There is no free lunch: We must refocus on rebuilding real exercised mil. capabilities. 6/7
What the “pivot to Asia” school should address is rebuilding our defense industrial base, building up stocks of weapons and munitions. Cutting aid to #Ukraine will not solve this problem, but it will be seen in Moscow and Beijing as America’s defeat. We can’t allow that. 7/End
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🧵An interesting discussion in DC today about what I call a “regionalized security optics” among European @NATO members. NATO has remained largely united politically in its support for #Ukraine, but there are pronounced differences when it comes to appetite for risk-taking. 1/6
@NATO countries along the Eastern flank, from Finland through the Balts, Poland to Romania have a keen sense of the threat Russia poses, and hence they are all in when it comes to building up their military capabilities. They understand the existential nature of the threat. 2/6
As one travels West away from the frontier, the sense of the threat becomes less so, with budgetary priorities other than defense driving gov’t spending decisions. Regional priorities also assert themselves, for ex. focusing South to the Med, away from the Eastern frontier. 3/6
🧵As I watch the war in #Ukraine unfold, it is too soon to pass definitive judgment on the overall performance of the Russian military. It is clear though that the forces RUS will field when this war ends will be different than those that went into Ukraine last February. 1/6
Regrettably, last year the Ukrainian military was not given what it needed to break RUS forces, and Moscow used the time since to build multilayered defenses and to upgrade equipment/logistics. My money is on the Ukrainian military, but it will be a brutal fight going forward.2/6
This is one more reason that we urgently need to supply #Ukraine with precision long-range fires and modern aircraft. And rather than expecting a spectacular breakthrough in short order, we must accept that in a war both maneuver and attrition are part of the same equation. 3/6
🧵I've made this point already, but it's worth repeating: Any US strategy that disconnects the Atlantic theater from the Pacific theater will hurt US credibility and ultimately fail. The argument that we should focus on #Asia at the expense of #Europe is strategic myopia. 1/6
Instead of talking about rebuilding our defense industry and expanding the Joint Force the flavor of the day in DC seems to be "China first" on the premise that any other policy "doesn't reflect reality." My question: Why is securing our national interests somehow unrealistic?2/6
I framed my argument as to why "pivoting to the Pacific" misses the point in this @WSJ piece.👇I would add that those who advocate that we abandon #Europe should be asked what kind of a global end state do they envision as a result of their strategy?3/6 wsj.com/articles/pivot…
🧵As I watch the brutal war unfold in #Ukraine, I need to make the following point for those who believe that somehow the US and its allies have full agency when it comes to what happens there-how it ends. True, since the US is the principal source of aid, we have influence. 1/6
But in the final analysis it is #Ukraine's fight for its sovereignty, for its very survival as a nation. Ukraine is an independent actor with its own interests/priorities. Never forget that it is emphatically NOT (as the Russians have tried to portray it) a US/@NATO puppet. 2/6
I find it odd to say the list that so many armchair strategists presume to prescribe the end game to #Ukrainians or talk about "trading land for peace." I suppose it's easy to draw lines on the map and give away someone else's land. In wonder what if this was their country? 3/6
🧵It is uncanny how many nat'l security analysts cling to the "short war" illusion when it comes to the war in #Ukraine. Throughout history the most bloody and transformative wars were thought of this way. The war in Ukraine is already a long war; it's been ongoing since 2014.1/7
And how many wrong assumptions there were about the relative power distribution in Europe, the strength of the Russian army, and most of all how much Western analysts underestimated the Ukrainians, their morale and their patriotism. There is a lesson here for the future. 2/7
We need to be cautious going forward about our own bias brought into the analysis. Too many analysts have had the "military balance" mentality that looks at capabilities, but neglects geography, distance and most importantly social cohesion & resilience have been in this war. 3/7
🧵I’ve been looking as the relative analytical contributions made by universities, think tanks and research institutes to our understanding of the drivers of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine, including pre-invasion assessments, projected outcomes and how the war would unfold. 1/5
It is striking how largely irrelevant US universities have been to our understanding of the war in #Ukraine relative to think tanks and research institutes. I think one of the principal reasons is the demise of Area Studies expertise at US universities over the past 30 years.2/5
This has been particularly true about American Political Science where Area Studies are no longer a pathway to tenure, pushing academics into a never-ending quest to be “scientific”—with grad schools churning out model-builders at the expense of regional and country experts. 3/5